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Violence at sea has long been a problem for the international community, 
although the nature and preponderance of incidents has evolved over time. This 
issue was dealt with in a cursory manner in the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea and therefore states have had to develop the legal framework 
through other instruments in order to address growing problems of maritime 
violence.  
This thesis examines mechanisms of change in the development of international 
law concerning maritime violence. It considers how international law has responded 
to this threat, and analyses a variety of different law-making techniques. This study 
observes that major international law-making activities concerning maritime 
violence in the recent decades have been in response to international incidents and 
crises, such as the Achille Lauro, the September 11 attacks, and the Somali piracy 
crisis. Counterfactually speaking, such law-making acts would not have taken place 
if these crises had not happened.  
The study also notes another shift of focus in making international rules aiming 
to tackle maritime violence away from customary international law and multilateral 
treaties towards an incremental dependence on United Nations Security Council 
resolutions, International Maritime Organization’s initiatives, regional cooperative 
measures, and treaty interpretation techniques for filling the gaps left in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
With this shift in law-making in mind, the thesis first explores gaps in law 
regarding piracy and terrorism at sea and reviews the negotiation of two major 
maritime terrorism treaties, i.e. the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and its 2005 Protocol. 
Secondly, it then inspects the United Nations Security Council’s law-making 
activities in combating terrorism and piracy. Thirdly, it surveys the creation and 
evolution of the Proliferation Security Initiative and also scrutinises the United 
States-led bilateral ship-boarding agreements for combating transportation of 
weapons of mass destruction. Finally, it compares and contrasts the regional 
approaches across Asia, Africa and Europe in the fight against piracy and armed 
robbery at sea.  
The thesis contends that each of the law-making technique employed in 
fighting maritime violence is not alternative or optional to one another, but rather 
used in a supplementary fashion to the overarching framework of the law of the sea. 
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Maritime Violence and the Coherent Development of International 
Law-Making 
‘Change begets change. Nothing propagates so fast.’ 
Charles Dickens, Martin Chuzzlewit, Chapter 18 (1844). 
‘Through my academic life, I tried to change the law, especially at the 
College. In this vein, I always supported and sought changes in the law 
of the sea.’ 
René-Jean Dupuy (1993)1 
I. Introduction 
This study concerns maritime violence and international law-making in the 
changing world. The issue deserves a thorough analysis for two reasons. First, 
maritime violence is politically-oriented, from its nature and evolution in history.
2
 
Maritime violence has caused profound political and legal problems in the past 
decades, thus it needs to be regulated by international law. There are obvious gaps in 
law for dealing with maritime violence. For example, the well-known Achillie Lauro 
hijacking in 1985
3
 and the recent Somali piracy phenomenon
4
 indicated that new 
                                                     
1 
René-Jean Dupuy (1918-1997), a French international lawyer, this quote derives from Cassese’s 
‘Interview with René-Jean Dupuy: June 1993’, A Cassese, Five Masters of International Law: 
Conversations with R.-J. Dupuy, E. Jiménez de Aréchaga, R. Jennings, L. Henkin and O. Schachter 
(Hart 2011) 23-24.; Lagrange observed that Professor Dupuy’s greatest merit was ‘constantly 
remaining aware of international law as a dynamic system subjected to changes triggered by the 
social system, indeed like any historical phenomenon.’ E Lagrange, ‘The Thoughts of René-Jean 
Dupuy: Methodology or Poetry of International Law?’ (2011) 22 EJIL 425, 431. 
2
 G Simpson, ‘Piracy and the Origins of Enmity’ in M Craven and M Fitzmaurice (eds.) Time, 
History and International Law (Brill 2006) 219.; G Chaliland and A Blin, The History of Terrorism: 
From Antiquity to Al Qaeda (University of California Press 2007) 
3
 See Chapter 3; and for example, MK Bohn, The Achille Lauro Hijacking: Lessons of Politics and 
Prejudice of Terrorism (Brassey's US 2004); A Cassese, Terrorism, Politics and Law: the Achille 
Lauro Affair (Polity 1989); GP McGinley, ‘The Achille Lauro Affair: Implication for International 
Law’ (1985) 52 Tennessee Law Review 691.; GR Constaninople, ‘Towards a New Definition of 
Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident’ (1986) 25 VJIL 723. 
4
 See Chapter 4; for example, JG Dalton et al, ‘Introductory Note to United Nations Security Council: 
Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Resolutions 1816, 1846, 1851 (2009) 48 ILM 129.; B van Ginkel 




rules and cooperative measures needed to be created for filling those legal gaps.  
Second, in a general sense about the nature of law, ‘law must be stable and yet 
it cannot stand still. Hence all thinking about law has struggled to reconcile the 
conflicting demands of the need of stability and of the need of change.’
5
 In a 
specific sense of international law, it has been noticed that ‘whether by treaty or 
custom, general international law is difficult to make or change.’
6
 Likewise, it has 
also been observed that traditional sources doctrine of international law has become 
less suited to the need of the changing international community.
7
  
This research is trying to answer five questions: (1) What are the mechanisms 
of change in the sense of developing international law for tackling maritime violence? 
(2) What are the trigger and catalyst for making laws in the fight against violence at 
sea? (3) What is the trend of international law-making in relation to maritime 
violence? (4) Did the law develop in a coherent way? (5) What lessons can be 
learned from the law-making history in this area?  
In this research, maritime violence covers crimes of maritime piracy and 
terrorism, including the transportation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) at 
sea.
8
 It may seem at the first sight that a concrete concept of crimes of piracy or 
                                                                                                                                                      
Opportunities (Martinus Nijhoff 2010); E Papastavridia, The Interception of Vessels on the High Seas: 
Contemporary Challenges to the Legal Order of the Oceans (Hart 2013) 161-197.; T Treves, ‘Piracy, 
Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) 20 EJIL 399.; D 
Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009) 61-74. 
5
 R Pound, Interpretation of Legal History (CUP 1923) 1. 
6
 L Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (Kluwer Law International 1995) 42. 
7
 W Friedman, The Changing Structure of International Law (Stevens and Sons 1964) 370. 
8
 There is no general accepted definition concerning maritime violence, but piracy and maritime 
terrorism are considered in the scope of maritime violence. MQ Meija, Jr, ‘Defining Maritime 
Violence and Maritime Security’ in PK Mukherjee et al (eds.) Maritime Violence and Other Security 
Issues at Sea (WMU Publications 2002) 27.; S Davidson, International Law and the Suppression of 
Maritime Violence’ in R Burchill et al (eds.) International Conflict and Security Law (CUP 2005) 




terrorism at sea should be defined here; however, there is no need to do that, because 
those available concepts and gaps in existing international law are fundamental 
elements for developing the thesis. They will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
II. Theoretical Framework 
Before proceeding to the general theoretical framework for analysis, it would 
be helpful for clarifying the concept of ‘law-making’ in the first place. The nature of 
international law-making is continuous and no-ending phase, so observed by 
Danilenko.
9
 The reason is straightforward, international law has to reflect the 
changing conditions in the international community. He categorised two general 
ways of law-making for accommodating the changing needs. First, it involves 
law-making in new areas, which indicates issues or problems ungoverned by 
international law. The second way is to ‘reflects the need for a constant upgrading 
and refinement of the already existing law’.
10
 The two ways of international 
law-making do not necessarily exclude one another. For example, to upgrade a treaty 
law like 1988 SUA Convention can also cover new areas regarding the 
transportation of WMD at sea.
11
  
In addition, the term international ‘law-making’ shows a semantic shift in 
literature. Klabbers argues: 
The term ‘law-making’ has come to replace the more 
traditional term ‘sources doctrine’, presumably because 
‘law-making’ carries more dynamic and politically astute 
overtones. ‘Sources’ suggest that the law springs somewhere, 
in much the same way as a river may have its source in a 
mountain stream; ‘law-making’ on the other hand, evokes a 
                                                     
9
 G M Danilenko, Law-Making in the International Community (Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 1. 
10
 Ibid, 1-5. 
11




less pastoral image and is far more suggestive of law being 
man made and, possibly, coming in many different guises.12 
In other words, by using the term international law-making, this study is trying 
to capture more dynamic aspects of the legal development about maritime violence. 
A. Incident and Crisis as Law-Making Trigger  
International incidents and crises have the potential for providing good 
atmosphere for international law-making activities easier and speedier. It is not a 
new idea to say that some of the historic momentum for developing international 
law was based on international incidents and crises.
13
 Charlesworth once made a 
comment that ‘international lawyers revel in a good crisis. A crisis provides a focus 
for the development of the discipline and it also allows international lawyers the 
sense that their work is of immediate, intense relevance.’
14
  
Incidents and crises catch our eyes easily, which means incidents and crises 
facilely capture political figures, diplomats, journalists and international lawyers’ 
attention. Well-known incidents and crises so effortlessly attract everyone’s 
                                                     
12
 J Klabbers, International law (CUP 2013) 40.; this semantic change is represented by, A Boyle and 
C Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP 2007) 
13
 WM Reisman and AR Willard, International Incidents: The Law that Counts in World Politics 
(Princeton University Press 1988); R Withana, Power, Politics, Law: International Law and State 
Behaviour during International Crises (Martinus Nijhoff 2008); WV Genugten and M Bulterman, 
‘Crises: Concern and Fuel for International Law and International Lawyers’ (2013) 44 NYIL 1.; B 
Authers and H Chalesworth, ‘The Crisis and the Quotidian in International Human Rights Law’ 
(2013) 44 NYIL 19.; JM Armaya-Castro, ‘International Refugees and Irregular Migrants: Caught in 
the Mundane Shadow of Crisis’ (2013) 44 NYIL 65.; E Bikundo, ‘Saving Humanity from Hell: 
International Criminal Law and Permanent Crisis’ (2013) 44 NYIL 89.; K Mickelson, ‘Between Crisis 
and Complacency: Seeking Commitment in International Environmental Law’ (2013) 44 NYIL 139.; 
S Kirchner, ‘Effective Law-Making in Times of Global Crisis: A Role for International Organizations’ 
(2010) 2 Goettingen Journal of International Law 267. 
14
 H Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 377. 
However, her opinion was just contrary to the usefulness of crises and incidents in international law. 
She thinks that taking the Kosovo crisis as a case study, the crisis research model contains many 
limitations. For example, the negotiability of facts; the lack of analytical progress, which means to 
analyse a crisis without taking previous crises or relevant incidents into consideration; or to 






 It has been observed, the interest in incidents is hardly novel, the point is 
that most incidents and crises are highly politically oriented.
16
  
International lawyers basically admit that ‘there can never be a complete 
separation between law and policy…the inextricable bonds linking law and politics 
must be recognised.’
17
 Likewise, as claimed by Boyle and Chinkin, that 
international law-making is not purely undertaken by lawyers, ‘It is a political 
activity, which requires above all the political initiative, energy and skill to set the 
process in motion sustain it thereafter.’
18
 Furthermore, as Ranganathan rightly 
observed, ‘the claim that international law is political appears everywhere; the 
difference lies in the perceptions of the character and modes of its politics, and of 
how they relate to international politics per se.’
19
 
In terms of analysing the international political influence from the incidents and 
crises to real law-making process and results, this research takes an idea as the 
starting point: international law is a process of communication among all relevant 
actors involving a series of ongoing authoritative decisions.
20
 This is the approach 
developed by the so called New Haven School, or policy-oriented perspective of 
                                                     
15
 O Gross and FN Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (CUP 
2006) 
16
 WM Reisman, ‘International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International 
Law’ in International Incidents: The Law that Counts in World Politics 3-24,; WM Reisman and AR 
Willard, ‘The Study of Incidents: Epilogue and Prologue’ in ibid, 263-270.  
17
 MN Shaw, International Law (CUP, 6
th
 edition 2008) 11.; KE Whittington et al, ‘The Study of 
Law and Politics’ in KE Whittington et al (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (OUP 
2008) 3.;B Simmons, ‘International Law and International Relations’ in ibid, 187. 
18
 Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International law 103.; Louis Henkin also argued that 
‘law-making is a political activity, the resulting law is determined by political forces in the system.’ 
See L Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (Kluwer Law International 1995) 43.; R Kolb, 
Theory of International Law (Bloomsbury 2016) 279-291. 
19
 Original emphasis, see S Ranganathan, Strategically Treaty Conflicts and the Politics of 
International Law (CUP 2014) 17. 
20
 R Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon 1994) 10.; 
see also J Crawford, ‘Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law’, (2013) 365 Recueil 






 A general feature of this approach is that it does not focus on 
analysis of international rules; instead, it concerns more on how law-making policies 
and legal decisions are made.
22
 Moreover, the New Haven School does not only 
consider the influence of states and state officials to international law-making, it also 
takes international organizations, NGOs, the media, and significant events into 
consideration.
23
 It was based on this general feature that a group of the New Haven 
School scholars took some incidents and crises as an analytical factor for observing 
how specific incidents and crises shape international norms, particularly under the 
context that traditional sources of international law are not fully applicable.
24
  
In considering international law-making, the main concerns of this incident 
analytical perspective draw inferences from international politics and the 
expectations of politically relevant actors.
25
 This incident method, as Falk argued, 
constitutes the discrete interactions between international law and politics,
26
 it also 
‘provides the best available means of comprehending the legislative potential of 
facts in relations to different topics and different geopolitical configurations on a 
local, regional or global scale.’
27
  
                                                     
21
 LC Chen, An Introduction to Contemporary International Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective 
(OUP, 3
rd
 edition 2015) 14-21.; WM Reisman, ‘The Quest for World Order and Human Dignity in the 
Twenty First Century: Constitutive Process and Individual Commitment’, (2012) 351 Recueil des 
Cours, Chapter V. 
22
 WM Reisman, ‘International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication: The Harold D. Lasswell 
Memorial Lecture’ American Society of International Law Proceedings (1981)’ in M Koskennemi 
(ed.) Sources of International Law (Ashgate 2000) 497. 
23
 WM Reisman, ‘Unilateral Action and Transformation of the World Constitutive Process: The 
Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention’ (2000) 11 EJIL 3. 
24
 WM Reisman, ‘International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International 
Law’ in WM Reisman and AR Willard, International Incidents: The Law that Counts in World 
Politics 3, 5.; WM Reisman and AR Willard, ‘The Study of Incidents: Epilogue and Prologue’ in ibid, 
263, 268. 
25
 AR Wllard, ‘Incidents: An Essay in Method’ in WM Reisman and AR Willard, International 
Incidents: The Law that Counts in World Politics 25. 
26
 R Falk, ‘The Validity of the Incidents Genre Feature’ (1987) 12 YJIL 376, 378. 
27




In addition, scrutinising international responses of incidents ‘makes us 
appreciate not only the pervasiveness of law but also its embeddedness in 
geopolitics and its subordination to power dynamics.’
28
 Evaluating the law-making 
potential from incidents in effect helps international lawyers to see international 
law-making and norm-shaping through the lens of political advisers and foreign 
policy makers.
29
 Moreover, to examine the impact of incidents with respect to the 
formation of international law is to equip ‘non-lawyers to discern non-regulative 
functions of international law-for example, the crystallization of a controversy 
through the invocation of legal justifications to articulate opposing claims-as well as 
the play of power variables upon regulative expectations.’
30
 Accordingly, compared 
to other theoretical approaches to the study of international law,
31
 the New Haven 
School approach contains the most dynamic character between law and policy, 
action and reaction, stimulate and response.
32
  
In the study, it shows that incidents and crises are particularly important to the 
development of international law concerning maritime violence. Counterfactually 
speaking, relevant law-making acts would probably not have taken place if these 
crises and incidents had not happened.
33 To sum up, incidents and crises triggered 
                                                     
28
 Ibid, 380. 
29
 Reisman, ‘International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International Law’ 
5-6.; Resiman and Willard, ‘The Study of Incidents: Epilogue and Prologue’ in WM Reisman and AR 




 See SR Ratner et al ‘Symposium: Method in International Law (1999) 93 AJIL 291.; P Allot et al, 
Theory and International Law: An Introduction (BIICL 1991); I Scobbie, ‘Wicked Heresies or 
Legitimate Perspectives? Theory and International Law’ in MD Evans (ed.) International Law (OUP, 
2
nd
 edition 2006) 83.; PF Diehl and C Ku, The Dynamics of International Law (CUP 2010); P Allot et 
al, Theory and International Law: An Introduction (BIICL 1991) 
32
 H Saberi, ‘Yale’s Policy Science and International Law: Between Legal Formalism and Policy 
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the political and law-making forces for stimulating change in the fight against 
maritime violence. 
B. Relevant Incidents and Crises 
There are two sets of incidents that have driven law-making in relation to 
maritime violence in the last two decades: increases in piracy and terrorism at sea.   
Whilst piracy has a long history,
34
 it has resurfaced in recent years as a major 
challenge for maritime law enforcement. In particular, Somali pirates have caught 
our eyes in the past decade.
35
 Geopolitically, the waters of Indian Ocean and the 
Gulf of Aden are considered as critical sea lanes of communication (SLOC) that link 
Europe and the Middle East.
36
 Over 20,000 ships a year pass this SLOC with 12% 
of the world’s oil supply,
37
 and hence it stimulated the great powers and shipping 
industry to calculate the economic cost.
38
  
It may be a bit difficult to identify which incident was serious enough to let the 
international community start to pay attention to the gaps of international law in 
dealing with pirates. However, there were two incidents which made international 
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The first one was World Food Programme ships attacked by Somali pirates in 
2007, and that incident was explicitly mentioned in the UNSC resolution 1816.
39
 
The second one was the French luxury yacht Le Ponant attacked and boarded by 
Somali pirates in April 2008.
40
  
At the peak of the Somali piracy phenomenon, it was estimated that Somali 
piracy cost the international community over one billion US dollars a year from 
increased insurance premiums, freight expenses, and the cost of rerouting ships to 
avoid shipping through some dangerous areas.
41
 The shipping insurance rates have 
risen to 20,000 US dollars per voyage in 2009, and this is a forty fold increase 
compared to year 2008.
42
 
A report published in 2011 on the economic cost of Somali piracy found that 
the total money spent in 2011 was between 6.6 to 6.9 billion US dollars, and the 
shipping industry bore 5.3 to 5.5 billion US dollars, which is about 80% of these 
costs The governmental spending on Somali pirates was about 1.3 billion US dollars, 
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about 19.5% of the total cost.
43
 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering also estimated 
that the total ransom money paid to Somali pirates in 2006 was 5 million US dollars; 
25 million US dollars in 2007; 70 million US dollars in 2008; 80 million US dollars 
in 2009; and then 180 million US dollars in 2010.
44
 
But this piracy problem does not only happen in the Gulf of Aden or off the 
coast of Somalia; piratical acts also can be found in Western Africa and Southeast 
Asia.
45
 The latest report issued in 2016 by Oceans Beyond Pirates (OBP) shows that 
the situation in the Gulf of Aden area is getting better in 2015; the piracy attacks in 
Southeast Asia also in steep declines in 2015. However, the Gulf of Guinea in West 
Africa has become the most dangerous place in facing pirates at the same time. It 
found that the economic cost in Western Indian Ocean, including the coast of 
Somalia was 1.32 billion US dollars, 73% of which was borne by shipping industry, 
other expenditure was shared by navies. In the Gulf of Guinea, the economic cost 
was about 719.6 million US dollars, 61% of the cost was borne by the shipping 
industry, and naval expenditure was about 276 million US dollars. In the Southeast 




As alluded above, these incidents and the cost of piracy made the UNSC take 
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action and it has issued more than a dozen resolutions for fighting the problem.
47
 In 
addition, some incidents occurred in Southeast Asia which also made regional states 
reached the ReCAAP in 2004 for dealing with regional piracy problem.
48
 
While the above survey indicates that serial incidents and crises reflect the 
inner motive for international law-making in relation to maritime piracy, the 
economic and cost consideration has been deep within the political actions. However, 
international responses to terrorism were different because relevant actions reflected 
more political and strategic thoughts, simultaneously with the lead of the US. 
It is not necessary for present purposes to comprehensively discuss and define 
the concept of maritime terrorism,
49
 but rather it is sufficient to illustrate three 
different types of maritime terrorism incidents.
50
 The first is the Achille Lauro type, 
which was about some terrorists conducted internal hijacking activity on the high 
seas. This incident and gaps in the law resulted in the creation of the SUA 
Convention in 1988.
51
 The second is the USS Cole type, which was a US warship 
attacked by terrorist bombing in a Yemen’s port, solely under a state’s sovereignty. 
The third is the So San or BBC China type,
52
 which represents some legal gaps in 
interdicting ships transferring WMD on the high seas. The So San and BBC China 
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incidents let the US established the PSI in 2003.
53
 
One significant factor should be noted that there was no such a speedy political 
willingness or international law-making response about terrorist activities during the 
Cold War, especially compared to the numbers of relevant legal documents issued 
after the 911 incident.
54
 In fact, the law-making speed was never as quick as how 
and what the UNSC did for responding the 911 incident.
55
 This kind of heavy 
weight intervention to combating international terrorism and counter-proliferation of 
WMD would be unthinkable during the Cold War. In other words, a bigger picture 
of international law-making about maritime violence has been under the context of 
the 911 terrorist attacks in the past decade. This phenomenon reinforces the theme of 
this study that there is a changing dynamic between politics and law, thus illustrates 
the reality that ‘politics is much closer to the heart of the system than is perceived 
within national legal orders, and power much more in evidence.’
56
  
C. Gaps in Law  
Gaps in law are naturally about the motivation, incentives or practical problems 
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in law. As Lauterpacht queried,  
In what, then, does the peculiarity of the question of gaps 
in international law lie?...They are the scarcity and 
indefiniteness of substantive rules of international law 
as the result of the comparative immaturity of the system, 
of the scarcity of precedent, both judicial and in the 
practice of States, and of the imperfections of 
law-creating and law-amending process.57 
 The purpose here is not going to conceptualise what the gap or silence in law 
is or what legal ambiguity or uncertainty is about. It may do so in terms of different 
cases and scenarios.
58
 For example, in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 
whether that case produces a ‘non liquet’ situation once aroused some ICJ judges 
and commentators’ debates.
59
 This Latin term literally means ‘it is not clear’.
60
 
Why it is not clear? Because the Court stated:  
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However, in view of the current state of international law, 
and of the elements at its disposal, the Court cannot 
conclude definitely whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme 
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival 
of a State would be at stake….’61   
Accordingly, gaps, lacuana, silence, non liquet, ambiguity, or uncertainty,
62
 
etc., all are terms used in legal scholarship for describing some elements are missing 
in law. Sometimes the missing is purposeful, because in diplomatic negotiation, 




In other words, the objective here is simply to depict a fact: with the 
stimulation of international incidents and crises, the first natural response is to check 
whether we have sufficient international law to deal with it. A basic distinction is 
that, for example, in the Achille Lauro incident, there is no provision in UNCLOS or 




On the contrary, in some of the anti-whaling activities on the high seas, whether 
those protesters are pirates or not, would be another question.
65
 On this issue, 
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UNCLOS provides guidance in Article 101(a), which says that ‘any illegal acts of 
violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the 
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft.’
66
 It means that the law 
is there, the key is how to apply and interpret the term ‘for private ends’ into facts.
67
 




 In terms of maritime piracy, there are laws regulating piratical acts. It is a 
crime regulated by customary international law and codified in Article 22 of the 
1958 High Seas Convention
69
 and UNCLOS Article 110,
70
 thus the piracy 
contention is more about interpretation of the definition. In other words, the piracy 
terms used in treaty law are no different to customary international law.  
However, some relationships are not as clear as the piracy case illustrated. For 
example, there is no specific provision in UNCLOS regulating maritime terrorism 
issues, whether the crimes of maritime terrorism or any interdiction measures have 
been crystallised as customary international law in the making of 1988 SUA 
Convention and 2005 SUA Protocol would be interesting to discover. To this end, it 
needs to illustrate some basic relationship between treaty and custom. Also, a 
theoretical structure for conducting analyses in this thesis should be explained. 
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III. Changing Mechanisms for International Law-Making 
The conventional beginning for the discussion of international law-making is 
the ICJ Statute Article 38,
71
 which lists international conventions, custom, general 
principle of law, judicial decisions, and teachings of publicists as the sources of 
international law. The sources doctrine is still important in the sense that it is the 
starting point for identifying and applying law. However, these sources must also be 
able to be adapted in order to take into account the new legal challenges and 
unexpected incidents and crises. It is under this context, a changing dynamic of 
utilising other law-making tools and mechanisms is underway. 
This research examines six evolving law-making tools and related mechanisms 
in the fight of maritime violence. They are the basic relationship between treaties 
and custom; the influence of judicial decisions; mechanisms in amending and 
modifying treaties; the hegemonic role of the US in international community; the 
regional approaches in making international law; the use of soft law and some 
international organizations’ efforts.   
A. Law-Making through Multilateral Treaties and Custom 
It has been observed that ‘modern attempts at making the law of the sea have 
sought to establish an international regime of a truly global character that would be 
applicable to all states.’
72
 However, based on the decentralised nature of the 
international legal system and there is ‘no constitutional or jurisprudential bar to such 
                                                     
71
 The most comprehensive analysis on this provision, see A Pellet, ‘Article 38’ in A Zimmerman et 
al(eds.) The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (OUP, 2
nd
 edition 2012) 
731-870.; Cf. J Charney, ‘International Lawmaking-Article 38 of the ICJ Statute Reconsidered’ in J 
Delbruck (ed.) New Trends in International Lawmaking-International ‘Legislation’ in the Public 
Interest (Dunker and Humblot 1997) 171. 
72







 it is important to consider not only the impact 
of treaties and custom to the development of the law of the sea, but also how 
multilateral treaties and custom interact with each other and the reason why they are 
tools for developing universal international law.
74
 
There are four types of relationship between treaty and custom. The first type 
refers to a situation that a treaty simply codifies and declares existing customary 
international law.
75
 Cases of this kind include the 1961 Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations
76
 and the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties.
77
  
The second type refers to some rules and principles which have been 
crystallised as having attained customary law status in a multilateral treaty 
negotiation or preparation process, prior to or by the time of the adoption of that 
treaty.
78
 Lots of this type results from the work of the International Law 
Commission.
79
 For example, even before UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, the 
regime of EEZ had passed into customary international law.
80
 The Court held in the 
1985 Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case that ‘the institution of the exclusive 
economic zone, with its rule on entitlement by reason of distance, is shown by the 
practice of States to have become a part of customary law.’
81
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The third type is the by-product of the second type, which relates to the 
near-agreements of some multilateral treaty-making process. For example, the Court 
suggested in the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the failed 1960 law of the sea 
conference concerning the questions of the breadth of the territorial sea and fisheries 
rights did not prevent the law evolve over time. Therefore, the Court concluded that 
‘after the Conference, the law evolved through the practice of States on the basis of 
the debates and near-agreements at the Conference. Two concepts have crystallized 
as customary law in recent years arising out of the general consensus revealed at that 
Conference.’
82
 In summary, customary international can be crystallised even when 
there was no conclusion reached in a treaty law-making conference.
83
 
The fourth type concerns the situation where a multilateral treaty has entered 
into force, and the non-parties also think it is necessary to apply the treaty rules. 
Then all relevant state practices may be seen as leading the treaty law to become 
customary international law. For example, UNCLOS Article 121 concerning the 
regime of islands have been recognised by the Court as having become customary 
international law in the 2001 Qatar/Bahrain case
84
 and 2012 Nicaragua/ Colombia 
case.
85
 In fact, there are many examples illustrating that some UNCLOS provisions 
have become customary international law.
86
 
In short, having in mind the interaction between treaty and custom would be 
helpful for considering recent international legal development regarding maritime 
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B. The Role of Judicial Decisions 
In terms of international and national courts’ role, some scholars and 
practitioners suggest that when there are some gaps, the courts and tribunals should 
exert their judicial-making role, for preserving the completeness of the legal 
system.
87




One issue should be considered first, whether there is any distinction between 
treaty application and interpretation. A short answer is yes. As argued by Judge 
Shahabudden that ‘since it is not possible to apply a treaty except on the basis of 
some interpretation of it…It seems arguable that the two elements constitute a 
compendious term of art generally covering all dispute’.
89
 Thus logically speaking, 
a treaty must firstly to be interpreted then proceed to the real application stage in the 
context of dispute settlement.
90
  
From a general legal perspective, Reisman defines application of a treaty or 
other international law as ‘the decision function in which prescriptions are put into 
effect in specific instances’.
91
 This is perhaps the reason why courts, no matter 
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international or national courts, do more than apply the law.
92
 When they apply the 
law, judges must also interpret it, especially when the terms or concepts are 
ambiguous or uncertain, such as the requirement of ‘for private ends’ in committing 
the crime of piracy. Therefore, interpretation is seen as a mechanism for developing 
international law,
93




In recent years, there are notable international and national case law concerning 
the interpretation and application of the UNCLOS piracy provision.
95
 Based on this 
reality, to see whether relevant cases are consistently developed and whether through 
the case law that the piracy provision in UNCLOS has been modified, evolved and 
giving it a new meaning,
96
 will also be a theme to this research. Moreover, pursuant 
to VCLT Article 31(2)(a) and (b), ‘any agreement’ relating to the treaty between all 
the parties or ‘any instrument’ which is made by one or more parties can be taken 
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into account for interpreting UNCLOS. In addition to ‘any subsequent practice’ 
provided in VCLT 31(2)(b) as an element for treaty interpretation,
97
 Article 31(3)(a) 
and (c) also provides that ‘any subsequent agreement’ and ‘any relevant rules of 




For instance, in the Navigational Rights case, the ICJ interpreted a term ‘for the 
purposes of commerce’ in a bilateral treaty between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The 
Court ultimately interpreted the term to include practice concerning tourism, and 
suggested that term is ‘capable of evolving, not one fixed once and for all, so as to 
make allowance for, among other things, developments of international law.’
99
 The 




A similar situation was in the Japanese Whaling case, the Court considered that 
the Article VII of the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
as ‘an evolving instrument’, though it did not decide to interpret the ‘lethal methods’ 
should ‘avoid an adverse effect on the relevant stocks’, the basic point is that 
international treaties are likely to evolve over time.
101
 
To sum up, by analysing recent international and national case law in relation to 
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UNCLOS piracy provision, this research will examine whether relevant cases are 
consistent and whether the meaning of piracy has evolved.  
C. The Incentive to Amend and Modify Treaties 
Klabbers observed that ‘treaty revision is a curiously under-analysed 
phenomenon in international law.’
102
 The reason, perhaps, had been illustrated sixty 
something years ago by Lord McNair, ‘As a question of law, there is not much to be 
said upon the revision of treaties’.
103
 No matter how things have changed, McNair’s 
comment still reflects certain reality.
104
 The reason is because that the treaty 
amendment or modification issue ‘is primarily political’.
105
 However, the function 
of treaty amendment or modification is important in the sense that it is a mechanism 
for things to evolve and change in order to meet the new challenges.  
The basic rule of treaty amendment and modification is stipulated by the 1969 
VCLT Articles 39-41,
106
 and whether treaty can be amended or modified mainly 
depending on consent of the parties.
107
 However, according to Kolb, we can 
categorise treaty amendment and modification procedure into two types.
108
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The first is the informal modification through subsequent practice. Even though 
legally speaking, subsequent practice is different from modification;
109
 the second 
type is the formal amendment and modification procedure prescribed by the VCLT 
or by each treaty’s provisions. But the distinction is ‘often very fine’.
110
 It should be 
noted that the International Law Commission has been working on this subsequent 
practice topic for some years.
111
 An informal way of modifying the treaty had been 
drafted in the 1966 ILC Draft article 38 of the law of treaties; it was formulated as 
‘A treaty may be modified by subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
establishing the agreement of the parties to modify its provisions’.
112
  
Kolb explains that this draft article was deleted at the conference for the 
reasons: (1) This rule is customary international rule, and to accept the wording 
‘subsequent practice’ in the treaty could undermine the stability of the VCLT as a 
treaty law. (2) Every state party will all eager to provide their subsequent practice if 
this issue is raised during the potential modification procedure and that may make 
the procedure more complicated.
113
 
Based on this general understanding, this research tries to see whether there is 
possibility or incentive to amend UNCLOS and how this treaty amendment and 
modification mechanism works in relation to UNCLOS and maritime violence.    
D. The Impetus of US Hegemonic Law-Making  
Another mechanism for accommodating changing circumstances depends on 
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great powers or say, hegemons’ law-making intention and law-making activities.
114
 
By its nature, maritime violence concerns highly politicised issues and it has the 
ability to arouse public anxiety. This character makes it easier to get attention and 
responses from the international community. It seems that among great powers, the 
US has been particularly willing to take initiatives and solve the problems in the 
fight agaisnt maritime violence.  
When it comes to the concept of hegemony, it intrinsically touches upon the 
relationship between law and politics again.
115
 Traditional international law pattern 
and obligation is established at the bilateral level of relations between individual 
states.
116
 As Simma understood, bilateralism has shifted to the direction of 
upholding community interest. According to his explanation, this community 
interest could be seen as a ‘consensus be left to the free disposition of States 
individually or inter se but is recognized and sanctioned by international law as a 
matter of concern to all States.’
117
 In fact, one aspect of bilateralism is that in the 
traditional bilateral foreign relations, especially when negotiating a treaty or 
facilitating cooperation, the smaller state is far easier to be influenced or managed 
by great powers. Hence the bilateral form of international law is basically shaped 
and ‘also more receptive to exceptional rules for powerful states’.
118
  
As we can see in many US-led drugs trafficking treaties signed between the US 
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and some smaller states in the Caribbean Sea,
119
 all reflected this pattern. Also, 
under the background of the PSI, the US also signed bilateral ship-boarding treaties 
with less powerful states,
120
 such as Panama, Liberia, Malta, ranked as the top 10 of 
the world’s leading shipping registries.
121
  
Furthermore, just as Rothwell labelled the PSI as ‘multi-unilateralism’,
122
 this 
term more or less described the deeds between the US and the PSI participants, 
Rothwell claimed, ‘the phenomena of multi-unilateralism has been building over he 
past few years.’
123
 On one hand, it was unilaterally announced by the US President 
Bush in 2003 in Poland. But in reality, it has attracted more than 100 states as 
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 Whether this is really unilateralism
125
 in modern international 
law-making will be scrutinised.  
A set of questions in relation to the role of US hegemony in international law 
had been asked and discussed some years ago. The discussion was mainly about 
whether, by its own capability and willingness, the US Hegemony can make some 
fundamental changes for promoting international community’s interests, changing 
customary international law, or doing things unilaterally, etc.
126
 One of the 
interesting answers was ‘it is too early to tell!’.
127
 Hence it might be an opportunity 
for this research to test how the US wield its hegemonic power for making 
international law concerning maritime violence. In short, the focus of hegemonic 
law-making will be on the role of the US.
128
 
E. Regionalism as an International Law-Making Forum 
It should be noted that one clear development of international law-making is 
regionalism, or say, regional approaches to international law-making.
129
 These 
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 and dispute settlement 
mechanism,
133
 etc.  
Regionalism is not something difficult to imagine. Even in the UN Charter, 
‘regional arrangement’ is stipulated in Chapter VIII, from Article 52-54. Base on the 
three provisions, UNSC is empowered a leading role with the coordination and 
cooperation of regional organizations in dealing regional affairs.
134
  
On one hand, regionalism and regional approaches are positive forces in 
developing international law;
135
 however, on the other hand, regionalism may 
undermine universal standards of international law and it may also create barriers to 




A concurring theme would be the fragmentation of international law.
137
 
Regionalism potentially has some ingredients in producing diversity and divergences 
in the sense of international law-making.
138
 Nonetheless, as observed by Crawford, 
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diversity is a ‘less pronounced’ issue in international law.
139
 The rationale behind 
why regionalism deserves attention and analysis in the development of international 
law perhaps is derived from an assumption: ‘an assumption of universality’.
140
  
It has been observed that ‘when the question of regionalism is raised this is 
usually done in order to discuss the question of the universality of international 
law’.
141
 If regional diversity may create conflict of norms and fragmentation in 
international law, it then may jeopardise or carry dangers to the universality of 
international law. This fear of diversity is particularly significant in the sphere of 
human rights law and keeping peace in conflict areas given those values are putative 
universal.
142
 However, as Harrison observed, this fragmented phenomenon in 
relation to law-making is not new,
143
 because the ‘decentralization has always been 
a feature of international law system’.
144
 Following this logic, it is not sensible to be 
suspicious or feared of the phenomenon of regionalism. 
In addition, the ILC Report on Fragmentation explained that the concept of 
regionalism can be seen as a set of approaches and methods for examining 
international law. Among different perspectives of regionalism, one sense of 
regionalism is to considerer it as ‘a privileged forum for international 
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 For example, the environmental norms and rules established under 
UNEP’s regional seas programmes,
146
 the adoption of the 1992 Helsinki 
Convention
147
 and the 1992 OSPAR Convention.
148
 
In fact, regionalism has been established for combating maritime piracy. For 
example, ReCAAP was sign by most of the ASEAN states.
149
 In recent years, 
following the cooperation based on the 2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct,
150
 the 
coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea also signed the Yaoundé Code of Conduct in 
June 2013.
151
 Interesting enough, the two Codes of Conduct were initiated and 
currently are still supported by the IMO. Is the ReCAAP so different compared to 
the aforementioned two Codes of Conduct?  
In terms of its legal nature, ReCAAP is treaty law, the two Codes of Conduct 
are soft law, thus it would be interesting to compare the three regional instruments 
and see how they interact with one another.
152
 Moreover, since regionalism is one of 
the mechanisms for changing and making international law, whether we can confirm 
that the old rules relating to maritime violence are interconnected to the latest 
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normative development, would be an answer to the fundamental hope for universal 
international law.
153




F. Soft Law as Ingredient in International Law-Making 
Dame Rosalyn Higgins observed that ‘the days of the mega international 
treaty-making conference seem over…In the recent years, we have rather seen 
so-called law-making resolutions attempt to fulfil some of the same functions.’
155
 
Her observation is generally echoed by some international lawyers. For example, 
Pellet noticed that ‘no great multilateral conventions have been concluded’
156
 since 
the end of the Cold War. This links to Kolb’s observation, ‘in many areas, the treaty 
has become too burdensome an instrument: long to prepare and to negotiate; 
potentially long to be ratified; uncertain on entry into force; difficult to modify and 
adapt.’
157
 Thus he claims that ‘soft law mechanisms allow the bypassing of some of 
these traps.’
158
 This phenomenon reflects a major change in international 
community: there are increasing numbers of soft law.
159
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What is the essence of soft law and how does soft law function in international 
law-making? First, the essence of soft law is that it is not binding. Second, the nature 
of soft law reflects in the diversity of its usefulness and applicable arena, thus it is 
not easy to make generalisations concerning its real effect. Therefore, it is important 
to give examples for illustrating the legal significance of soft law.  
There are four types of soft law in international law-making.
160
 The first is 
so-called declaratory law-making, which helps to facilitate treaty negotiation. Two 
examples are the most important in this kind: the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights
161
 and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development.
162
 Other examples include International Atomic and Energy Agency’s 
Guidelines and safety recommendations
163
 for amplifying and interpreting the 1994 
Convention on Nuclear Safety,
164
 UNGA resolutions on outer space
165




In terms of its legal effect, the Universal Declaration is expressly soft, neither 
formed as a treaty nor concrete legal obligation was endowed; but it represents the 
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general will of the UN member states’ in upholding the relevant human rights 
provisions specified in the UN Charter.
167
 Therefore, it is reasonable to take the 




In addition, some provisions of the Universal Declaration has become 
customary international law, thus it can be applied in the judicial deliberation 
process by international courts.
169
 Further, it has become the bedrock for 
negotiating two significant human rights treaties, namely, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights
170
 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.
171
 Furthermore, some further human rights treaty law 
negotiations also followed a similar pattern. For example, the 1965 Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
172
 was initiated and 
negotiated following the adoption of several UNGA Resolutions.
173
  
The weight of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
reflects in its impact in all relevant international environmental law arenas. For 
example, the Court directly referred to it in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion.
174
 Further, the UNGA considered it as containing fundamental principles 
with regard to sustainable development.
175
 Moreover, for the reason that it was 
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adopted by consensus, the Rio Declaration represents ‘something of a package deal, 
rather like the 1982 UNCLOS’.
176
 In addition, the Rio Declaring also tried to 
integrate and balance the interests between developed and developing countries, thus 
Principle 7 referred to the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’. 




The second type of soft law relates to the codification and progressive 
development of international law. An example is the adoption of the ILC draft 
articles on the law of state responsibility.
178
 Though it has not become a formal 
treaty law after forty-years codification, collected by the UN Secretary General in 
2007, states refereed to it for no less than 129 cases before international courts and 
tribunals.
179
 Other examples include the identification of customary international 




The third type of soft law concerns subsidiary rules and standards. Because 
some treaty provisions are designed and written in broad and general terms,
181
 they 
need to be supplemented and given some details through annexes, additional 
agreements, protocols, or guidelines for applying those general principles into 
practice. For example, in order to create some degrees of dynamism, UNCLOS uses 
the so-called ‘implied reference’ in the wording of ‘generally accepted international 
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 or ‘competent international organization’
183
 for accommodating the 
potential change of rules over time. The IMO is probably the most significant 
international organization in issuing such rules and standards for regulating 
international shipping
184
 and marine pollution.
185
 
Soft law in this type also includes the 1995 Code of Conduct on Responsible 
Fisheries
186
 and 2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU Fishing),
187
 both were issued by 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and their core function is to 
implement the 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with Conservation 
Measures on the High Seas
188





These examples illustrate the ways how soft law and hard law interact and enhance 
each other, as Boyle observed, the nature of ‘these instruments may not be legally 
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The fourth type is about the usefulness of soft law in treaty interpretation. It is 
notable in some international case law that the Court admitted the influence of soft 
law instruments in relation to issues of decolonisation and the use of force.
192
 In 
addition, the Court also noted that some international organizations’ non-binding 
recommendations, guidelines and resolutions, once they were adopted ‘by consensus 
or by a unanimous vote,’ they may be relevant for treaty interpretation,
193
 because 
those soft law instruments are within the meaning of VCLT 31(3)(a)and (b).
194
 Also, 
as we have seen from previous discussion, the FAO Code of Conduct on 
Responsible Fisheries and Plan of Action on IUU Fishing can be considered as 
having the same influence to the interpretation of UNCLOS, 1993 Compliance 
Agreement and 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement. Likewise, though Agenda 21
195
 is a 
soft law document and does not amend UNCLOS, it certainly has a continuing role 
in interpreting and implementing UNCLOS. 
Taken together from the aforementioned sections, the thesis intends to highlight 
the relevance of soft law in the coherent development of international law-making 
relating to maritime violence. In addition, the thesis also aims to scrutinise the 
inter-relationship between various law-making techniques. For example, it is 
obvious that UNCLOS provides provisions for regional cooperation in enclosed and 
semi-enclosed seas;
196
 at the same time, it does not confine regional cooperation in 
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hard or soft law forms. Thus a soft law instrument such as the PSI can logically be 
seen as relevant rules of international law in the application or interpretation of 
UNCLOS on security issues at sea. 
 Moreover, UNCLOS Article 311(3) also designs to limit the right and power 
of contracting parties to derogate from the Convention, and provided further 
agreements shall not affect the application of basic principles embedded in it. In 
other words, UNCLOS prevails over later-concluded international instruments if a 
provision is incompatible with the object and purpose the Convention. 
Based on this sense of the coherent development of international law-making, it 
will be illustrated in Chapter 3 and 4 that several UNSC and UNGA resolutions 
concerning terrorism helped to facilitate the 1988 SUA Convention and 2005 SUA 
Protocol’s negotiations and to fill in the gaps of law in relation to maritime violence. 
It will be seen in Chapter 6 that regional arrangements of the ReCAAP, Djibouti 
Code and Yaoundé Code of Conduct do assist the development of maritime piracy 
law within the scope of UNCLOS. 
In short, this study will examine how relevant international organizations 
involve in areas of maritime piracy and terrorism; whether they can offer new 
opportunity for developing customary international law
197
 will also be a subject in 
the thesis. Ultimately, this study endeavours to discover the inter-relationships of 
recent normative evolution and law-making techniques in relation to maritime 
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The thesis is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 covers four major issues. The first is the problem of UNCLOS piracy 
provisions, in which it will identify relevant gaps in law concerning maritime piracy 
and terrorism. Second, it analyses the significance of international and national case 
law, aiming to know whether judicial decisions have potential to fill in legal gaps or 
help to develop the law. Third, it ties to identify legal gaps with regard to maritime 
terrorism. Fourth, it seeks to answer whether the UNCLOS amendment procedure 
will be used in the near future.  
Chapter 3 discusses the multilateral treaty-making process of 1988 SUA 
Convention and 2005 SUA Protocol. It covers three main issues. First, it identifies 
how those treaty provisions came from and identifies their strength and weakness 
separately. Second, it compares the negotiation methods and techniques used in the 
two treaty-making process, it will consider what the lessons can be learned. Third, it 
inspects the most important provision, namely, Article 8bis of 2005 SUA Protocol 
concerning interdiction of WMD at sea, the curiosity is to excavate its significance 
and legal status. 
Chapter 4 moves to the actions made by the UNSC. It tackles three main 
themes. The first centres on the law-making role and past experiences of the UNSC. 
It then deals with the contents of counter-terrorism resolutions. The point is trying to 
discover what can be improved in the future. The third inspects all the piracy-related 
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resolutions. It endeavours to know what the innovations that the UNSC has made for 
fight maritime piracy. 
Chapter 5 considers the role of the US under the context of hegemonic 
law-making in relation to WMD interdiction at sea. It mainly focuses on three 
subjects. The first is the creation, the ingredients and evolution of the PSI. Second, it 
scrutinises the strength and weakness of the PSI and the PSI bilateral ship-boarding 
agreements. Third, it examines whether the PSI has the potential to become 
customary international or not.  
Chapter 6 explores four regional types in the fight of maritime piracy. It begins 
with the evolution about IMO’s involvement in responding to piracy. It then 
discusses the law-making effect of ReCAAP in Southeast Asia. Third, it compares 
and contrasts the similar and different parts of ReCAAP, Djibouti and Yaoundé 
Codes of Conduct. Also, it tries to evaluate if the three approaches can be improved. 
Lastly, it considers some cross-regional interactions and arrangements for 
transferring suspects of piracy and information-sharing.  
Chapter 7 is the final conclusion. The central argument of the thesis is that 
traditional international law-making instruments and mechanism have changed, 
from the focus of customary international law, multilateral treaties incrementally 
moves to rely on UNSC resolutions, IMO’s initiatives, regional soft law measures 
and treaty interpretation techniques for filling gaps left in UNCLOS. 
The thesis contends that the law surrounding maritime violence has been 
developed in a coherent way. In other words, the law-making techniques discussed 
in this research are often used in a complementary fashion, not necessarily applied 









Chapter 2   
Identifying Legal Gaps over Maritime Violence: Judicial Decisions, 
Textual Considerations and Amendment of UNCLOS 
Prince: ‘Seal up the mouth of outrage for a while, till we can clear 
these ambiguities. And know their spring, their head, their true 
descent.’ 
William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet (1595), Act 5, Scene 3. 
I. Introduction 
A Somali pirate was interview by New York Times journalist Gettleman in 
December 2008: 
‘“They can’t stop us,” said Jama Ali, one of the pirates 
aboard a Ukrainian freighter packed with weapons that was 
hijacked in September and was still being held. He explained 
how he and his men hid out on a rock near the narrow mouth 
of the Red Sea and waited for the big gray ships with the 
guns to pass before pouncing on slow-moving tankers. Even 
if foreign navies nab some members of his crew, Mr. Jama 
said, he is not worried. He said his men would probably get 
no more punishment than a free ride back to the beach, which 
has happened several times. “We know international law,” 
Mr. Jama said.’1 
As indicated in the interview above, some pirates are very aware of the 
loopholes regarding international law of piracy. Therefore, in this chapter, it will 
firstly look into the provisions concerning jurisdictional issues about piracy at sea. 
In recent years, there are some international and national case law concerning the 
interpretation and application of the UNCLOS piracy provisions
2
 in prosecuting 
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 and anti-whaling activists.
4
 Accordingly, it then proceeds to scrutinise 
whether international and national courts have contributed to the development of 
law in this field. While there are basic elements of maritime piracy provided in 
UNCLOS, no such a maritime terrorism concept can be found in UNCLOS. The 
focus of the second part will then be shifted to the analysis of the gaps in relevant 
provisions concerning maritime terrorism. The third section consists of the 
discussion on whether the international community needs to go to amend UNCLOS 
and whether it is worth doing for ultimately solve the problem. 
II. Maritime Piracy and Gaps in UNCLOS: Implications of International and 
National Case Law 
Logically speaking, the first step for any law enforcement and implementation 
activity is to identify those applicable laws and how the process goes. When the 
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international community got confused about what the legal tools are and what can be 
used for dealing with pirates, states and experts not only tried to identify relevant 
international rules
5




A. The Problem: Piracy at Sea 
Pursuant to UNCLOS Article 101: 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act 
of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or 
the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, 
or against persons or property on board such ship or 
aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in 
a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of 
a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it 
a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating 
an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b). 
As a matter of treaty law, only those states that ratified the 1958 High Seas 
Convention
7
 are bound by the following definition, which is very close to the 
UNCLOS definition, Article 15 of the High Seas Convention provides: 
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Piracy consists of any of the following acts:  
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
   (a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, 
or against persons or property on board such ship or 
aircraft; 
   (b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in 
a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;  
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of 
a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it 
a pirate ship or aircraft;  
(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating 
an act described in subparagraph 1 or subparagraph 2 of this 
article. 
From the definitions provided above, piracy contains four elements: (1) Any 
illegal acts of violence or detention or depredation; (2) For private ends by crew of 
passengers; (3) On the highs seas; (4) Against another ship or aircraft. However, 
there are some noticeable gaps and flaws in UNCLOS provisions. 
These four elements all point to gaps and ambiguities in law. First of all, the 
reference to ‘illegal’ acts of violence is imprecise. Logically speaking, the language 
of UNCLOS Article 105 provides that ‘every state “may” seize a pirate or aircraft, 
or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under control of pirates’.
8
 This indicates 
that the exercise of prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction is only a possibility, not 
a strict obligation.
9
 That also means to prosecute pirates or not is simply a state’s 
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 Even though piracy is a crime generally recognised in the sphere of 
universal jurisdiction,
11
 it still depends on a state’s discretion.
12
 In short, universal 
jurisdiction is ‘an option, not a duty’.
13
 As a result, the real criteria of the ‘illegal’ 
acts should be defined or legislated by domestic laws.
14
 In terms of the law 




Second, there have been different opinions about what constitutes ‘for private 
ends’.
16
 Some argue that political-motivated behaviours cannot be piracy
17
, and 
some suggest that it just reflects the rule that governmental ships cannot commit 
piracy.
18
 This debate is important because it involves the possibility that 
environmental activists could be considered as pirates at sea, and this issue will be 
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discussed further later.  
Third, to state that piracy can only occur on the high seas is problematic.
19
 
This urged the IMO and ReCAAP to create the phrase ‘armed robbery against ships’, 
which means piratical crime within a coastal state’s territorial sea.
20
  
Fourth, the two-ship requirement means that internal hijacking cannot be 
piracy.
21
 This was the situation happened in the Achille Lauro terrorism incident.
22
 
Based on this general understanding, the next section aims to check whether 
existing case law has contributed to the development of law. 
B. International Case Law 
As some experts argued, prosecuting maritime pirates and terrorists is difficult, 
and it does reflect the reality in exiting cases.
23
 Since there are only a few cases 
judged by international courts and tribunals concerning the offence of piracy based 
on international law, these cases certainly deserve more attention by international 
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lawyers. In the following section, two international cases will be examined first. 
1. Arctic Sunrise Case 
The first case and dispute about prosecuting pirates is the Arctic Sunrise case. It 
is the No. 22 case listed in the ITLOS, and later on referred to the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (PCA).
24
 The background of the dispute was about the Greenpeace 
International’s protest action in the Arctic in September 2013. It was between the 
Netherlands and the Russian Federation. Part of the dispute was whether the Arctic 
Sunrise’s protest against the fixed platform Prirazlomnaya was piratical and terrorist 
acts. At the beginning of boarding the ship and arresting crew members from the 
Arctic Sunrise in the exclusive economic zone of Russia, the Russian government’s 
position was that the protest of the Arctic Sunrise was suspected of piracy and 
terrorism.
25
 So the Tribunal had to examine whether those activities were sufficient 
to be counted as piracy or terrorist. 
The Tribunal firstly quoted the UNCLOS Article 101 concerning the definition 
of piracy. It then clearly stated that ‘an essential requirement of Article 101 is that 
the act of piracy be directed “against another ship” and yet ‘the Prirazlomnaya is not 
a ship. It is an offshore ice-resistant fixed platform.’
26
 The Tribunal noted that even 
Russian President Putin and his human rights adviser Mikhail Fedotov both stated 
that those activities ‘are obviously not pirates’, and that ‘there isn’t the slightest 
justification for accusing the crew of the Arctic Sunrise of piracy’.
27
 Having 
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considered the law, the facts and the aforementioned statements, the Tribunal 
concluded that it ‘need not consider the other elements required to show piracy 
within the meaning of Article 101.’
28
 In other words, because it is clear that there is 
no such two-ship requirement, arguing that the activities were piracy would not be 
sensible. However, as the dispute was about the element of one ship ‘against another 
ship’, it makes no further room for considering other elements of piracy stipulated 
by UNCLOS Article 101. Consequently, the Tribunal did not clarify any specific 
issues. 
When it comes to the offence about maritime terrorist, some news agency and 
the Russian Coast Guard reported that the Arctic Sunrise was a threat of terrorist 
attack, though the crew members were never charged with terrorism offences.
29
 
While the Tribunal mentioned the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (‘SUA Fixed 
Platforms Protocol’ as abbreviated by the Award), it did notice that the Protocol 
empowers states to take enforcement measures within a 500-metre zone around an 
installation or structure of a fixed platform if there are reasonable grounds to suspect 
vessels engaging terrorist offence. Nevertheless, the Tribunal said that ‘there is no 
right to seize or board vessels in the EEZ in relation to such offences where such 
action would not otherwise be authorised by the Convention’.
30
  
On the other hand, the Tribunal also considered whether there was reasonable 
grounds for Russia to take preventive action against any possible future terrorist 
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attack on 19 September 2013.
31
 Based on the facts and evidence the Tribunal 
examined, it ruled that the intention and ways that the Arctic Sunrise protested were 
clearly not about terrorist threats, hence it concluded that ‘there were no reasonable 
grounds for the Russian authorities to suspect the Arctic Sunrise of terrorism and 
therefore any purported suspicion of potential terrorism could not provide a legal 
basis for the measures taken by Russia’.
32
 
The method the Tribunal adopted to examine the evidence about whether the 
Arctic Sunrise was acting and intending to do terrorist attack was simple. Based on 
Greenpeace’s several statements that the protest would be ‘non-violent’ and that the 
Russian authorities ‘were aware of the likelihood of a protest action by the Arctic 
Sunrise at the Prirazlomnaya’,
33
 the Tribunal ‘does not accept that there were 
reasonable grounds for the Russian authorities to consider that, on this particular 
occasion, the Arctic Sunrise intended to resort to terrorism to achieve its ends.’
34
 
Precisely speaking, there were no convincing subjective intention and no objective, 
factual performance to show that terrorist attacks had been implemented by the 
Arctic Sunrise. 
In short, on the one hand, the Arctic Sunrise case does touch upon the meaning 
of piracy and the possible interpretation of terrorism. On the other hand, based on 
the factual activities of the Arctic Sunrise and its intention to utilise the non-violent 
protest at the Prirazlomnaya, the Tribunal did not have to interpret the provisions of 
UNCLOS or the SUA Convention and Protocol. Despite that it is a good judgment, 
it unfortunately neither adds anything new nor develops the law concerning 
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maritime piracy and terrorism. In other words, it is irrelevant for filling or clarifying 
gaps such as what constitutes ‘private ends’. 
2. Enrica Lexie Case 
The second case is the Enrica Lexie case,
35
 which is disputed between Italy 
and India
36
 about an Italian-Flagged oil-container ship equipped with Italian Navy 
marines. On 15 February 2012, two fishermen were shot dead by two marines 
around 20.5 nautical miles off the Coast of India. The Indian authority arrested the 
two marines and charged them with murder and homicide under the Indian Penal 
Code in the first place.
37
  Later in January 2014, India decided to charge them by 
invoking SUA Convention. However, Italy protested that it would associate this 
incident with a terrorist affair. So after about three months, India dropped the SUA 
charges
38
 and downgraded the charges from murder to violence, which would avoid 
the two marines facing the death penalty.
39
  
The disputed issues include, for example, whether the situation and condition 
can satisfy the requirement of ‘urgency’ in the context of provisional measures;
40
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whether Italy has exclusive flag state jurisdiction or India has coastal state 
jurisdiction over the case and the two marines;
41
 whether the two marines enjoy 
functional immunity;
42
 or whether the use of vessel protection detachment (VPD) is 
lawful under international law.
43
 However, none of these issues are relevant to the 
central question in this chapter, namely, does it help to clarify the gaps in UNCLOS 
in relation to piracy and terrorism at sea? 
In fact, we may only discover that the whole incident was developed under the 
counter-piracy scenario, and as Del Vecchio argued, it is difficult to claim that those 
acts of piracy in the Indian Ocean are considered as terrorist threats.
44
 In other 
words, these potential or possible piratical behaviours by the Indian fishing boat St. 
Anthony in the Enrica Lexie case should thus be placed within the ambit of 
international piracy law, and the financial gains of the piratical actions then should 
be seen as ‘private ends’. 
Italy maintains that the incident took place at approximately 20.5 nautical miles 
off the coast of India;
45
 the Indian High Court of Kerala and the Supreme Court also 
confirmed that ‘the place of occurrence would be within the Contiguous Zone of 
                                                                                                                                                      
22QIL 25. 
41
 A Del Vecchio, ‘The Fight against Piracy and the Enrica Lexie Case’ in L del Castillo (ed.) Law of 
the Sea, From Grotius to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Liber Amicorum Judge 
Hugo Caminos (Brill 2015) 397. 
42
 N Ronzitti, ‘The Enrica Lexie Incident, Law of the Sea and the Immunity of State Officials Issues 
(2013) 22 IYIL 3.; V Eboli and JP Pierini, ‘Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel Protection 
Detachments and Immunity Issues: The Enrica Lexie Case’ (2012) 51 MLLWR 117. 
43
 C Schofield, ‘Arming Merchant Vessels: Enhancing or Imperiling Maritime Safety and Security’ 
(2014) 2 Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law 46.; M Tondini, ‘Some Legal and 
Non-Legal Reflections on the Use of Armed Protection Teams on Board Merchant Vessels: An 
Introduction to the Topic’ (2012) 51 MLLWR 7.; CR Symmons, ‘Embarking Vessel Protection 
Detachments and Private Armed Guards on Board Commercial Vessels: International Legal 
Consequences and Problems under the Law of the Sea’ (2012) 51 MLLWR 21.; K Neri, ‘The Use of 
Force by Military Vessel Protection Detachments’ (2012) 51 MLLWR 73.; M Zwanenburg, ‘Military 
Vessel Protection Detachments: the Experience of the Netherlands’ (2012) 51 MLLWR 97. 
44
 A Del Vecchio, ‘The Fight against Piracy and the Enrica Lexie Case’ 408. 
45




India which overlaps with the Exclusive Economic Zone’.
46
 Pursuant to UNCLOS 
Article 33, this is the contiguous zone. However, at the same time, it is also a part of 
the EEZ. Here, the piracy provision can certainly apply to the EEZ according to 
Article 58(2). Moreover, if Article 58, 94, 97 and piracy-related provisions are taken 
into consideration together,
47
 Italy would seem to rightfully enjoy flag state’s 
jurisdiction over the case.
48
 Under such circumstances, it would seem that India has 
no right to exercise coastal state’s criminal jurisdiction over the incident.
49
 
In sum, the above two international cases do not add anything new to the law of 
piracy or maritime terrorism. While this argument may not be completely fair given 
that the Enrica Lexie case is still pending in the PCA as of March 2017,
50
 the real 
disputed issues in both cases had never been surrounded with the gaps or ambiguity 
of the UNCLOS piracy provision. The definition of piracy in applying to the facts is 
relatively straightforward in these two cases. 
In the next section, cases of national courts will be examined to see if national 
courts can be of help in clarifying the meaning of UNCLOS piracy provisions when 
the international cases fail to do so. 
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C. National Case Law 
What concerns this section is those national cases which engaged in 
interpreting the disputed concept ‘for private ends’ in the UNCLOS definition of 
maritime piracy, because this concept elicited the debate about how to distinguish 
environmental activists from terrorism and piracy at sea.
51
  
In Summer 2013, when the oral proceedings of the Japanese Whaling case was 
processing in the ICJ, two of Japan’s counsel, Payam Akhavan and Yuji Iwasawa 
both demonstrated that the environmental activists, i.e. Sea Shepherd’s violent 
sabotage activities against Japan’s whaling ships ‘is of the great relevance to this 
case’. Akhavan stated: 
‘Sea Shepherd’s violent actions have been repeatedly 
condemned by the IWC (International Whaling Commission) and 
the International Maritime Organization. The United States 
Federal Bureau of Investigation has labelled it as “eco 
terrorism”. On 25 February 2013, the United Stated Court 
of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit held that the Sea Shepherd 
attacks against Japanese research vessels are, I quote, 
“the very embodiment of piracy” under international law. 
There is currently an Interpol Red Notice against its 
notorious founder Paul Watson, for multiple charges in 
different countries….A Quick glance at the Sea Shepherd 
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website demonstrates what is a private army used to wage 
war against Japanese research vessels on the high seas,….on 
the first day of the hearing, a Sea Shepherd representative 
spoke to journalists outside this courtroom. He proudly 
claimed that the opening of this case “was a vindication 
of the group’s controversial tactics….Mr. Watson had stated 
publicly, “if Australia or New Zealand…can agree to take 
legal action, Sea Shepherd will agree to back off our 
aggressive tactics.”’52 
Following the same view, Iwasawa claimed that Australia downplayed the 
violence of Sea Shepherd.
53
 While Paul Watson and the participants of the Sea 
Shepherd address themselves as ‘the whale warrior: a pirate for sea;
54
 the use of the 
terms ‘warrior’ or ‘pirate’ is more like campaign slogans rather than meaningful 
application of international law. Meanwhile, how the US Court of Appeal judged the 
case and whether or not its reasoning is convincing are to be discussed. 
The appeal background is that on 19 March 2012, the US Western District 
Court of Washington issued its decision (Sea Shepherd I) about the dispute between 
the Institute of Cetacean Research, a Japan’s research foundation and the Sea 
Shepherd Conservation Society. In the District Curt’s decision, Sea Shepherd won 
the first case, thus the Institute of Cetacean Research appealed the case to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeal. The Appeal Court rendered it decision on 24 May 2013 
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(Sea Shepherd II).  
A major point and dispute was about whether the Sea Shepherd’s activity and 
tactics were considered as piracy, or, to be more precise, are their behaviours 
qualified as ‘for private ends’ under international law of piracy.  
The US Western District Court firstly confirmed that UNCLOS Article 101, 
which reflects customary international law, and represents modern definition of 
piracy. It held that the Institute of Cetacean Research had failed to demonstrate that 
Sea Shepherd’s tactics and activity can be regarded as for private ends. The District 
Court formed their reasoning by stating following points: First, the whalers cite no 
authority that defines private ends.
55
 Second, in the ordinary scenario, maritime 
pirates seek financial gains, and that is the prototypical private end. A related fact is 
that Sea Shepherd is not interested in financial gains.
56
 Third, the District Court was 
aware of none concerning an international consensus on this private ends issue. 
Therefore, the District Court cannot say that there is a universal norm against 
violence in pursuit of the protection of marine life.
57
  
The Appeal Court’s decision was authored by Chief Judge Alex Kozinski,
58
 In 
the first paragraph of the Opinion of the Court of Appeal, he stated: 
You don’t need a peg log or an eye patch. When you ram ships; 
hurl glass containers of acid; drag metal-reinforced ropes 
in the water to damage propellers and rudders; launch smoke 
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bombs and flares with hooks; and point high-powered lasers 
at other ships, you are, without a doubt, a pirate, no matter 
how high-minded you believe your purpose to be.59 
In the Appeal Court’s decision, it also confirmed and reiterated that UNCLOS 
Article 101, also the 1958 High Seas Convention Article 15, provide almost identical 
definition, which means that this definition is the basis for considering the case. The 
Appeal Court’s reasoning can be summarised as follows: First, the District Court’s 
interpretation on what constitutes ‘violence’ and ‘private ends’ was wrong. It 
regarded that the ‘private ends’ is too limited to those pursued for financial 
enrichment. The Appeal Court considered the term ‘private’ is normally understood 
as an antonym to ‘public’, and often connects to matters that are not necessarily 
connected to finance. Second, according to some scholarly works and US case law,
60
 
the Appeal Court thought that the history of piracy law shows that the concept of 
‘privates ends’ implicates acts taken not on behalf of a state. Third, it referred to a 
1986 Belgian case law, the Castle John,
61
 and considered that is the case which had 
held the environmental activism as for private ends. Therefore, it concluded that the 
meaning of private ends includes ‘those pursued on personal, moral, or 
philosophical grounds, such as Sea Shepherd’s professed environmental goals’.
62
 
Fourth, the Appeal Court further interpreted the term ‘violence’, it criticised that the 
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District Court’s interpretation ‘was equally off-base’ and ‘citing no precedent’.
63
 It 
regarded that it is ‘commonsense understanding of the term’ that Sea Shepherd’s acts 




There are a variety of ways to examine whether or not the Appeal Court’s 
reasoning is sensible and convincing. First of all, we need to analyse the Castle John 
case, which was the basis of Appeal Court’s reasoning. The Belgian Court of Appeal 
firstly used the 1958 High Seas Convention Article 15 as the starting point for 
considering whether the ship Castle John owned by Greenpeace, had committed 
piracy or not. The Belgian Court of Appeal considered that the Greenpeace’s object 
of the protest was to alert public opinion regarding the discharge at sea of waste 
products, and ‘those acts were committed for personal ends’.
65
 The Court concluded 
that ‘personal motives such as hatred, the desire for vengeance or the wish to take 
justice into their hands are not excluded in this case’,
66
 it also referred to the 
original decision ‘that the acts in question were committed for personal ends, in 
particular the pursuit by the applicant of the objects set out in its articles of 
association.’
67
 Consequently, those acts were committed ‘purely in support of a 
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Second, it has been deemed problematic to equate private ends to personal ends. 
Therefore, Churchill noticed that the Castle John decision ‘has been strongly 
criticised
69
 and should probably be regarded as incorrect.’
70
 If the Castle John case 
is not a correct decision, then certainly the Appeal Court’s reasoning in the Sea 
Shepherd II case would not be a good one, either. However, Churchill also thinks 
that ‘the perpetrators believe themselves to be serving the public good does not 
render their ends public.’
71
  
Third, to claim those environmental activists as pirates would be going too far 
from UNCLOS drafters’ intention. Hence commentators argued that in the Castle 
John and the Sea Shepherd II case, the two national courts in effect invented a new 
definition of piracy.
72
 This leads to the question about the original meaning of ‘for 
private ends’. A general sense is to exclude the acts of civil-war belligerents, rebels 
and political motivated objects, because ‘all acts of violence lacking State sanction 
are acts undertaken “for private ends.”’
73
 With this logic in mind, a fair argument 
would be that the opposite side of the term private ends would not be political ends 
but public ends. This indicates that terrorists are acting for political ends,
74
 not 
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Nevertheless, the real problem is that ‘there is no realistic possibility of the 
international community redefining the term.’
76
 For this reason, we may either hope 
that there are more and more environmental protests and more cases to be judged by 
national courts across the world, or hope that courts will apply and interpret the law 
in the same direction, avoid producing contradictory decisions; just as Honniball 
rightly observed that ‘current precedents are insufficient to establish a recognised 
definition of “private ends” under international law.’
77
 He noted that if these 
precedents can be followed in the future, then the nature and scope of piracy will not 
‘exclude violent acts perpetrated by individuals from effective punishment merely 
because such actors were motivated by political goals.’
78
  
D. Expecting Future Judicial Dialogue  
To date, neither international courts and tribunals nor national courts have 
contributed to the evolution of international law with regard to maritime piracy and 
terrorism. Moreover, if these cases are rare, there seems to be little hope or effect to 
accumulate those precedents, thus not much expectation should be held towards 
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them in terms of developing the law.
79
  
However, from a positive point of view, this process can be seen as 
international law-making process,
80
 because international courts and national courts 
are making judicial dialogue
81
 from the rare precedents.
82
  
On the one hand, these cases do help accumulate some issues and problems to 
be considered
83
 even if it is quite difficult to discern whether or not courts have 
developed something solid.
84
 Because of these cases, there has been a process of 
communication, be it the communication between the courts and academia, the 
NGOs and governmental officials, or the general public and the media. This process 
incrementally reflects the so-called democratization of international law-making in 
the modern international legal system.
85
   
On the other hand, this process also proves that crises and incidents do matter 
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in forming international law of maritime violence. If there were no such 
controversial incidents illustrated above, it would not be possible to see these 
judicial precedents.  
In short, the real problem is that when the negotiators were drafting the piracy 
provisions of the UNCLOS and 1958 High Sea Convention, there was a lack of 
attention in incorporating future maritime violence scenarios. During that past few 
decades before the rise of Somali pirates, maritime piracy was of little practical 
concern and was deemed ‘a thing of the past’.
86
 Thus it is reasonable that the 
drafters cannot foresee the problem. It so happened that the issue about maritime 
terrorists was also out of imagination during the negotiations.  
III. Identifying Legal Gaps over Maritime Terrorism 
There is no general recognised definition on what is maritime terrorism.
87
 The 
reason is simply because that there is just no general accepted consensus and 
definition about the term ‘terrorism’ in international law.
88
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According to the Appeal Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon relating 
to the crime of terrorism, it said: 
Although it is held by many scholars and experts that no 
widely accepted definition of terrorism has evolved in world 
society because of the marked different views on some 
issues,…..As we shall see, a number of treaties, UN resolutions, 
and the legislative and judicial practice of States evince the 
formation of a general opinio juris in the international 
community, accompanied by a practice consistent with such 
opinion, to the effect that a customary rule of international 
law regarding the international crime of terrorism, at least 
in time of peace, has indeed emerged. This customary rule 
requires the following three key elements: (i) the perpetration 
of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, 
arson, and so on), or threatening such an act; (ii) the intent 
to spread fear among the population (which would generally 
entail the creation of public danger or directly or indirectly 
coerce a national or international authority to take some action, 
or to refrain from taking it; (iii) when the act involves a 
transnational element.89 
While there is no accepted definition on terrorism or maritime terrorism, if we 
apply some connotations mentioned above, certain activities can fit within the scope 
of maritime terrorism
90
: for example, WMD transportation,
91
 the internal hijacking 
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of a vessel at sea (the Achille Lauro),
92
 and the terrorist bombing within a state’s 
jurisdiction (the USS Cole case).
93
 What concerns most in this part is WMD 
transportation, because this activity reflects and reveals several potential gaps and 
ambiguities in UNCLOS. Accordingly, the main purpose of this section is to assess 
and realise these legal gaps before proceeding to the analysis of law-making 
techniques concerning maritime terrorism in the following chapters. 
A. Considerations in the Territorial Sea 
The territorial sea is a maritime zone under a state’s sovereignty not exceeding 
the 12 nautical miles limits set up from the baseline.
94
 However, that sovereignty 
power is not without limitation because the right of innocent passage is an essential 
component in the territorial sea. UNCLOS Article 18(1) firstly indicates that 
‘passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of: (a) 
traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port 
facility outside internal waters; or (b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call 
at such roadstead or port facility.’ Secondly, passage shall be continuous and 
expeditious. Pursuant to Article 19 (1), innocent passage refers to an activity ‘so 
long it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. 
Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other 
rules of international law.’ The meaning of the wordings in this paragraph will be 
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discussed later.  
UNCLOS Article 19(2) stipulates a list, which provides several kinds of 
non-innocent activities, they are: 
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of the 
coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of 
the United Nations;  
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice 
of the defence or security of the coastal State;  
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence 
or security of the coastal State;  
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any 
aircraft;  
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military 
device;  
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or 
person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State;  
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this 
Convention;  
(i) any fishing activities;  
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;  
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of 
communication or any other facilities or installations of 
the coastal State;  
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on 
passage. 
These conditions call for two comments. First, it is not clear whether it is an 
exhaustive list or not,
95
 though Allen opines that this debate is perhaps purely 
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academic because the US and former Soviet Union took the position that Article 
19(2) was an exhaustive list.
96
 It can be seen that there is no specific wording on 
terrorism or transportation of WMD. However, this does mean that there is no 
potential room for taking terrorism-related crimes into the category. 
For example, Article 19(2)(l) provides: ‘any other activity not having a direct 
bearing on passage’. This paragraph is potentially wide enough to be thought as ‘a 
catch-all clause by a costal state inclined to a narrow view of innocence.’
97
 During 
UNCLOS negotiations, this subparagraph was criticised by some states, they 
considered this has an ‘open-ended character’.
98
 Accordingly, coastal states have 
some discretion in determining what constitutes ‘any other activity’ and ‘not direct 
bearing.’ It seems that the phrase is ‘troubling and potentially open to 
abuse…however, there is little practice to suggest that this provision has in effect 
been misused.’
99
 In other words, there is still possibility to abuse this provision; 
however, there is now no evidence to suggest coastal states take pure WMD 
transportation as non-innocent activity. 
Second, commentators generally opine that the nature of innocent passage is 
evaluated by its manner rather than the destination, motive of passage or the type of 
ship.
100
 This understanding is similar to the Court’s judgment in the Corfu Channel 
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Case, in which the Court specified: ‘It remains, therefore, to consider whether the 
manner in which the passage was carried out was consistent with the principle of 
innocent passage’.
101
 This judgement bears a question: whether a coastal state can 
invoke Article 19(2)(a) for rendering a foreign vessel transporting WMD to a third 
state as non-innocent. In fact, there is no record to suggest that a foreign vessel 




1. Peace, Good Order and Security 
Generally speaking, there are two set of terms needs to be interpreted in 
relation to Article 19(1)(2), 21(1), 25(3) and Article 27(1)(b). The first set is about 
‘peace, good order and security’. The second is about ‘other rules of international 
law.’ 
First, by applying common sense, or in the sense of international law to the 
concept of security,
103
 it is pretty natural to take terrorism, proliferation of WMD or 
piracy as threats that could hamper the ‘peace, good order and security’ of a state.
104
 
If it is in the scenario of suicide bombing within the territorial sea, a coastal state can 
exert its power to enforce the law, just like in the port or internal waters. That would 
be as simple as it could be. Article 21 essentially gives rights to coastal states for 
adopting laws and regulations relating to innocent passage, as long as those rules are 
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But if the case is about transporting WMD in the territorial sea of a coastal state, 
that would be difficult to meet the conditions stipulated in those provisions. 
Let us consider whether there is any technique to rightly apply and interpret the 
terms ‘peace, good order, or security’. During the UNCLOS negotiations, there was 
‘no attempt to explain those terms, and this left the determination to the discretion of 
the coastal State’.
106
 This is also depicted by Lowe and Churchill, when they 
discussed the right of innocent passage, they held a similar view that ’the right has 




If there is no any applicable or acceptable interpretation to ‘peace, good order or 
security’, are there some experiences which can be used in clarifying at least a bit 
about the terms? 
In the Nicaragua case, one of the Court’s task was to interpret a 
phrase ’considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interest’ in the 
article XXI of the 1956 bilateral treaty between the US and Nicaragua. The Court 
firstly said that ‘any interpretation or application of the Treaty lies within the Court’s 
jurisdiction’.
108
 Then the Court illustrated: 
It is difficult to deny that self-defence against an armed 
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attack corresponds to measures necessary to protect 
essential interests. But the concept of essential security 
interests certainly extends beyond the concept of an armed 
attack, and has been subject to very broad interpretations 
in the past. The Court has therefore to assess whether the 
risk run by these “essential security interests” is 
reasonable, and secondly, whether the measures presented as 
being designed to protect these interest are not merely 
useful but “necessary”.109 
As the Court found no evidence to prove that the embargo was necessary to put 
upon Nicaragua for protecting those American ‘essential security interests’, thus the 
US was in breach of that bilateral treaty.
110
 In fact, the same ‘essential security 
interests’ issue had been raised and discussed in the Oil Platform case.
111
 Again, the 
US lost the case with a similar reasoning.
112
 
It may be argued that the Court did not establish any criteria for determining 
what the concept ‘essential security interests’ implicates in a general sense. In other 
words, the Court was of no help in clarifying the concept.  
Outside of the use of force picture, for example, pursuant to Article XXI of the 
1994 GATT on ‘security exceptions’, it stipulates: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: 
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any 
information the disclosure of which it considers contrary 
to its essential security interests; or 
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any 
action which it considers necessary for the protection of 
its essential security interests 
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(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials 
from which they are derived; 
 (ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and 
implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and 
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the 
purpose of supplying a military establishment;  
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations; or 
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any 
action in pursuance of its obligations under the United 
Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. 
According to WTO’s Analytical Index and commentators’ explanation, this 
article was designed for striking a balance between a state’s national security concern 
and free trade. As one GATT drafter said, ‘We cannot make it too tight, because we 
cannot prohibit measures which are needed purely for security reasons. On the other 
hand, we cannot make it so broad that, under the guise of security, countries will put 
on measures which really have a commercial purpose’.
113
  
However, as Bossche observed, the reality is that this provision has been 
interpreted broadly by some Members of the WTO; and to date, ‘these expectations 
have never been invoked in any panel of the Appellate Body of the WTO’.
114
 
As a matter of fact, it is naturally no need to clearly define about the concept of 
security or good order. It does not help at all. Nevertheless, it does not mean states 
can interpret the terms arbitrarily.  
In short, there are no criteria to assess whether some transportation of WMD 
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and related materials can be formed as real threats to a coastal state or not. Therefore, 
interpretation and application of provisions about ‘peace, order and security’ mainly 
depends on a state’s discretion. 
2. Other Rules of International Law 
There is another term which needs to be clarified.
115
 In UNCLOS Article 19(1) 
and 21(1), both refer to ‘in conformity with this Convention and other rules of 
international law’.
116
 What does this term ‘other rules of international law’ 
implicate?  
From the negotiation records, it was once drafted as ‘the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’;
117
 therefore, to 
include the UNSC resolutions would be sensible. That is also the general opinion 
shared by commentators.
118
 Thus, the significance of UNSC resolutions on 
terrorism and WMD is one factor that cannot be ignored in combating maritime 
terrorism. 
3. Criminal Jurisdiction 
Another issue is about UNCLOS Article 27 on the criminal jurisdiction on 
board a foreign ship. It may be a bit strange because pursuant to the first and fifth 
paragraph of this provision, they suggest that states ‘should not’ and ‘may not’ do 
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something on board the ship for exert their criminal jurisdiction.
119
 But in the third 
and fourth paragraph, they both provide that states ‘shall’ do something if meet the 
conditions provided in the article.
120
 An explanation is that during negotiation, this 
article was an attempt to strike a balance between the right of the coastal states and 
flag states.
121
 Hence, it is correct to argue that the term ‘should not’ is ‘hortatory’.
122
 
That means coastal states should be cautious and should not do something more than 
the conducts provided in Article 27(1)(a)-(d). And it was confirmed that the 
conducts in the list is ‘exhaustive’.
123
 From the view of avoiding conflict of 
interests between flag and coastal states, Article 27(4) expressly provide that ‘due 
regard’ is required for preserving the stability and interests of freedom of navigation.  
The final point would be whether or not Article 27(5) can be applied to the 
WMD-related transporting activities at sea. Though this paragraph states the coastal 
states ‘may not’ take any steps for ships which are just passing through the territorial 
sea while the crimes have already committed before passing. The tone of the term 
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‘may not’ can be considered hortatory, gentle, and even ambiguous. In reality, this 
kind of phrase does not prohibit coastal states to execute their national laws, if they 
insist. Since the purpose is to strike a balance between the rights of coastal states and 
flag states, it only implicitly tells coastal states that if states insist to do something 
and have understood the meaning of the sentence ‘shall have due regard’ in the 
fourth paragraph, then states concerned should contemplate what the consequences 
may incur.  
Ultimately, if a coastal state does not want to provoke a diplomatic and legal 
dispute with some other powerful states, it may try to ignore Article 27(5). 
Nonetheless, with the legal obligation embedded in the UNSC Resolution 1540,
124
 
it seems that UNSC resolution would supplement the exceptions enclosed in this 
paragraph. In other words, with a stronger obligation imposed by the UNSC 
Resolution 1540, Article 27(5) can be applied to the scenarios of WMD-related 
transportation by sea. 
4. Nuclear-related Ships and Substances 
A relevant question about innocent passage is whether WMD and related 
materials can be managed by UNCLOS Article 22 and 23. Article 22 concerns sea 
lanes and traffic separation in the territorial sea, and Article 23 regulates 
nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear and other dangerous or noxious 
substances. It can be said that the warships which are run by nuclear power had been 
noticed and discussed since the beginning of the UNCLOS negotiation,
125
 because 
such an nuclear-powered warships managed by some great powers have been there 
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for years. It is quite obvious that at that time, again, the focus in the two articles did 
not include non-state actors such as terrorist groups. Not only that there was no 
intention to regulate maritime terrorism but also that UNCLOS simply could not do 
so.  
It is generally understood that terrorists normally do not have access to own a 
ship run by nuclear power. Some related issues concerning those ‘inherently 
dangerous or noxious substances’ transported by merchant ships have been 
examined with the development of different national law, international rules and 
modern technology.
126
 That is to say, the two provisions are in effect quite difficult 
to be applied in real maritime terrorism scenario. Likewise, only when coastal states 
have reliable intelligence would these two provisions be made applicable to 
potential WMD materials transferred under the guise of merchant ships 
5. Straits and Archipelagic Waters 
Lastly, transit passage and innocent passage in the international straits
127
 or 
innocent passage in archipelagic waters and sea lanes
128
 also reflect the principle of 
freedom of navigation, though the two regimes are newly invented by UNCLOS.
129
 
In legal terms, the two regimes have their own separate characters.
130
 However, 
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under the consideration of maritime terrorism, the nature of the rules applied in 
managing transit passage or passage in the archipelagic waters and sea lanes is not 
so much different if compared to innocent passage in the territorial sea.
131
 For 
example, UNCLOS Article 42 empowers states bordering straits by allowing them to 
‘adopt laws and regulations’ in respects of safety of navigation, prevention of 
discharge of oil oily wastes and other noxious substances.
132
  
However, the problem perhaps not just lies in prescriptive jurisdiction,
133
 
because there is this argument that states bordering international straits might not 
have sufficient enforcement power.
134
 For example, Shearer noticed that ‘there is no 
direct prohibition of enforcement measures by the coastal States in straits, nor any 
direct recognition of them’.
135
 He referred to Article 233 together with Article 42 
and 44 and argued that ‘if ordinary territorial seas jurisdiction existed in straits, 
Article 233 would be otiose or at least unnecessary’.
136
 Nonetheless, this ambiguity 
may not be that difficult to solve. If states bordering international straits have 
already legislated their own laws in criminalising some activities into real offences, 
even Shearer concluded that once the passage was not performed as transit passage, 
states ‘might therefore be boarded, and arrested if found to have committed offences 
against the laws of the coastal States which it is entitled to apply to its territorial 
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B. Considerations beyond Territorial Sea 
1. Contiguous Zone 
When maritime terrorism happens in other maritime zones beyond the 
territorial sea, then the situation will become relatively more complex. Fortunately, 
contiguous zone is still not difficult to comprehend in the scenario of terrorist 
bombing or WMD transportation. 
By definition, the contiguous zone is a zone that may not extend beyond 24 
nautical miles.
138
 As it is a part of the EEZ and part of the high sea, freedom of 
navigation is applicable in it. Since UNCLOS Article 33 provides the only provision, 
it seems that the contiguous zone is relatively easy to deal with. In fact, it is ‘less 
straightforward’ for tackling maritime terrorism.
139
 The nature of the contiguous 
zone is a zone set up for ‘security’ consideration.
140
 Nonetheless, because of the 
term ‘security’ was initially considered ‘extremely vague’, hence it was drafted in a 
more concrete way.
141
 That is why the scope of preventing ‘infringement of its 
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations’ was inscribed in 
UNCLOS. 
Taking potential terrorism or WMD transportation activities into account would 
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be both sensible and suitable if only the purpose of security and the nature of the 
continuous zone are taken into consideration, but this leads to the question about 
how the law enforcement authorities proceed in this matter. If there is only tiny 
potential and that the possibility is so low, along with having no reliable intelligence 
on the given ship regarding what is going on there, the coastal states would find it 
difficult to exercise ‘the control necessary’
142
 to the potential crime. Accordingly, 
the control must be limited to ‘inspections and warnings, and cannot include arrest 
or forcible taking into port’.
143
 Other than that, it seems that there is little coastal 
states can do about it.
144 
2. Exclusive Economic Zone 
In the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),
145
 all states enjoy the freedom of 
navigation. the coastal states enjoy sovereign rights for exploring and exploiting 
living and non-living natural resources.
146
 The jurisdiction covers the establishment 
of artificial islands, installations and structures, marine scientific research as well as 
the preservation of marine environment.
147
 Pursuant to UNCLOS Article 58(2), 
some enforcement jurisdiction can be applied to EEZ as long as they are not 
incompatible with the rules stipulated in the high seas part. Also, According to 
Article 58(1) and (2), the EEZ regime imports the high seas freedoms of navigation 
into it. 
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In a maritime terrorist incident such as suicide bombing or a cruise being 
kidnapped in the EEZ, it might be unlikely to enforce criminal laws the coastal states 
have already enacted, and the reason perhaps is that these activities are obviously not 
connected to sovereign rights.
148
 This flaw has contributed to new developments and 




While the recent practice about the right of visit and hot pursuit has been used 
and applicable to the EEZ,
150
 maritime terrorism by its nature is a criminal offence 
under the turf of criminal law.
151
 Therefore, if there is no recognized prescriptive 
jurisdiction granted by UNCLOS to deal with terrorist offences in the EEZ, then it is 
logically inappropriate to enforce national laws to potential maritime terrorism 
offences such as WMD transportation.  
It has been noticed that since the 911 terrorist attacks, a growing number of 
practice indicates that more states have ‘the willingness to interfere with 
navigational rights and freedoms on grounds of maritime security’.
152
 For example, 
Australia tried to establish its ‘Australian Maritime Identification System’ in 2004. It 
was based on the designation of ‘Maritime Identification Zone’, the width of which 
is 1,000 nautical miles from an Australian coastline. The announced purpose of this 
designation is to accumulate all relevant information for protecting its national 
                                                     
148
 Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea 89.; D Guilfoyle, ‘Maritime Interdiction: What 
Challenges Lie Ahead?’ (2014) Revue Belge de Droit International 94, 109-120. 
149
 JM Van Dyke, ‘The Disappearing Right to Navigational Freedom in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone’ (2005) 29 Marine Policy 107, 109.  
150
 For example, see the M/V Saiga case (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and Grenadines v. Guinea); (1999) 38 
ILM 1323. 
151
 A Blanco-Bazan, ‘Suppressing Unlawful Acts: IMO Incursion in the Field of Criminal Law’ in 
Ndiaye and Wolfrum (eds.) Law of the Sea, Environmental and Settlement of Disputes (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2007) 713. 
152




security interests and preventing proliferation of WMD.
153
 As Klein observed, the 
implication of such development is that maritime security threats ‘will only be 




3. High Seas 
On the high seas, freedom of navigation naturally exists.
155
 If the extent of a 
coastal state’s jurisdictional power is characterized as from the highest near the 
shore to almost zero when reaching the high seas,
156
 then logically speaking, the 
extent of freedom of navigation is from almost zero near the coast to the highest 
extent when reaching the high seas.  
Two questions await answers with regards to maritime terrorism on the high 
seas: first, how does UNCLOS address stateless ships if those ships are used for 
transporting WMD? Second, can the high seas regime or the exclusive rights of flag 
states adequately deal with it?  
A stateless ship is defined as a ship ‘sails under the flags of two or more States, 
using them according to convenience, may not claim any nationality…and may be 
assimilated to a ship without nationality’.
157
 In the So San incident,
158
 it was 
initially identified as a North Korean ship and then confirmed it was registered in 
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Cambodia with a different name. The Spanish navy interdicted the ship with 
reasonable suspicion about whether it is stateless or not. This can certainly be 
justified by UNCLOS Article 110.
159
  
The problem or gap is not whether UNCLOS can interdict stateless ships or not, 
but relates to a clear omission that no provision can be used for seizing or detaining 
stateless ships.
160
 The drafters’ consideration has been claimed as ‘difficult to 
understand’.
161
 Moreover, the right to visit or search is only under five grounds:
162
 
piracy, slave trade, unauthorised broadcasting, stateless ships and flying a foreign 
nation’s flag or refuse to show its flag. As such, WMD transportation or potential 
terrorist activity clearly does not serve as a legal ground for utilising the right of 
visit.  
In sum, the object of identifying potential legal gaps concerning maritime 
violence is to reflect some law-making needs in the evolution of the law of the sea. 
The reason why these legal gaps and ambiguities exist is because whe UNCLOS 
was being negotiated, maritime terrorism or terrorist-like scenario was not an issue 
and not a foreseeable problem.
163
 That being said, if these problems stem from the 
original treaty-making process, the question about the likelihood to modify or amend 
the UNCLOS for filling such gaps or clarifying ambiguities thus surfaces. 
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IV. Amendment and Modification of UNCLOS 
There are two general ways to let the UNCLOS being adapted with the changes 
and challenges of new political, scientific and technological developments in 
international society. One way is to use the UNCLOS amendment procedures;
164
 the 
other way is to go through the UNCLOS Article 311(3)
165
 and other treaty 
modification techniques.
166
 This section is not going to deal with the UNCLOS 
formal amendment procedures in detail, because this topic has been satisfactorily 
examined elsewhere.
167
 Rather, the question being examined is the need for 
adjustment or amendment concerning maritime violence. 
A. Risks by Using the UNCLOS Amendment Procedures 
To put it simply, it is not worth using the UNCLOS formal amendment 
procedures, and nor should it be used in the near future.  
It is general consensus that it is ‘unlikely’ and ‘unworkable in practice’ that the 
UNCLOS will be amended by the formal procedures.
168
 In other words, it is not 
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impossible in the sense that nothing is impossible, and since the drafters have 
considered it and wrote it into the treaty, it is always possible. However, as Albert 
Einstein once said: ‘In theory, theory and practice are the same; in practice, they are 
not;’
169
 in theory, it is possible to utilise the amendment procedures, but in practice, 
it is almost impossible to put those provisions in action. 
Commentators generally share the following views that explain why the 
amendment procedures should not be used: First, it would be time-consuming, and 
may jeopardize the integrity and coherence of the balanced maritime interests 
formed by the ‘package deal’ negotiation method. Second, the original political 
consensus and compromises could be undermined by different and selective 
amendment proposals, and it may rouse some original and unnecessary 
controversies again. Third, it could impede the universal ratification of the UNCLOS 
and might threaten the legitimacy and process of the formation of customary 
international law of the sea. Fourth, even if the amendment can be done, it will 




Among all related discussions about the potential risks and usefulness of the 
UNCLOS amendment procedures, Oxman’s analysis deserves a special attention: 
One should not confuse unwillingness to agree with legal 
inability to do so. Nothing in the Convention either 
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requires States to insist on exercising rights or to refuse 
to accept new duties by agreement; in many cases, quite the 
opposite is suggested by the Convention. If there are 
political obstacles to an agreement on the matter, there 
is little reason to believe those obstacles will disappear 
in the context of a negotiation of amendments.171 
In short, formal amendment is almost impossible and should not be used.
172
 
Consequently, we need to find other means to let UNCLOS fitting into the new 
circumstances. 
B. Other Means to Modification 
It is argued that the distinction between treaty amendment and modification is a 
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fluid one. For example, Aust used ‘amendment’ to cover both the concept of 
amendment and modification (i.e. subsequent practice).
173
 In contrast, Kolb used 
‘modification’ to cover formal modification (i.e. amendment) and informal 
modification (i.e. subsequent practice).
174
 While the treaty interpretation through 
subsequent practice
175
 can be distinguished from the concept of treaty modification, 
‘the distinction is often rather fine’.
176
  
There are many examples that can illustrate how the UNCLOS has been de 
facto amended. For instance, the creation of the 1994 Implementing Agreement
177
 
and the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement
178
 are two obvious additions to the UNCLOS. 
The two treaties do in fact ‘change or amend’ UNCLOS.
179
 Other examples include 
the decisions of the Meetings of the States Parties which have effectively made new 
law for managing some procedural and administrative issues such as the judges’ 
election for the ITLOS, the information submission deadline to the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf, etc.
180
 
Under this context, the central question is whether the term ‘may’ in UNCLOS 
Article 105 implicates that the initial pirates-arresting states can transfer those 
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suspects to non-arresting states for later prosecution and sentence.
181
 Some argue 
that there is no such rights embedded in this provision,
182
 but some argue third 





 While there does not seem to have a clear answer in the Virginia 
Commentary,
185
 Roach claimed that those who believe that third states cannot 
prosecute those pirates misread ‘the ILC commentary and its context, which relate to 
enforcement jurisdiction…..the view that cooperation in the suppression of piracy by 
transferring captured pirates to another state for prosecution is entirely consistent 
with international law of piracy’.
186
 In other words, the character of Article 105 has 
been incrementally modified by subsequent state practice; as argued by Buga, ‘this 
represents more than a merely “procedural” change’,
187
 and this development does 
not damage the objects and purposes of the UNCLOS at all.   
In sum, there is no need to amend UNCLOS for creating new rules relating to 
maritime violence. 
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Throughout this chapter, gaps and ambiguities regarding maritime violence 
have been identified. To understand these deficiencies in UNCLOS is a sort of 
precursor and bedrock for proceeding to the next stage analysis about what potential 
international law-making needs will reflect in reality and how those law-making 
techniques can be employed.  
 Existing case law indicates that international and national courts’ contribution 
to the development of maritime violence is limited. In short, perhaps the only thing 
that we should expect is to wait for more judicial dialogue among international and 
national courts.  
This chapter also argues that using the formal UNCLOS amendment 
procedures is almost impossible, thus other modification methods must be 
considered.  
The key point is that interpretation by courts and UNCLOS amendment 
procedure are not the only ways for dealing with relevant legal gaps and ambiguities; 
there is a variety of means for addressing these problems with regard to maritime 
violence. It has been clearly observed in the following chapters that those 
law-making techniques are supplementing, supporting and enhancing one another. 
Therefore, it is necessary to look into other law-making mechanisms and to see what 




Chapter 3  
Multilateral and Diplomatic Processes over Maritime Terrorism: 
Treaties as Law-Making Instruments 
If you go with a raging ulcer to see a doctor, you should not hope for 
much relief if you describe it as a mild stomachache. It is your job 
to have the other side understands exactly how important and legitimate 
your interests are. 
Roger Fisher and William Ury (1991)1 
I. Introduction 
Treaty-making represents one of the traditional ways of international 
law-making.
2
 In filling legal gaps and clarifying ambiguities relating to maritime 
terrorism, the method of making treaties and amending these instruments in a 
multilateral forum have been chosen for developing the law in this sphere. The two 
results are the 1988 SUA
3
 Convention and its 2005 Protocol
4
.  
The following sections contain two parts: the first is about the making of the 
SUA 1988 Convention. The Achille Lauro incident is the key reason for making the 
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 As of 14 March 2017, there are 41 Contracting Parties to the 1988 SUA Protocol, (the combined 
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1988 SUA Convention. Thus it is necessary to know some facts and legal issues 
surrounding the incident. Also, it will consider how the treaty was formulated by the 
so-called ‘sectoral approach’ of counter-terrorism treaties.
5
 It will then investigate 
its strength and weakness.  
The second part aims to understand how the SUA amendment was initiated and 
proceeded. It will also look into the leading role of the United States of America in 
the law-making process. The central feature of the SUA Protocol is that it developed 
a new ship-boarding regime by emulating the 1988 Drugs Convention
6
 and the 
Migrant Smuggling Protocol
7
 of the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime.
8
 Accordingly, how these regimes interact with one another and 
what lessons can be learned from the multilateral and diplomatic process will be 
scrutinised. 
Though UNCLOS did not deal with maritime terrorism and left some gaps in 
law, this chapter shows that the UNGA and UNSC both issued some resolutions and 
guided the direction of further negotiations after the Achille Lauro and 911 incidents. 
At the same time, multilateral treaties have been taken as law-making instruments 
for complementing and supporting other law-making and norm-formulating efforts 
in the fight against maritime terrorism.. 
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II. The Making of the 1988 SUA Convention 
A. The Achille Lauro Incident 
On the first day of October 1985, just about a week before the Achille Lauro 
hijacking, some members of the PLO killed three Israel civilian on a yacht outside 
the coast of Cyprus, the Israel Air Force struck the PLO base in Tunis, Tunisia; and 
about 60 PLO members were killed. Then as thought as a response to the air strike, 





 October, there were four armed young, the youngest was only seventeen 
years old, who belonged to one faction of the PLO; namely, the Palestine Liberation 
Front (PLF). They boarded the Cruise Achille Lauro and tried to kidnap the ship. 
They were surprised and discovered when they were clearing their weapons. For that 
moment, there were at least 97 passengers on board, including twelve American 
civilians. They demanded for the release of 50 Palestinians who were in Israel’s 
prison. On 8
th
 October, because there was no further progress regarding the 
negotiation, they killed an American named Leon Kinghoffer, a Jewish-American 
who can only move from the wheelchair. Later on they dumped the body at the sea.  
On 9
th
 October, the four terrorist surrounded based on an agreement with Egypt, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, for exchanging the passengers’ safety. 
Reagan, the US President immediately asked for extraditing these terrorists back to 
US. For not jeopardising too much of their relationship with the PLO, Egypt allowed 
the hijackers to leave their territory. On 10
th
 October, the hijackers were transported 
by Egyptian aircraft, however, they were intercepted by four US aircrafts and forced 
them to land in Signonella, a NATO base in Sicily island. Although the US 
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government requested to extradite the suspects, it was refused by the Italian 
government. At the end of the incident, four hijackers with other accomplice were 
on trial in the Italian Courts. The hijackers were all released in the past decade by 




The Achille Lauro was flying the Italian Flag when the hijacking was being 
conducted; it was at the location off the coast of Egypt around 30 miles,
11
 equal to 
about 25 nautical miles from Egyptian Port Said. That is to say, it was on the high 
sea. 
The whole incident, the complete political, legal process and multilateral 
negotiation for extraditing the hijackers, including the Italian courts’ judgments, was 
far too complicated than Cassese expected. Therefore, he did a great research on 
relevant governments’ political opinions, legal standing and reasoning; and 
concluded that ‘in times of crisis, states revert to the old individualistic patterns of 
behaviours typical of the period when the community was born, around the Peace of 
Westphalia (1648). It is a sad conclusion’.
12
  
In other words, Cassese reckoned that all the regular rules in managing the use 
of force, piracy, terrorism, extradition were not that useful at all. He may be correct 
based on his research on different aspects of the Achille Lauro incident. However, 
He did not consider and somehow ignored the further influence of the Achille Lauro, 
for developing and making the law with regard to maritime terrorism. That was the 
topic for the IMO to deal with, and the outcome was the creation of 1988 SUA 
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What can be identified firstly regarding the Achille Lauro incident is the so 
called ‘internal hijacking’, as alluded in chapter one. Pursuant to UNCLOS Article 
101(a) (i) and (ii), an offence of piracy consists of any illegal acts of violence of 
detention…on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, persons or property 
outside the jurisdiction of any state. This ‘against another ship’ is nicknamed as 
‘two-ship’ requirement. There was no such a two-ship condition can be met in the 
incident.  
Even if it can, assuming that it was an incident from a terrorist ship against the 
Achille Lauro, it still cannot meet the condition ‘committed for private ends by the 
crew or the passengers’.
13
 Even though at that time, there were some commentators 
thought that modern piracy should broaden its scope to include terrorist acts 
concerning ‘public ends or political ends’.
14
 In sum, the Achille Lauro incident tells 
us that the first gap in UNCLOS relating to piracy is: when the two-ship requirement 
cannot be met in a piratical incident, there is no way to establish the piracy offence. 
B. The Initial and the Final Stage 
In response to the Achille Lauro incident, the President of the UNSC issued a 
statement to criticise the terrorist attack.
15
 The IMO Assembly also passed a 
resolution in November and then established a working group to study measures in 
preventing unlawful acts against ships and crew.
16
 Later in December, the UNGA 
adopted a resolution requesting the IMO to not only recommend measures but also 
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engage actively in preventing international terrorism.
17
 While Italy prepared for the 
first draft for a future treaty in suppressing the unlawful acts against the safety of 
maritime navigation, Austria and Egypt joined the initial drafting process in 
collaboration with Italy. On 25 September 1986, the three states submitted the IMO 




The IMO Council took the proposal and established an ad hoc Committee with 
the mandate for drafting the convention. The ad hoc Committee held two sessions in 
London from 2-6 March 1987 and then in Rome from 18-22 May 1987.
19
 These two 
sessions resulted in two drafts of the SUA Convention and the Fixed Platforms 
Protocol.
20
 The diplomatic conference was held in Rome from 1-10 March 1988. 
According to Plant,
21
 due to limited financial resources, no summary records of the 
diplomatic conference were kept.
22
 However, there is a record of relevant decisions 
and working papers of the conference.
23
  
The negotiation result was 69 participating states signed the Final Act, while 23 
of the 79 participants signed the SUA Convention. One issue should be noted, in 
paragraph 23 of the Final Act, there is a statement showing a compromise between 
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concerned states about SUA Convention Article 4,
24
 it provides: 
In relation to Article 4 of the Convention for Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Navigation some 
delegations were in favour of the inclusion of Article 4, 
paragraph 1, of straits used for international navigation. 
Other delegations pointed out that it was unnecessary to 
include them since navigation in such straits was one of 
the situations envisaged in Article 4, paragraph 1. 
Therefore, the Convention will apply in straits used for 
international navigation, without prejudice to the legal 
status of the waters forming such straits in accordance with 
relevant conventions and other rules of international law.
25
 
It seems that this statement was in attempt to guarantee the applicable law 
of the sea rules that coastal and other states’ rights over the waters of the straits 
are not changed.
26
 In fact, the reason to leave the statement in the Final Act 
was because Saudi Arabia proposed that offences covered in Article 3 should be 
included if committed in international straits. The key issue at that time was 
whether cabotage should be covered, or only navigation beyond the limits of 
the coastal states should be covered.
27
 Those negotiations seemed to reach a 
compromise on this provision, because it excluded cabotage that takes place 
exclusively in the territorial sea of a coastal state. However, foreign ships that 
enter or leave the territorial sea or are scheduled to do so are all covered in the 
treaty. In other words, Saudi Arabia’s proposal about inserting the term 
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‘international straits’ was rejected.
28
  
 In addition to this compromise in the Final Act, there are also some other 
features about the negotiation method worth mentioning.  
C. Ad Hoc Committee and Consensus Law-Making 
As one of the negotiators at the diplomatic conference, Plant noted three 
essential elements during the negotiation. First, the establishment of the ad hoc 
Committee was ‘fortunate’,
 29
 because it helped form a broad range of expertise 
from various legal fields. Thus the ad hoc Committee could emphasise the practical 
aspects of the law by focusing on precedents ‘rather than rewriting the law’.
30
 
Second, with the auspices of the IMO and by embracing IMO’s spirit and function in 
maritime affairs, the negotiation tried to avoid the alignment of political blocs. Third, 
the new treaties were adopted by consensus,
31
 a typical decision-making method 
used in the IMO.
32
  
Consensus does not mean unanimity,
33
 a general understanding of consensus is 
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that it is designed for negotiators to reach a decision but avoid voting.
34
 There are 
many definitions about what consensus means and certain ingredients it contains, 
though the difference is slight in essence.
35
 For example, UNCLOS defines 
consensus as ‘the absence of any formal objection’;
36
 Szasz considered consensus is 
‘taking a decision only when no participant opposes it so strongly as to insist on 
blocking it’;
37
 Berridge defines consensus as ‘an attempt to achieve an agreement of 
all participants in a multilateral conference without the need for a vote and its 
inevitable divisiveness.’
38
 In fact, Sabel observed that in recent practice, ‘the terms 
of “consensus”, “general agreement” or “without a vote” are used interchangeablely’, 
39
 and states ‘regard the three terms synonymous.’
40
 Despite there are numerous 
definitions, the reason why consensus is important in international law-making is 
because it is ‘a state of art emerging from negotiations.’
41
  
The rationale of developing the consensus method in international negotiations 
was captured by Buzan decades ago, he observed that the expansion of members in 
international community has let majority voting increasingly useless for lawmaking 
decision because of the danger powerful alienated minorities. The need is for a 
technique that will ensure very broadly based support for decision in a highly 
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divided system, and it is on this ground that consensus exercises its appeal.’
42
 
However, to utilise the technique of consensus does not indicate that it is impossible 
to take a vote in the decision making process of the IMO or other international 
conferences.
43
 Just rightly as Sabel noted, ‘No treaty-making conference has 
adopted such a pure form of consensus and it appears unlikely that it will be adopted 
in the future.’
44
 Therefore, having rules about voting in any given international 
forum can logically become a threat or incentive to reach consensus.
45
 
In addition, it has been noted that consensus law-making ‘can have powerful 
law-making effect’
46
 if combines with a package deal such as UNCLOS did and if 
that so, new customary international law ‘may come into being very quickly’.
47
 
Hence it would be more sensible to see consensus as ‘a specific form of law-making 
process’
48
 instead of considering it a more effective method of negotiation. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean there are no disadvantages by using the technique 
of consensus. For instance, consensus may slow the negotiation process because 
attempts muse be made to overcome every substantive objection. Also, the result is 
likely not the best solution for tackling challenges. Moreover, if compromise cannot 
be achieved, the product of negotiation may result in a weaker content and 
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In short, having the conception of consensus in mind would help to understand 
how international negotiations proceed in a treaty-making process and in a 
multilateral forum. 
D. Transplanting the Sectoral Approach of Terrorism Offences to the 
Maritime Sphere 
The sectoral approach means that law-makers targeted similar considerations in 
regulating terrorist’s acts and related violence by modelling and transplanting 
existing anti-terrorism treaties.
50
 However, all these sectoral approaches did not 
define the crime of terrorism in international law.
51
 There may be some slightly 
different contents in criminalising terrorist acts, but the central feature of the sectoral 




1. Either Extradite or Prosecute 
In the reasoning of the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite case, the Court 
explained the basic element in this principle is ‘the obligation for the State to 
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criminalize torture and to establish its jurisdiction over it finds its equivalent in the 
provisions of many international conventions for the combating of international 
crimes.’
53
 Therefore, the purpose of the sectoral approach in combating terrorism is 




Although the Court did not explain the relationship between the obligation of 
either extradite or prosecute, it did state that if a Contracting Party adopted 
legislation and criminalised torture, and ‘give its courts universal jurisdiction in the 
matter and make an inquiry into the facts. These obligations, taken as a whole, may 
be regarded as elements of a single conventional mechanism aimed at preventing 
suspects from escaping the consequences of their criminal responsibility, if 
proven.’
55
 The Final Report of the ILC on this topic demonstrates that if the crime 
was committed abroad and ‘with no nexus to the forum State, the obligation to 
extradite or prosecute would necessarily reflect an exercise of universal 
jurisdiction,…if a State can exercise jurisdiction on another basis, universal 
jurisdiction may not necessarily invoke.’
56
 
As explained in the Chapter 2, universal jurisdiction over maritime piracy is an 
option, not a duty. Under UNCLOS Article 105, it only provides that states ‘may’ 
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seize a pirate ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under control by pirates.
57
 As a 
result, prosecuting pirates is not a treaty or customary law obligation.  
Kolb considered the difference between universal jurisdiction and the 
obligation of either extradite or prosecute is often ‘a problem of definition’.
58
 He 
indicated four core differences: first, the either extradite or prosecute is not universal 
but limited to specific treaty; second, universal jurisdiction is ‘a right, an entitlement, 
but the principle of either extradite or prosecute is a duty’
59
; third, universal 
jurisdiction is a title to try, but the either extradite or prosecute obligation is ‘an 
alternative of either trying or extraditing’
60
; fourth, universal jurisdiction only 
applies to a limited category of crime, but the either extradite or prosecute obligation 
is embedded in ‘a larger category of crimes.’
61
 From Kolb’s perspective, if a crime 
must be an offence against the fundamental value of the international community, 
such as the concept surrounding jus cogens or erga emnes norms,
62
 then the either 
extradite or prosecute thus indeed cannot be seen as universal.  
However, he stressed that ‘there is no reason to deny that the universal 
jurisdiction could operate only between the parties to a given agreement.’
63
 In other 
words, the obligation of either extradite or prosecute contains the character of a 
certain extent of universal jurisdiction in terms of its relativity. At the same time, it 
also upholds a compulsory duty along with a somewhat subsidiary nature in 
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 Following this logic, to say that the obligation 
contained in all the related sectoral anti-terrorism treaties is quasi-universal 
jurisdiction would be reasonable.
65
 
In short, when this obligation was being drafted into the SUA Convention 




2. Two Categories of Jurisdiction 
There are two types of jurisdiction in Article 6. One is compulsory, and the 
other is discretionary. Article 6(1) represents the compulsory type; it provides that 
states ‘shall’ take measures to establish its jurisdiction’. Article 6(2) represents the 
discretionary type; it provides that states ‘may’ also establish its jurisdiction over 
offences listed in Article 3. It went on smoothly in drafting the part of compulsory 
jurisdiction, because most of this provision was probably modelled on the Article 5 
of the 1979 Hostage Convention.
67
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On the other hand, certain controversies existed in the discretionary category. 
Article 6(2)(a) was drafted from the Hostage Convention, while Article 6(2)(b) and 
(c) exemplified a compromise on the passive personality and protective principle of 
jurisdiction.
68
 The inclusion of the two kinds of jurisdiction and scenarios 
considered were just the reality happened in the Achille Lauro incident. It could 
simply expect that the US would request for the two types of additional jurisdiction 
basis, and it was later confirmed by Halberstram, the US head delegation to the 
diplomatic conference; that the inclusion of the discretionary jurisdiction was 
necessary to the US.
69
 Halberstram also stated: 
One delegation indicated that it might propose that the 
extradite or prosecute requirement apply only with respect 
to requests by states that assert jurisdiction under 
mandatory provisions and that it is not apply to requests 
by states that assert jurisdiction under the optional 
provisions. Such a proposal, if adopted, would effectively 
vitiate the provisions for optional jurisdiction.70 
 Undoubtedly, some delegations might fear an excessive proliferation of 
jurisdictional basis in agreeing some new rules in the treaty. Before the delegations 
reached that final compromise, the Chairman chose to take a series of indicative 
votes,
71




3. Political Offence Exception 
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Kuwait delivered a proposal borrowed from Article 9 of the Hostage 
Convention, and that would prohibit extradition if the request of jurisdiction was 
based on religion, ethnic questions or political opinions.
73
 This kind of provision is 
denoted as ‘political offence exception’.
74
 This turned out to be quite controversial 
at the diplomatic conference. Kirsch noted that the Eastern European states ‘had 
never liked it’, though they have become parties to the Hostage Convention; he 
further recorded an interaction during the negotiation: ‘The superpowers resisted. 
The Arab Sates found this attitude, particularly the reversal of Western States…and 
threatened to vote against the whole Convention if some accommodation was not 
found.’
75
 The final result was therefore to reject the Kuwaiti proposal but wrote the 
‘shall pay due regard’ wording into Article 11(6).
76
  
In sum, the sectoral approach of transplanting the terrorism related offences to 
the maritime sphere was the law-making method in the negotiation of SUA 
Convention. It was certainly a first step for the law of the sea regime to interact with 
counter-terrorism regimes, and the drafters of the SUA tried to use this method to 
avoid possible conflicts among existing treaties. 
E. National Liberation Movement and State-Sponsored Terrorism 
The relationship between national liberation movements and terrorism or 
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state-sponsored terrorism has been considered to contain both the political and legal 
nature in negotiations concerning anti-terrorism.
77
 Therefore, at the diplomatic 
conference, Cuba firstly proposed that based on the principle of self-determination, a 
paragraph was needed in the Preamble of the Convention to reaffirm the legitimacy 
and struggle of all peoples under colonial, racist or other forms of regimes, ‘in 
particular, the national liberation movements.’
78
  
Later, Algeria submitted another proposal with a similar intention,
79
 but it 
seems that Algeria did not urge to discuss this issue further ‘probably in order to 
avoid creating a divisive problem in an atmosphere where…participating States 
were clearly striving for consensus.’
80
 At the end of the negotiation on this issue, 
none of their proposals were accepted, while the only reference or compromise was 
an insertion of a paragraph in the Preamble, a reiteration of a UNGA resolution.
81
  
Another related issue was the concept of state-sponsored terrorism. Though the 
concept was never clear and potentially extremely broad to include many possible 
conditions, Kuwait suggested before the diplomatic conference that a conditional 
phrase was needed in the offences listed in Article 3(1), ‘even if acting on behalf of a 
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 Saudi Arabia and Nicaragua subsequently proposed adding 
governments as potential offenders.
83
 But the proposals were not accepted for 
negotiation. 
In fact, these proposals could be seen as reflections of political atmosphere in 
different regions at that time. A similar example was that Saudi Arabia and Iran 
introduced proposals about offences for the interference of maritime shipping in 
international straits,
84
 and that was clearly influenced by the Iraq-Iran War during 
1980-1988.
85
 Fortunately, these issues did not hinder the purpose of the negotiation: 
to adopt a treaty reflecting the Achille Lauro incident. Hence those highly 
political-related issues were all either rejected or abandoned at the diplomatic 
conference.  
F. Achievements and Deficiencies 
The conclusion of the Convention comprises 22 Articles. Excluding the 
Preamble, it can be divided into six parts. Articles 1 to 4 concern the definition of 
the ‘ship’ and that of ships not covered in the Convention, maritime terrorism 
offences, and the geographical scope they can apply to. Articles 5 to 16 cover the 
either extradite or prosecute obligation and subsequent jurisdictional basis, including 
custody, inquiry, delivery and extradition procedure. Article 16 is about the dispute 
settlement. Articles 17-22 are about the signature, entry into force, revision criteria 
and procedure.  
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Also, in terms of the contents, the ten Articles adopted in the Fixed Platform 
Protocol are quite similar to the Convention. For example, Article 1 ‘applies to 
Article 5, 7 and 10-16 of the Convention’, and they ‘shall also apply mutatis 
mutandis to the offences set forth in Article 2’ of the Protocol. Article 3 of the 
Protocol is completely identical to Article 6 of the Convention. Compared to the 
Convention, the difference can be seen in Articles 5-10, which emphasize the 
signature, entry into force, and revision procedure. 
If taking stock of the result of the Convention, what has achieved and what has 
not? In terms of the achievements, first of all, it was adopted by consensus, a 
negotiation method used regularly in the IMO but not used in the former negations 
of anti-terrorism treaties. A trait of this consensus law-making method, illustrated by 
the Vice Chairman of the diplomatic conference, was that participating states needed 
not ‘to accept controversial provisions’.
86
  
Second, to a large extent, the Convention solved a major issue occurred in the 
Achille Lauro incident: not only maritime terrorism offences
87
 were made, but also 
the internal hijacking act would not be seen as piracy or something close to piracy, 
and it thus filled the gap left in the UNCLOS piracy provisions. Further, although 
the Convention was not designed for combating maritime piracy, now it can be used 
as a tool for dealing with piratical acts.
88
 
Third, including the additional jurisdiction basis in Article 6(2)(b) and(c) was a 
success, particularly for states like the US, which always have interests ‘in seeing 
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offenders brought to justice.’
89
 
Fourth, it was the first step to take the international law of terrorism into the 
law of the sea, especially when the either extradite or prosecute obligation was 
transferred from other precedents can be reckoned as an achievement. It also 
indicated that the international community was willing to modify the existing law by 
treaty for governing criminal jurisdiction at sea.
90
  
During the negotiation, flaws or regrets might have been foreseen, as 
compromising some terms and conditions might be inevitable. Below are the four 
identified ones. 
First, it seems that there is no solid or strict obligation to extradite the potential 
offenders.
91
 Article 11(2) provides that if one of the requesting Parties ‘has no 
extradition treaty’ with the requested Party, ‘the requested State Party may, at its 
option, consider this Convention as a legal basis for extradition…extradition shall be 
subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State Party’.
92
  
Francioni criticised that the words of ‘at its option’ would give some requested 
states an excuse to avoid extraditing offenders to the requesting state. He considered 
that during the 1960s and 1970s, there were hundreds of terrorists requested in 
extradition, but only a handful of these offenders were actually extradited.
93
 
Although in the scenario of a failed extradition, the prosecution may still be able to 
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be conducted in the national state of the offender, the potential problem is that it 




Second, there is no real obligation to render the suspects for prosecution and 
punishment.
95
 Article 10(1) does provide that to submit the case ‘without delay to 
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution… those authorities shall 
take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave 
nature’.
96
 Francioni contested that this provision ‘leaves ample room for 




Though Treves thought this observation was well founded, he did not think it is 
a critical deficiency in the Convention based on two reasons: first, Article 11 was 
modelled from other anti-terrorism treaties; second, It should take into account the 
reality that most of the judicial institutions in a state ‘is independent from the 
executive power, and that sometimes the prosecutors do not depend on the 
government.’
98
 That is to say, even if this is a loophole, it may not be serious. The 
views of Treves are to be preferred. 
The third deficiency would be that there is no explicit provision indicating the 
exception of the political offences.
99
 It could be argued that according to Article11 
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(3), that extradition ‘shall be subject to other conditions provided by the law of the 
requested State Party’, hence a contracting party would apply their domestic law 




The final deficiency is about the ship-boarding procedure, including the right of 
visit and search, safeguards, etc. None of these issues were brought into discussion 
at the diplomatic conference, probably because the law-making approach was 
emulated from existing anti-terrorism treaties of the aviation sphere. In any event, 
without an adequate enforcement procedure, SUA Convention can only apply to 
maritime terrorism offences after one has been committed. It means that SUA 
Convention does not have deterrent function in preventing maritime terrorism.
101
 
Further, SUA Convention Article 9 provides that nothing ‘shall affect in any 
way the rules of international law pertaining to the competence of States to exercise 
investigative or enforcement jurisdiction on board ships not flying their flag’.
102
 
This shows that the exclusive right of the flag states for exercising legislative and 
enforcement jurisdiction over ships on the high sea has always been reckoned as one 




                                                     
100
 There were two neglected issues which Francioni thought it might be helpful if they had been 
considered at the diplomatic conference. One is the state-sponsored terrorism; the other one is the 
legality of self-help measures to rescue a ship from terrorists at sea. F Francioni, ‘Maritime Terrorism 
and International Law’, 285-287.; D Freestone, ‘The 1988 International Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation’ (1989) 3 International 
Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 305, 311-312. 
101
 IMO Doc LEG 84/6 (13 March 2002), para. 7. 
102
 SUA Convention, art. 9. 
103





The SUA Convention is the first international treaty in dealing with maritime 
terrorism. It thus carries a significant weight in showing that the international 
community at that time was willing to make law in the form of a treaty, filling the 
gap about the internal hijacking, which was not considered and included during the 
UNCLOS negotiations.
104
 While it took the international community as long as two 
and a half years to respond to the Achille Lauro incident by making a new treaty, it 
did fill the gaps by making the SUA Convention. 
 The negotiation process also signified that it was an attempt of letting the 
regimes of anti-terrorism and the law of the sea to interact and learn from each 
other,
105
 thus reduced the potential fragmentation in the development of 
international law.
106
 Though the attitude of the participating states tended to be 
‘rather conservative when it comes to the creation of new rules’,
107
 and most of the 
bold or controversial proposals were either rejected, ignored or never discussed at 
the diplomatic conference, the Convention nevertheless began to stand as a starting 
point for considering all the potential terrorist acts at sea after the year of 1988. And 
that has made all the difference.  
Approximately 18 years later, a new instrument was made to revise the SUA 
Convention. It was initiated by the stimulation of the September 11 attacks. Two key 
questions must ask before analysing the law-making process. Are there any 
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differences in its nature, scope or in the law-making method between making the 
1988 SUA Convention and the 2005 Protocol?
108
 What are the strength and 
weakness of the new provisions?  
III. The Making of the 2005 SUA Protocol 
The day right after the 911 attacks, the UNGA swiftly issued a resolution 56/88, 
condemning the terrorist attacks in the United States; it ‘calls for international 
cooperation to prevent and eradicate acts of terrorism.
 109
 The UNSC also adopted 
resolution 1368 for condemning ‘in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist 
attacks’.
110
 A week later, the UNSC issued Resolution 1373 under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter,
111
 deciding that ‘all states’ shall prevent, suppress and refrain from 
supporting terrorist acts and the financing of terrorism. The UNSC also requested 
‘all states’ to find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational 
information regarding actions or movements of terrorists and its networks, including 
fully implementing the relevant international conventions.
112
  
In late November, the IMO Assembly adopted resolution A.924(22), requesting 
the Maritime Safety Committee and the Legal Committee ‘to undertake, on a high 
priority basis,’ to review and to ascertain whether there is a need to update existing 
international instruments and other relevant IMO instruments for preventing and 
suppressing ‘terrorists acts against ships at sea and in port and to improve security 
aboard and ashore, in order to reduce any associated risks to passengers, crews and 
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port personnel on board ships and in port areas and to the vessels and their 
cargoes.
113
 As a result, it conducted a series of reviews regarding the SUA 
Convention and the 1974 Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), and so 
on. 
A. Initial Considerations and the Role of the US 
As now we see the most important result in the reviewing and law-making 
process is the creation of new maritime terrorism offences and the ship-boarding 
provisions to the SUA 2005 Protocol.
114
 However, this was only a part of the initial 
suggestions.  
The IMO suggested in March 2002 that the first three possible issues needed to 
be considered were as follows: (1) Expanding ‘the offences in article 3 to ensure that 
a wider range of unlawful acts are covered by the Convention in the light of the 
experience of 11 September; (2) Enlarging the scope of application to cover domestic 
cabotage navigation; (3) Strengthening the regulations on jurisdiction and extradition, 




A few days later in the same month, the US submitted its first review opinion to 
the IMO. Likewise, no ship-boarding procedure was suggested, but the US proposed 
to add new offences concerning non-proliferation, harmful substances, piracy and 
armed robbery at sea, taking ships as weapons, etc., to Article 3 of the SUA 
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 Turkey also submitted its proposal to amend the SUA Convention 
but only on the new offences about Article 3.
117
 
During the initial stage of reviewing the SUA Convention, a Correspondence 
Group was established and led by the US.
118
 In August 2002, the US submitted the 
first draft Convention for discussion, and then the ship-boarding issue was raised.
119
 
In the draft Convention, the US stated: 
Such procedures have evolved over the past 14 years, first 
in article 17 of the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, 1988, and more recently in articles 7 to 9 of 
the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea 
and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, as well as the 
recently concluded Agreement Concerning Co-operation in 
Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Trafficking in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean 
Area.120 
With the draft amendments to the SUA Convention and the Fixed Platforms 
Protocol, the real negotiation started at the 85
th
 Session of the IMO Legal Committee 
in October 2002. At the outset of discussing the US draft amendments, most 
delegations expressed their concerns about the draft Article 8bis. It was recorded that 
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this boarding procedure provision ‘involved considerations not only of a legal but 
also of a political kind.’
121
 There were also doubts regarding ‘the potential lack of 
compatibility between the proposed boarding procedures and the principles of 
freedom of navigation and flag State jurisdiction.’
122
 Whether there is any 
‘compelling need of such an article, and the potential for abuse in its practical 
application’
 123
 were also mentioned.  
This boarding procedure suggestion also includes the possibility of adding 
additional safeguards for seafarer’s safety. Furthermore, the issue regarding whether 
other existing treaties could be adapted for use in the SUA context was brought up. 
For example, the delegations specified that the Caribbean Drugs Agreement ‘should 
not be used’ as precedent.
124
 The reason was that neither the unique geographic 
features nor the incapability of many states in the region could be considered the 
legitimate grounds to adopt the Caribbean Drugs Agreement.
125
 
Before the Legal Committee continued to review the SUA Convention, a 
by-product was produced in December 2002, and that is the International Ship and 
Port Facility Code (ISPS Code).
126
 
B. By-product: the ISPS Code 
The IMO held a diplomatic conference from 9-13 in December 2002. It 
updated the Chapter XI-2: Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security of the 
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International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974 SOLAS)
127
 and 
adopted a set of maritime security measures including the ISPS Code, which is the 
most significant technical measure in promoting maritime safety and security. The 
reason why it can be thought as a by-product to 2005 SUA Protocol is that when 
negotiating the Preamble of the SUA Protocol, the IMO Secretariat suggested that 
‘given the fact that the ISPS Code was also developed in response to IMO 
Resolution A.924(22)…to prevent and suppress acts of maritime terrorism, the 
Secretariat also suggests the inclusion of a reference to the ISPS Code in the 
preamble of the draft Protocol of 2005’.
128
 It was then accepted and put into the 
Preamble of the SUA Protocol.  
The ISPS Code is designed to identify potential threats and suspicious acts at 
sea. It applies to passengers and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnages or more, 
including high speed-passenger craft, mobile offshore drilling units and port 
facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages. War ships, 
governmental ships used for non-commercial purpose
129




The ISPS Code is divided into two parts. Part A includes mandatory 
requirements regarding regulations of gathering, assessing and exchanging 
information of security threats, providing means for raising alarms, requiring ship 
and port facility security plans, training drills, etc.
131
 Part B contains 
recommendatory but specific detailed guidelines for teaching contracting parties 
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how to implement Part A. For instance, ways and methods for establishing contact 
points, setting security levels, making port facility security plans, and controlling the 
security measure are provided.
132
  
The objective of the Code is to establish an international framework involving 
close cooperation between contracting parties of the SOLAS. The rationale behind 
these technical measures is to utilise the ‘risk management’ concept, and thus it tries 
to ‘provide a standardised, consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling 




There are some concerns about whether some flag states have the capability to 
comply with the requirements, because states need to spend money in establishing 
facilities, buying equipments and training officers.
134
 However, it has been 
favourably complied.
135
 Accordingly, about ‘86% of ships and 69% of port facilities 
had their security plans approved by the July 2004 deadline, and thus ‘it was a 
source of satisfaction to the IMO…which indicates that the international community 
was not simply paying lip service to the idea of heightened security and compliance 
with the new measures’.
136
 
Although some ships not covered by the ISPS Code may potentially cause 
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difficulties and create loopholes in preventing maritime terrorism, the Code still 
represents a successful example reflecting the shared interest of the international 
community in reducing risks at sea.
137
 
C. Consensus, Voting Procedure and Objections 
The IMO announced on 4 May 2005 that a diplomatic conference will be held 
in the IMO headquarter from 10-14 October for amending the SUA Convention. 
Subsequently, provisional agenda
138
 and rule of procedure were also provided.
139
  
A procedural issue as well as a law-making method needs to be compared in the 
first place before entering into the analysis of the substantial negotiation process. 
The methods used in negotiating the provisions of the SUA Protocol were basically 
identical to the SUA Convention, i.e. consensus. However, according to Rule 34 of 
the decision making procedure at the diplomatic conference, the voting method shall 
normally be ‘by show of hands’. Nonetheless, if requested by any representative, it 
may use the ‘roll-call vote’ by the English alphabetical order of the names of the 
participating states. If this voting method is used, then the result ‘shall be inserted in 
the record of the meeting concerned’. As there is no such a record, so no roll-call 
vote was used at the diplomatic conference.  
According to Rule 32, all matters of substance shall be taken ‘by two-thirds’, 
but on matters of procedure, the rule shall be ‘simple majority’.
140
 It seems that the 
decisions were taken by the two-thirds majority vote, but evidence shows that the 
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final texts of the SUA Protocol was still adopted by consensus while there might be 
some indicative votes taken at the diplomatic conference. Young, a Senior Legal 
Office of the IMO who was also a participant at the conference,
141
 stated that the 
conference did not have the budget to record all the positions of each state. 
Therefore, such records do not exist.
142
 Evidence can also be found from one 
Record of Decisions. In short, in deciding the Final Act of the SUA Protocol, the 
Record shows that the decision was made by consensus.
143
  
Nevertheless, both India and Pakistan did not sign the SUA Protocol.
144
 
Pakistan expressed its pity that the negotiation ‘was conducted in an arbitrary 
manner inconsistent with the UN principles of consensus for negotiating such 
international agreements’.
145
 India argued that as the review process did not address 
its concerns and ‘did not conform to the principle of consensus’,
 146
 and thus ‘it 
could not join the consensus’.
147
 
It was reasonable that India and Pakistan did not sign the SUA Protocol in 
terms of their concern. But it does not make sense to state that the adoption was not 
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made by consensus, or adopted in an arbitrary manner. Moreover, in the last 
sentence of India’s statement, it expressly said that ‘it could not join the consensus’. 
That is to say, the SUA Protocol was certainly adopted by consensus.
148
 
The reason why it was rational for the two states not to sign the Protocol was 
that they have consistently rejected the idea of transforming the nuclear 
material-transporting acts as new maritime terrorism offences into the SUA Protocol 
due to the following three reasons. First, they are not parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
149
 Second, they thought that would 
exceed the mandate of the IMO.
150
 Third, it may hinder their use of merchant ships 
in transporting nuclear or dual-use materials for their civilian power plants. It was 
observed that these few states ‘have cautioned against the temptation to cast the 
IMO Convention in the NPT framework’,
151
 or the way around, ‘through the back 




While Russia also had these concerns about dual-use materials, it issued a 
statement indicating that it ‘maintained its reservations with regard to subparagraph 
1(b)(iv) of its article 3bis, because in its opinion, the definition of the dual-use 
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offence contained is excessively wide and may open for subjective interpretation.’
153
 
Consequently, Russia holds the view that ‘nothing in the article 3bis…gives to any 




Despite it being a heated and highly sensitive issue, it seems clear that the 
diplomatic conference did not put Article 3bis or the whole Protocol to the vote,
155
 
and it was probably because Article 3bis (2) has made clear exemptions to states 
parties to the NPT. In other words, if they can transport nuclear and related materials 
without violating the NPT obligations, and the contents of these statements are not 
contrary to the very idea of the SUA Protocol, then everything will be fine.
156
  
In sum, the SUA Protocol was adopted by consensus with a general sense that 
consensus does not mean unanimity. If other parts of a treaty did not arouse too 
much controversy, the majority can still adopt an instrument by consensus, i.e. 
without going to vote.  
D. New Offences and Political Offence Exemption 
Since the IMO began to review the SUA in early 2002, it took IMO roughly 
three years to negotiate the SUA Protocol before it was finally adopted in October 
2005, and this was longer than the time spent in negotiating the SUA Convention. If 
we calculate the number of negotiation sessions in the Legal Committee, there were 
nine sessions in total, combining delegations discussions and debate sessions 
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To a large extent, most of the substantial concerns were discussed and more or 
less solved before the diplomatic conference was taking place. The Legal Committee 
prepared for procedural rules, conference schedule and draft texts of the Protocol.
158
 
Only a number of political and policy issues needed to be decided at the conference. 
The aforementioned NPT issue was one of them. Other examples include the criteria 
about how many states will be needed for allowing the new Protocol to enter into 
force; draft text of the Article 5(d) of the Article 8bis, and some blank square bracket 
needs to be filled, and so on.
159
  
Major issues in the negotiations can be identified and separated into two lines. 
The first line is about the new maritime terrorism offences and the question of 
political offence exception. The second line is about freedom of navigation, 
ship-boarding regimes interaction, human rights and safeguards, which will be dealt 
later. 
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The negotiation records show that most of the new offences were widely 
supported at its final meeting in April 2005.
160
 The first part of offences such as 
‘uses against or on a ship or discharges from a ship any explosive, radioactive 
material or BCN
161
 weapon in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death or 
serious injury or damage; discharges, from a ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other 
hazardous or noxious substance; uses a ship in a manner that causes death or serious 
injury or damage’,
162
 were relatively easy to reach an agreement, because most of 
the offences are clear reflection to the 911 incident. 
However, some delegations still thought that draft texts were too vague and 
difficult to apply.
163
 Consequently, it can be observed that few states were not 
satisfied about taking a vote for approving the draft text regarding new offences. The 
90
th
 Session Report of the Legal Committee indicates that ‘the Committee approved 
the basic text with majority…a number of delegations were not satisfied with this 
decision, noting there was no consensus and that these issues should be decided by 
consensus rather than by majority vote’.
164
 But the Legal Committee also noted that 
the purpose of approving this draft provision was to narrow the differences so that 
the new treaty can be adopted with as many delegations as possible. 
The second part of offences is about transporting biological, chemical and 
nuclear materials, though this part has encountered some difficulties such as doubts 
concerning the dual-use provision, i.e. Article 3bis (1)(b)(iv). It was suggested by 
some delegations that this part of texts should be put into square brackets for further 
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negotiation, but a majority of delegations approved to remove the brackets.
165
  
The third part is related to Article 3ter and 3quater; the two provisions are 
about terrorist’s motive. No evidence shows that any strong objection was ever made 
to exclude this mens rea component during the negotiation process.  
Another issue was to expressly eliminate the political offence exemption,
166
 
while only few delegations cautioned its removal in the beginning.
167
 The provision 
is modeled from Article 11 of the 1997 Terrorist Bombing Convention
168
 and 
Article 14 of the 1999 Terrorist Financing of Terrorism.
169
 It may be conceived as 
another direct response to the 911 incident. In short, to remove the political offence 
exemption helps fill the gap and clarifies the uncertainty in the SUA 1988 
Convention. 
E. Ship-Boarding Regime: SUA Protocol Article 8bis  
The second line in making the SUA Protocol is about the right of visit and 
search; this boarding activity has been commonly called as shipping interdiction or 
interception.
170
 The nature of it is law enforcement or enforcement jurisdiction at 
sea.  
This Article 8bis is the most important part of the SUA Protocol. It took most of 
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the delegations’ time and energy to discuss, debate and negotiate until the last day of 
the diplomatic conference. As a participant vividly described, the Article 8bis is ‘an 
extremely long article, which in itself, reads like a treaty within a treaty; it has its 
own preamble principles and detailed procedural prescriptions. It really looks like a 
symbol of the irruption of the new times into an old treaty.’
171
  
Article 8bis is designed for the states parties to cooperate and suppress 
maritime terrorism to the fullest extent and shall respond to the boarding requests as 
expeditiously as possible.
172
 Once the boarding request is issued by the requesting 
state, certain information should be provided, such as the name of the suspect ship, 
the IMO ship identification number, the ports of origin and destination, etc.
173
 
When it comes to boarding, the state parties shall take into account the danger and 
difficulties they may encounter when boarding the suspect ship.
174
 It also requests 
state parties to have ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’
175
 a maritime terrorism offence 
has been, is being or is about to be committed.
176
  
A pre-conditional matter before exercising the boarding procedure is to identify 
the nationality of a given ship, i.e. a ship flying the flag or displaying marks of 
registry.
177
 After confirming the nationality of the ship and obtaining information 
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about the reasonable grounds, it proceeds to the exact boarding procedure.
178
 A 
relevant question here is how to know that the information required is enough for 
holding the reasonable grounds to suspect? For example, India argued that the flag 
state may ‘also seek further information if this is deemed necessary’
179
, but the 
Legal Committee considered that this concern ‘was already covered’ in Article 8bis 
(5).
180
 Also, Article 8bis (7) does provide that the requested party can ask for 
‘additional information from the requesting Party’. Therefore, conditions imposed 
on the authorisation process seem enough for not giving the requesting party 
discretionary or arbitrary power to decide the reasonable grounds to suspect. 
If a ship’s nationality is confirmed and reasonable grounds can be established, 
the requesting state shall ask the flag state for authorization. Here the flag state has 
options as listed: it may authorize the boarding, conduct the boarding by their own 
law enforcement mechanism or with the requesting state, or it may subject to the 
conditions of requiring more information, or the conditions about how the boarding 
should be taken.
181
 The options show that the flag state still holds the absolute 
power to manage the boarding procedure. This authorization method is the principle 
boarding procedure. 
Alternatively, upon or after depositing the ratification document to the IMO, 
there are two other ways to authorise the boarding. First, a state party may notify the 
IMO Secretary-General that it would allow authorisation to board, search and 
question persons on the suspected ship if there is no response from the requested 
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state within four hours.
182
 Second, a state party may also notify the IMO 
Secretary-General that it would authorise the boarding.
183
  
To sum up, the nature of the two options is flag state’s prior authorisation. 
However, the primary rule of authorisation, as mentioned above, is still on a 
case-by-case basis. In other words, it does not change the traditional exclusive rights 
held by the flag state over ships of their nationality.   
The geographical application of the SUA Protocol is a maritime zone ‘located 
seaward of any State’s territorial sea’.
184
 Although it does not expressly indicate 
whether the place is on the high seas or the EEZ, this does not seem to be an issue, 
because the Protocol provides that state parties ‘shall take due account of the needs 
not to interfere with or to affect the rights and obligations and the exercise of 
jurisdiction of coastal States in accordance with international law of the sea’.
185
 In 
the Preamble of the Protocol, it expressly acknowledged the importance of 
UNCLOS and customary international law of the sea. On the other hand, according 
to UNCLOS 58(2), the EEZ contains the nature of the high seas.
186
 If a state does 
not declare their EEZ, then area outside the territorial sea is to be deemed as high 
seas, hence no need to write the EEZ or the high seas wording in the text. 
Another question is related to the four-hour time limit. When negotiating about 
whether it should include a time limit for receiving the confirmation of a suspect 
ship’s nationality, some delegations suggested that ‘unless a clear time limit was 
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established, legal uncertainty would arise as to what the requesting Party would be 
entitled to do in the event an answer was not received’.
187
  
China doubted this time limit scheme, stating that ‘since the time zones and 
infrastructures of countries vary from each other, it is unreasonable and 
impracticable to set a uniform time limit’.
188
 While the majority of delegations 
supported China’s reasoning, they also indicated that ‘if the absence of reply was 
interpreted as an authorization to board, this would be unacceptable to many 
delegations, since such an authorization in many jurisdictions could only be granted 
by the courts of the flag State’.
189
 As a consequence, this time limit proposal for 
automatic authorization was rejected. Nevertheless, the four-hour tacit acceptance 
scheme was compromised, drafted and adopted at the diplomatic conference as one 
of the alternative options for authorizing the boarding.
190
  
On the one hand, no matter which authorization option of the boarding 
procedure a state party chooses, the flag state has the exclusive rights over the 
suspect ship even if the requesting state has detained it. On the other hand, the flag 




During the negotiation, it was noted that pursuant to Article 6 of the SUA 
Convention, there might be a potential jurisdictional conflict between a state (or 
states) which has rights for prosecuting the maritime terrorists and the other state (or 
states) which may also claim that it has jurisdiction, arguing that there are some 
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victims of its national. As a result, it was necessary to regulate about which state in 
question ‘should have the primary right to exercise its jurisdiction’.
192
 Nonetheless, 
the Legal Committee also took some possible situations into account, ‘in which it 
would be more sensible to allow the intervening State-or a third State-to exercise its 
jurisdiction’.
193
 The purpose is to avoid unnecessary conflicts in competing 
jurisdiction for prosecution.  
One of the major concerns after states started to negotiate the new boarding 
procedure was the use of force and subsequent safeguards,
194
 particularly when 
some boarding scenarios over maritime terrorists may be quite serious and 
unpredictable. These concerns were most reflected by opinions of NGOs,
195
 such as 
the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the International Shipping Federation 
(ISF) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
196
 
Take the ICFTU for example. It reminded the correspondence group that the 
1995 Fish Stocks Agreement
197
 provides ‘The degree of force used shall not exceed 
that reasonably required in the circumstances’.
198
 Also, it suggested that the Legal 
Committee should consider the Judgment of the M/V Saiga (No.2) case, which 
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adjudicated that ‘the use of force muse be avoided as far as possible and, where 
forces is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the 
circumstances’.
199
 The final result of the provision provides that the use of force 
‘shall be avoided except when necessary to ensure the safety of its officials and 
persons on board, or where the officials are obstructed in the execution of the 
authorized actions. Any use of force pursuant to this article shall not exceed the 
minimum degree of force which is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.’
200
 
The US noted that in drafting the SUA Protocol, the objective was to seek a 
balance ‘between security concerns with the human rights of seafarers and the 
legitimate interests of the shipping interests by providing enhanced protection for 
innocent seafarers and carriers’.
201
 These safeguards include, for example, general 
principles in taking due account of the need not to endanger the safety of life at sea
202
 
and not to prejudice the commercial or legal interests of the flag state.
203
 They also 
comply with applicable international human rights law
204
 and apply measures 
environmentally sound under circumstances.
205
  
In addition, they ensure the master of a ship is known of the intention to aboard 
the ship.
206
 The other set of safeguards is connected to issues of state 
responsibility.
207
 For example, if there is no sufficient evidence to prove the grounds 
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for boarding, or such measures are unlawful or are exceeding the proportionality 
based on the available information, the state taking those measures shall be liable for 
any damage, harm or loss.
208
 
The final provisions of the Article 8bis provide that state parties are encouraged 
to develop procedures for joint operations, and states ‘may conclude the agreements 
or arrangements among them to facilitate law-enforcement’.
209
 Commentators 
interpreted that these agreements or arrangements could let the US maintain the 




On the one hand, Article 8bis is a comprehensive new ship-boarding regime in 
suppressing maritime terrorism, and it is believed that ‘if (Article 8bis is) adopted, it 
will create new international law’
211
 for boarding foreign ships suspected of 
conducting maritime terrorism. However, on the other hand, even the US, the first 
initiator and the most important advocate of this Protocol, also considered that ‘the 
boarding procedures do not change existing international maritime law and or 
infringe upon the traditional principle of freedom of navigation.’
212
 
In short, SUA Protocol is certainly a new treaty law in suppressing potential 
maritime terrorists, but the question is, how different it is if we compare with other 
existing treaties regarding ship-boarding procedures? 
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F. Regime Interaction and Comparison of Ship-Boarding Procedures 
The SUA Protocol was not originated from nowhere. It did specifically indicate 
in the first US draft Protocol that the boarding procedures and safeguards were 
adopted from UNCLOS, High Seas Convention, the Drugs Convention, and the 
Migrant Smuggling Protocol. The US also provided a table detailing the overlap 
between the draft new offences and the Terrorists Bombing Convention.
213
  
In terms of the final outcome, it appears that there is no need to depict how the 
SUA Protocol learned from other anti-terrorism treaties, particularly on the new 
offences, because it expressly stipulates that the new offences should also consider 
offences set forth in any treaties listed in the Annex of the SUA Protocol.
214
 The 
nature of the added offences came from the so-called sectoral approach by 
modelling the offences of existing anti-terrorism treaties, but comparatively the 
boarding procedures are not clear. Therefore, a simple comparison would be 
necessary in seeking the distinctions. 
In terms of treaty provisions and terms or sentences used in relevant treaties 
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with regard to ship-boarding procedures, SUA Protocol Article 8bis(1) is modelled 
from Article 17(1) of the Drugs Convention and Article 7 of the Migrant Smuggling 
Protocol. These provisions are all about general obligations for cooperation to the 
fullest extent. Article 8bis(4) is quite similar to Article 17(2) and (3) of the Drugs 
Convention and Article 8(1) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, as these provisions 
are related to nationality of a state party and reasonable grounds to suspect. Article 
8bis(7) is likely derived from Article 17(6) of the Drugs Convention and Article 8(5) 
of the Migrant Smuggling Convention, because they all claim that a state party shall 
not take additional measures without the express authorization of the flag state or 
authorize the boarding with conditions parties mutually agreed. As indicated above, 
Article 8bis(7) was emulated from Article22(1)(f) of the Fish Stocks Agreement. 
With some precedents and similarities derived from the Drugs Convention and 
the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, the safeguards provision Article 8bis(10) could be 
regarded as the most important part in the boarding procedure and in the 
treaty-making process. Not only that we see the involvement of NGOs and shipping 
industry in the making of the provisions, but also it does make progress in boarding 
procedures and its related potential consequences. 
For example, the chapeau of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol Article 9 
specifically provides that it is ‘safeguard clauses’. Article 8bis(10)(a) of the SUA 
Protocol uses three ‘due account’, five ‘ensure’ and one ‘take reasonable efforts’ 
clauses in trying to broaden the scope of detailed measures which need to be 
carefully enforced. If we refer to the 1988 Drugs Convention, we see that it only 






 and ‘shall take the due account of the need not to interfere with or affect 
the rights and obligations’ of the coastal states.
216
  
Furthermore, Article 8bis(10)(b) stipulates the state responsibility issue. State 
parties are liable for compensating damage or loss caused by their unfounded 
grounds or unreasonable measures. While there are no traces of such a regulation 
from the Drugs Convention, in essence, the spirit of this clause can be found in 
Article 9(2) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, UNCLOS Article 110(3) and the 
High Seas Convention Article 22(3).
217
 
Beyond the range of the safeguards, Article 8bis(12) and (13) encourage states 
parties to develop more detailed procedure to enforce joint operations and to reach 
agreements or arrangements between them. These two paragraphs can be deemed 
that it was modelled from Article 17(9) of the Drugs Convention and Article (17) of 
the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. 
A curious question that may be asked here: where did the ‘four-hour’ limit 
come from? Apparently, it did not come from the Drugs Convention, did not come 
from the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, and did not come from UNCLOS or the High 
Sea Convention. It came from the Caribbean Drugs Agreement Article 6. It provides 
that ‘requests for verification of nationality shall be answered expeditiously and all 
efforts shall be made to provide such answers as soon as possible, but in any event 
within four (4) hours’.
218
 
At the time of the initial stage, it can be seen clearly that the US had already 
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indicated that the Caribbean Drugs Agreement was one of the recent development 
regarding ship-boarding procedure, though it was not considered as an appropriate 
precedent by many delegations in terms of its geographical location and the nature 
of the subject matter.
219
  
In fact, this four-hour limit was not invented by the Caribbean Drugs Agreement 
but derived from the 1995 Council of Europe’s Drugs Agreement.
220
 Article 7 
stipulates that ‘the flag State shall immediately acknowledge receipt of a request for 
authorisation under Article 6 and shall communicate a decision thereon as soon as 
possible and, wherever practicable, within four hours of receipt of the request.’ The 
Explainer Report of the Agreement only indicates that ‘the four hour time limit 
mentioned in the agreement should be regarded as the latest time for communication 
of the decision in most cases.’
221
 In short, there is no sufficient basis for taking this 
invention as a general rule.  
It seems that we see no documented significant influence from the Caribbean 
Drugs Agreement to the SUA Protocol; however, only SUA Protocol and the 
Caribbean Drugs Agreement have some options for the authorization for boarding. 




In sum, one or two regional treaty law may not be considered as strong 
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evidence for creating general rules of international law of the sea. That was probably 
why the so-called shiprider (law enforcement officials)
223
 provisions were never 
considered in the negotiation process. Shipriders can enforce law within a state 
party’s territorial sea. If the negotiators cannot agree that the four-hour time limit is 
the principle authorization method, then it can imagine that ‘these developments 
simply went too far for many states’.
224
 
G. Achievement and Deficiency 
In the matter of making a treaty, to broaden the new offences and to create a 
new boarding regime with sufficient safeguards would certainly be identifiable 
achievements. However, the treaty only binds upon signatory parties, and thus it 
cannot grant other rights or impose other obligations to third parties.
225
 To sum up, 
the effectiveness depends on its ratification and real practice.
226
 
Deficiencies or limits may be more easily to be identified. First, the 
enforcement measures and exclusive rights remain in the hands of the flag state. 
Like how the US described the Protocol, it does not change existing rules of 
international law of the sea.
227
 Second, the requirement of express authorization 
from the flag state may undercut its utility if the flag state chooses to delay or 
decline the authorization.
228
 For those states concerning more about maritime 
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terrorism, using the Protocol may not guarantee effectiveness. For example, if states 
reckon that using the cooperative framework of the PSI will be more efficient than 
using the SUA Protocol, then the Protocol will in effect become redundant, and for 
states that may not be so worried about maritime terrorism, the new boarding regime 




IV. Conclusion  
As ‘negotiation in the classic diplomatic sense assumes parties more anxious to 
agree than to disagree,’
230
 anxiety and tension appeared in both the SUA 1988 
Convention and 2005 Protocol negotiation process. 
On the last day at the diplomatic conference of the SUA Protocol, Mitropoulos, 
the Secretary-General of the IMO who stated that the conference ‘will go down in 
the annals of IMO history as possibly the one most political charged…we are 
running a race against time in our efforts to prevent and suppress unlawful acts 
against safety of maritime navigation’.
231
 The reasoning of the inference of ‘the one 
most political charged’ is yet unknown. However, the fact is that the 2005 SUA 
Protocol negotiation took more time than 1988 SUA Convention to compromise a 
draft before going to the diplomatic conference. While the 911 was a bigger 
terrorism incident than the Achille Lauro, this reality did not make the SUA Protocol 
negotiation easier.  
On the other hand, there was no evidence to reflect that the NGOs or the 
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shipping industry contribute significantly to the 1988 SUA Convention, but records 
show that in negotiating SUA Protocol, the ICS, ISF and ICFTU did contribute a lot 
to protecting seafarers and safety at sea. The IMO worked as a forum in discussing 
issues and negotiation, but it seems not sensible to argue that it played some sort of 
law-maker’s role. In the making of the SUA 1988 Convention, Italy, Austria and 
Egypt occupied more important roles, while the US took the lead in preparing 
several versions of the draft texts in negotiating the SUA Protocol.  
Regarding treaty-making methods, if we compare the preparations of the SUA 
1988 Convention and 2005 SUA Protocol, it appears that an ad hoc committee for 
SUA Convention functions more effectively than the Legal Committee in the matter 
of negotiating the SUA 2005 Protocol. Unlike getting heated debates so early and 
easily in the IMO Legal Committee, through an ad hoc committee, consultation with 
experts could take place first, and this tecninque would result in a more neutral and 
less controversial draft. If that was the situation, it might let the US not so eagerly to 
present a complete draft all by itself. After all, it was a highly political charged 
maritime terrorism agenda. When a great power acted too eagerly in such a 
multilateral form with such a highly sensitive issue, it might cause some 
counter-effects if some states felt huge pressure imposed by such as a powerful state.  
A related law-making issue is consensus. The SUA 1988 Convention was 
highly praised for its being adopted by consensus. While the SUA Protocol was 
adopted by consensus, there was no praise to this consensus method. As stated 
earlier, for some unknown reasons, India and Pakistan claimed that it was not 
adopted by consensus. In hindsight, it seems that consensus was not a useful 




terrorism compared to previous decades.  
In terms of regime interaction for avoiding potential conflicts in competing 
jurisdiction and in considering what precedents can be used, it should be noted that 
both the SUA Convention and SUA Protocol did well. The negotiators were all 
aware of the provisions in new treaties should be in consistence with existing law of 
terrorism and the law of the sea.  
It is observed that the negotiation of the 2005 SUA Protocol might ‘have 
contributed to the crystallisation of a customary international law prohibition on 
WMD transportation’ only if it is widely ratified.
232
 In reality, it has not. As of 
August 2017, there are only 41 parties to the 2005 SUA Protocol.
233
 Even if it is 
widely ratified, it is necessary to see how many states choose the opt-in clause for 
the deemed consent authorisation regarding interdiction at sea. Until now, it seems 
that no any party is willing to choose this opt-in interdiction procedure.
234
 
Nonetheless, the SUA Protocol did make some progress regarding future changes 
with respect to international rules of maritime terrorism. To a certain extent, the 
concept of sovereignty and exclusive right of flag state has been loosened.  
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The Korean delegate’s final statement at the SUA Protocol diplomatic 
conference grasped this changing nature and atmosphere in making this new 
development:  
For hundreds of years after Hugo Grotius prevailed in his 
famous controversy with John Selden, the principle of the 
freedom of the high seas has been applied across the seas. 
Although this principle has in some part been slowly eroded 
by the expansion of the territorial sea as well as the 
creation of other zones of functional jurisdiction, the 
freedom of the high seas lies at the heart of the law of the 
sea and has contributed significantly to the 
ever-increasing navigation, trade, and travel among peoples 
and nations. This time, the freedom of the high seas is 
somewhat limited, paradoxically to ensure the uninterrupted 
flow of international seaborne trade, navigation and travel. 
My delegation believes that this limitation of the exclusive 
jurisdiction competence of the flag State is, in a sense, 
the inevitable result of changed security circumstances.235 
The above statement indicates that while this traditional multilateral 
treaty-making mechanism has some obvious flaws; for example, it takes too much 
time to negotiate a treaty, even if it is adopted, the life and future of specific 
instrument is unpredictable. However, multilateral treaty-making forum and the 
diplomatic processes may still help to push forward a trend or to generate a positive 
atmosphere in thinking what the rules that the international community needs for 
tackling new challenges.  
After all, to expect a revolutionary change in a multilateral treaty-making 
forum would be unrealistic,
236
 especially when facing a highly political charged 
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Chapter 4  
UN Security Council Resolutions as Law-Making Instruments: 
From Terrorism to Piracy  
‘Mr. Collins had only to change from Jane to Elizabeth—and it was soon 
done, done while Mrs. Bennet was stirring the fire.’ 
Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (1813), ch 15.1 
‘The character, shape and the content of international law—as of the 
national law—are determined by prevailing political forces within the 
political system, as refracted through the way law is made.’ 
Louis Henkin (1979)2 
I. Introduction 
After the 911 incident, the growth in UN Security Council (SC) resolutions has 
attracted significant academic interest with respect to the role of the Security 
Council in international Law-Making.
3
  




, both triggered 
significant debates in discovering its legislative power and limits in international 
law-making concerning terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
6
 Accordingly, 
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some commentators have argued that the SC is working as the ‘world legislature’.
7
  
Moreover, with the rise of maritime piracy in East and West Africa around the 
year of 2007, the UNSC has since then issued more than a dozen resolutions on 
fighting piracy at sea. From the Resolution 1816
8
 to the latest Resolution 2316
9
, all 
represent efforts by the SC to broaden the meaning of what constitutes a ‘threat to 
international peace and security’.
10
  
Do these terrorism-related resolutions impose new obligations to all states? Do 
they help to reduce or mitigate terrorism at sea? Have piracy-related resolutions 
changed the international law of piracy codified in UNCLOS and customary 
international law? These questions are concerned not only with the SC’s legislative 
power, but also with practical question of whether the SC should issue more 
legislative resolutions to contribute to the common interests of the international 
community. 
This chapter is structured as follows for answering the questions above: First, it 
briefly surveys the legal competence of the SC granted by the UN Charter. Second, 
it presents some precedents with regard to SC’s legislative role. Third, it analyses 
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whether those resolutions on terrorism and WMD are creating norms in fighting 
maritime terrorism. Fourth, it considers whether the SC is filling some gaps in 
international piracy law. 
Given the lengthy and time-consuming process of multilateral treaties 
law-making, and the unpredictability of national ratification of treaties, the SC may 
offer a faster mechanism to form international norms and effective means of tackling 
problems concerning maritime terrorism and piracy at sea.  
In other words, by examining these UNSC resolutions, this chapter argues that 
the Security Council is assuming a stronger legislative role in international law than 
it previously had, and in doing so, it has the potential to shape international norms 
on maritime terrorism and piracy. However, this development does not mean that the 
SC ignored the usefulness of multilateral treaties or soft law techniques; rather, the 
SC has been supporting all relevant law-making instruments as well as innovated 
several new techniques by itself. 
II. Security Council’s Law-Making Power 
The function and primary responsibility of the SC is to maintain international 
peace and security.
11
 Article 39 of the UN Charter provides that the SC ‘shall 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breech of the peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decides what measures shall be 
taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security’.
12
 After rendering a decision, the ‘Members of the United 
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Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions.’
13
  
Although the SC resolutions are not deemed as traditional sources of 
international law, as stipulated in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, the case law of 
the ICJ has regarded SC resolutions as ‘coming within the scope of the traditional 
sources of international law.’
14
 To illustrate this development, Dame Rosalyn 
Higgins, shortly before she was elected an ICJ Judge, said ‘we must not lose sight of 




Contrary to conservative views suggesting that the SC is not an organ for 
legislating substantive international law and is only for interpreting and applying 
existing norms.
16
 The drafters of the UN Charter in fact intended to let the powers 
of the SC to be enough broad, flexible and discretionary.
17
 Although this does not 
mean that the SC powers is without limits or constraints,
18
 but as Wood argued that 
the ‘effects of these limits in practice has been slight’.
19
 Therefore, while there were 
debates about what constitutes threat to the peace and international security, the 
                                                     
13
 UN Charter, art. 25. 
14
 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment [1998], ICJ Rep 9; M Plachta, ‘The Lockerbie Case: The Role of the Security Council in 
Enforcing the Principle of Aut Dedere Aut Judicare’ (2001) 12 EJIL 125. 
15
 R Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon 1994) 28 
16
 MP de Brichambaut, ‘The Role of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal 
System’ in M Byers (ed.) The Role of Law in International Politics (OUP 2000) 269, 275. 
17
 DM Malone, ‘The Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: A Study in the Creative 
Interpretation of the UN Charter’ 36 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics (2002-2003) 
487.; E Papastavridis, ‘Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions under the Chapter VII in the 
Aftermath of the Iraqi Crisis’ 56 ICLQ (2007) 83, 89-94, 107-118 
18
 S Lamb, ‘Legal Limits to United Nations Security Council Powers’ in GS Goodwin-Gill (ed) The 
Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (OUP 1999) 361.; DH Joyner, 
‘Non-Proliferation Law and the United Nations System: Resolution 1540 and the Limits of the Power 
of the Security Council’ (2007) 20 LJIL 489.; A Boyle et al, ‘The United Nations Security Council’s 
Legislative and Enforcement Powers and Climate Change’ 7-9.; J Crawford, ‘Chance, Order, Change: 
The Course of International Law’ (2013) 365 Recueil des Cours 304-308. 
19
 M Wood, ‘The United Nations Security Council’ (July 2007) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 




connotation of this concept to date has expanded to include international terrorism, 
transporting WMD, humanitarian disasters.
20
  
Furthermore, in the Tadic case, the Appeal Chamber of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) stated that ‘“the act of 
aggression” is more amenable to a legal determination, “the threat to the peace” is 
more a political concept.’
21
 Thus the ICTY continued to say: ‘Article 39 leaves the 
choice of means and their evaluation to the Security Council, which enjoys wide 
discretion powers in this regard.’
22
  
Following the same logic, Talmon has predicted in 2005 that in future years, 
perhaps this threat to the peace concept can expand to cover issues of transnational 
organized crime, drugs trafficking, maritime piracy and refugee flows; thus ‘it may 
be argued that every situation that the Council has identified as a threat to the peace 
in a particular conflict situation potentially qualified as a threat to the peace per 
se.’
23
 His observation rightly predicted the later development about SC resolutions 
of maritime piracy . 
As alluded above, even though the limits of the SC powers are not significant, 
‘there must be a genuine link between the general obligations imposed and the 
maintenance of international peace and security’.
24
 Moreover, the UN Charter does 
not give the SC a monopoly right in considering matters of international peace and 
security. Article 11 of the UN Charter provides that ‘the General Assembly may 
consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international 
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 it also ‘may make recommendations with regard to such 
principles to the Members or to the Security Council or both’.
26
 The General 
Assembly (GA) may also discuss questions or situations about international peace 
and security, but whatever action or recommendation is necessary ‘shall be referred’ 
to the SC.  
In other words, the GA has the power to talk and make proposals but has no 
power to take action; the action and measures shall be taken or recommended by the 
SC, only the SC has the power to make legally binding resolutions.
27
 Perhaps for 
this reason and by way of analogy, Koskenniemi described that the SC and GA are 
‘[A] police man and a Temple of Justice’, which means that the SC should establish 




A practical question would be, what are the precedents which best illustrated 
the legislative role of SC in forming international law? 
III. Security Council’s Law-Making Experiences 
A well-known case is Resolution 687 (1991)
29
 regarding the Gulf War ceasefire. 
This resolution stated that Iraq is ‘liable under international law for any direct loss, 
damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or 
injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations’,
30
 as a result of Iraq’s 
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. It also created a Compensation 
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Commission to settle claims brought pursuant to the resolution.
31
  
Another more far-reaching precedent is Resolution 827 (1993)
32
.Through which 
the SC determined to establish an ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal namely, 
the ICTY for prosecuting those responsible for committing serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. At the same time, the SC also adopted a Statute 
deciding the substantive and procedural rules to be applied by the tribunal. Although 
the legitimacy of this legislative action underwent a lot of debates during that time,
33
 
the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY asserted that the SC did have the authority under 
Article 41 of the UN Charter to establish the tribunal.
34
  
The SC followed this precedent when it established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by Resolution 955 in 1994.
35
 Then, in August 2000, 
the SC adopted Resolution 1315,
36
 requesting the UN Secretary-General to begin 
negotiations with the Sierra Leonean government to create a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone. In fact, as some commentators noticed, these tribunals constituted ‘an 
innovative and increasingly well-developed body of jurisprudence on contemporary 
international criminal law and procedure.’
37
  
The SC’s legislative moves have also entered the sphere of humanitarian 
catastrophes.
38
 Since the end of the Cold War, the SC has adopted several 
resolutions concerning the use of ‘all necessary means’ in dealing with humanitarian 
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intervention affairs. Although these law-making innovations remain controversial, 




The most relevant examples to this study are Resolution 1373 and Resolution 
1540. The SC was acting under Chapter VII when it adopted the two Resolutions. 
Compared to the above cases, these two resolutions can be seen as qualitatively 
different exercises of the SC’s innovative legislation. For example, in the above 
cases, when the UNSC was addressing the threats posed by a single state or from the 
failure of a single state, it was in the position responding to a specific situation.  
However, pursuant to Resolutions 1373 and 1540, the SC was responding to 
global threats posed by international terrorism and offering a global approach to help 
addressing them. Its responses were not directed to any particular group or terrorist 
act but to all possible future acts of terrorism.
40
 
In addition, the two Resolutions were not imposed for a time-limited purpose, 
whereas the former cases all explicitly or implicitly deal with a time-limited object 
This means that neither Resolution 1373 nor Resolution 1540 contain an explicit or 
implicit time limitation.
41
 In other words, the two Resolutions can be practiced 
forever until the SC decides to terminate them someday for some reasons. 
In terms of their legislative nature, Resolution 1373 and 1540 are the same. They 
both impose on ‘all states’ some general obligations in combating terrorism, and 
targeting non-state actors, namely, terrorists. They both transfer consent-based 
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obligations of anti-terrorism and non-proliferation treaties to all states.
42
 It has been 
observed that their application and influence in effect exceed and expand the scope 




However, in terms of the measures contained, they are different. Resolution 1371 
decides that states shall refrain from supporting terrorist acts no matter in any 
particular form. It further calls on all states to cooperate through information sharing 
and has established the Counter-Terrorism Committee
44
 for implementing the 
Resolution and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate as its 
monitoring institution.
45
 Resolution 1540 also created a 1540 Committee
46
 but its 




Having reviewed the general features of the SC’s law-making activities, it 
appears that the most appropriate timing to wield this law-making power is when 
there exists some lacuna in the laws pertinent to an emergent situation.
48
 In these 
situations, the SC may serve the function of creating techniques or mechanism to 
interpret and apply existing international legal rules to a specific threat that is 
causing deterioration in international peace and security.
49
 The advantage of the 
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SC’s law-making power in this regard is that it can fill these existing legal or 
enforcement gaps quickly. This competence can create binding obligations
50
 that are 
more effective than treaty negotiations. 
In other words, the question of whether the SC is competent to legislate or to 
make law is not simply a theoretical or an elusive one. The above precedents show 
that the legislative activities of the SC can be speedy and efficient in terms of its 
effects. While there exist doubts about the legitimacy of this law-making 
competence,
51
 the reality is that the SC only consists of 15 member states. One 
could always argue that only 15 states cannot represent the entire international 
community. 
IV. Security Council Resolution 1540 and Weapons of Mass Destruction 
The next question to consider is: what is the practical influence and usefulness 
of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 in combating maritime terrorism? 
In fact, only Resolution 1540 is directly linked to the activities of maritime 
terrorism, because it aims at to preventing the transport and shipment of WMD 
materials, including WMD delivery system. The main focus of Resolution 1373 is to 
tackle the logistics and financial support of terrorist groups, entities or persons, 
though it also aims to eliminate ‘the supply of weapons of terrorists.’
52
 Likewise, 
Resolutionn1373 notes with concern of the connection of terrorism and transnational 
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organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms trafficking and other 
potential deadly materials.
53
 However, Resolution 1373 does not expressly deal 
with the question about transportation of WMD and its related materials. 
A. Significance 
Resolution 1540 has been described as making ‘a significant milestone in the 
development of international law on the subject of WMD proliferation’.
54
 This is 
because the Resolution not only imposes specific non-proliferation obligations on all 
states,
55
 but also presents the SC’s formal attempt at regulating proliferation of 
WMD and related materials. Another illustration of Resolution 1540 legal effect is 
that it reflects ‘other rules of international law’ stipulated in many international 
treaties. For example, UNCLOS 19(1) provides that innocent passage shall take 
place in accordance with UNCLOS and with ‘other rules of international law’.
56
 
Thus when considering threats or activities which may jeopardise innocent passage, 
states shall take Resolution 1540 as another legal source.   
The text of Resolution 1540 provides that all states shall refrain from 
supporting non-state actors’ ‘transport, transfer or use of chemical or biological 
weapons and their means of delivery.’
57
 Also, all states ‘shall adopt and enforce 
appropriate effective laws’,
58
 ‘take and enforce effective measures to establish 
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 for prohibiting proliferation of the WMD. The essence of 
Resolution 1540 is to ask states to establish prescriptive jurisdiction and 
enforcement jurisdiction in tacking the proliferation of WMD. In short, with regard 
to ‘transfer, transport, proliferate, transit, trans-shipment’, it makes sense that these 
activities may go through sea. That is the fundamental difference between the two 
Resolutions. 
B. Potential Problems 
There are some potential problems in implementing Resolution 1540. First, it is 
questionable whether Resolution 1540 has sufficient legal basis for imposing on all 
states a general obligation to interdict WMD and related materials. The terms used 
in Resolution 1540 are quite vague, even though it has tried to explain a bit more, by 
putting a footnote in defining what is ‘means for delivery’ and ‘related materials’.
60
 
Nonetheless, as Talmon rightly noted, ‘the unclear language, vague definitions, and 
lack of specific standards may result in time-consuming and painstaking in 
legislative process at the national level’.
61
 After all, one important element in 
carrying out Resolution 1540 is domestic enforcement and effective national 
legislation, yet the vagueness of the Resolution may hinder this domestic 
enforcement process in states.  
Second, there is no explicit language referring to ‘interdiction’, ‘boarding’ or 
‘interception’ in the Resolution’s text; accordingly, there is no way to authorise or 
request an authorisation for boarding a ship suspected carrying WMD by simply 
relying on the Resolution. Evidence shows that during the informal consultation and 
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formal discussion stages in the SC,
62
 China expressly opposed insertion of the word 
‘interdiction’ in what is now paragraph 10 of the Resolution. Before passing 
Resolution 1540, China’s Representative stated in the SC meeting that ‘China’s 
proposals are reflected in the current draft, and a reference to interdiction was 
deleted at the request of the Chinese delegation.’
63
 One should also notice that 
paragraph 10 uses the words ‘calls upon’ rather than ‘decides’ to describe how states 
should take action. This illustrates the observation that it is more akin to 
‘invitation-making instead of obligation imposing’.
64
  
Third, it concerns a reflection of a political compromise on the concerns of 
terrorism and WMD, Resolution 1540 more or less fails to provide measures and 
tools for enforcement actions.
65
 Accordingly, when interpreting and applying these 
UN Chapter VII resolutions in real situation or enforcing measures in specific 
incident, states should always be cautious and be ware that ‘any unilateral action 
involving the use or threat of force should not be lightly presumed.’
66
 
Although Resolution 1540 does not provide clear support for interdiction of 
ships suspected of carrying WMD and related materials, it is the source for 
enhancing and upholding the legality of the Proliferation Security Initiative.
67
 The 
reason is that paragraph 10 of Resolution 1540 does call upon all states to cooperate 
by using their national law and ‘consistent with international law’ in preventing 
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 At the time of adopting this Resolution, 2005 SUA 
Protocol was still under negotiation, thus illustrating the influence of the two 
Resolutions on SUA drafting and discussion process. The Preamble of the 2005 




It remains to be seen whether the SC and the Members of the SC have 
sufficient willingness to go a bit further for imposing more concrete obligations in 
regulating maritime terrorism. Resolution 1540 does set up some norms and 
obligations but does not go too far for prescribing the exact enforcement measures 
and procedures. One could speculate whether the timing of adopting Resolution 
1540 might have led to a different outcome. If Resolution 1540 had been discussed 
immediately after the 911 incident, following the discussion of Resolution 1373, 
would the result have been different?  
This counter-factual question may have several imaginative answers, but the 
point is that it was obvious that the timing of discussing Resolution 1540 was not 
ideal for about three years passed between the 911 incident in September 2001 and 
the adoption of Resolution 1540 in April 2004. Around that time, only one news was 
significant to the Resolution: Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan who has been reckoned as the 
father of Pakistani’s Nuclear weapons, confessed in February 2004 that he had 
transferred nuclear technology to Iran and Syria.
70
  
In short, a key advantage of the SC’s law-making role is that it takes less time 
and to impose binding obligations on states or to consolidate an existing 
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 On the contrary, if the timing is not right and there is no grave 
security, atrocity and peace concerns at hands, SC actions may result in a less useful 
or less cheerful outcome for upholding international peace and security. In other 
words, even if the SC might produce common interests for the international 
community, the fruit may not taste so sweet if it plants the seeds in the wrong 
season.  
To some extent, when the timing is not right, the SC may only be explicitly 
showing some great powers’ law-making intention, without regarding for the 
common interest of the international community. This will make states reluctant to 
accept the outcome and political pressure.
72
 Put another way, the Permanent Five 
Members of the SC always have to face doubts about the legitimacy
73
 and their 
unbalanced bargaining power over less powerful states.
74
 Therefore, if the SC 
cannot seize the moment to tackle threats to international peace and security, it had 
better wait for the next crisis or next proper timing. That said, of course no one 
wishes for more international incidents harming international peace and security. 
V. Piracy and Armed Robbery around the Horn of Africa 
Apart from intervening on terrorism and WMD issues, the SC also has dealt with 
piracy problems in the past few years. As of November 2016, the SC has issued 
more than a dozen resolutions in dealing piracy problems off the coast of Somalia.
75
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Among these, only Resolution 1918(2010), 1976(2011) and 2015(2011) were not 
issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The following section will discuss the 
background of these SC resolutions, and the rationale of characterising piracy as a 
threat to international peace and security. It also scrutinises some general features 
and innovations of these resolutions in combating Somali pirates and analyses 
certain law-making issues. The key question being asked is: do these SC resolutions 
concerning pirates off the coast of Somalia change the general international law of 
piracy? 
A. Initial Responses 
The SC began in 2008 to formally adopt resolutions on how to combat Somali 
piracy. It appears that the ascent or the resurgence of a piracy scourge off the coast 
of Somalia had previously not been noticed by the SC. However, this perception was 
totally contrasted to the reality.
76
 
In a Statement made by the President of the SC in late 2005, it has more or less 
noticed that the piratical acts and incidents at sea have increased, and thus expressed 
‘serious concern over the increasing incidents of piracy off the coast of Somalia. The 
Council condemns recent hijackings of vessels in the area, particularly of ships 
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carrying humanitarian supplies to Somalia.’
77
 Among those incidents, a well-known 
hijacking by the Somali pirates in that year was of a ship called MV Semlow, which 
carried UN World Food Programme supplies.
78
  
Later on in anther Presidential Statement issue in March 2006, the SC took note 
of ‘the increasing incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off 
the coast of Somalia. The Council encourages Member States whose naval vessels 
and military aircraft operate in international waters and airspace adjacent to the coast 
of Somalia to be vigilant to any incident of piracy therein and to take appropriate 
action to protect merchant shipping, in particular the transportation of humanitarian 
aid.’ This Statement was also the first time that the SC clearly stated that 
counter-piracy activities should be ‘in line with relevant international law.’
79
 
After two months, the SC formally considered the Somali piracy problem in its 
Preamble of Resolution 1676,
80
 reiterating that it was concerned about the 
increasing piratical acts occurring off the coast of Somalia. This Resolution was 
adopted under Chapter VII, though the context was solely the deteriorating political 
and humanitarian situation of Somalia.
81
 
In fact, in October 2005, the SC established a Committee on Somalia based on 
the request citing paragraph 3 (i) of the Resolution 1630 (2005)
82
. The SC requested 
the Chairman
83
 of the Committee to submit a report covering all the tasks set out in 
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 The Chairman submitted the said report to the SC in 
2006. In that Report, it first traced the root causes of piracy and presented a brief 
evolution of piracy in Somalia. It also found that even in the 1980s, during the time 
of the Siyad Barre regime, Somali pirates had once posed as law enforcement 
officers in order to board ships for looting.
85
 They typically initiated violent acts on 
a ship by using verbal commands and warnings and only scarcely used automatic 
weapons and other armaments.
86
 
This Report noticed that another type of Somali pirates emerged as the 
self-described coast guards. They targeted vessels were engaged in illegal, 
unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU fishing) or were engaged in dumping toxic 
waste substances in the Somali coastal waters.
87
 What was discovered at that time 
was that this type of grass-roots enforcement by the coast guards, coupled with the 




Serving as a preliminary survey, the Report admitted that the information 
provided was ‘far from complete’.
89
 This meant that prior to the Somali piracy 
problem was being thrust into the public eye, the SC had already noticed this 
phenomenon but offered no solution. In short, this Report sent out the initial caveat, 
but during the reporting year of 2006, just a year before the ascent of the Somali 
problem, it seemed to think there was no need to consider this topic in more detail 
                                                     
84
 ‘Letter Dated 4 May 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established 
Pursuant to Resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council’, S/2006/229 (4 May 2006) 
85
 See also M. Murphy, Somalia: The New Barbary? 11-14 
86
 S/2006/229, para. 76-80 
87
 KL Panjabi, ‘The Pirates of Somalia: Opportunistic Predators or Environmental Prey?’ (2010) 34 
William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 377. 
88
 S/2006/229, para. 81. 
89




within the SC. 
Finally in August 2007, perhaps with the reality that the piracy phenomenon 
was clear enough at that time, the SC issued Resolution 1772 to expressly encourage 
Member states ‘to take appropriate action to protect merchant shipping, in particular 
the transportation of humanitarian aid, against any such act, in line with relevant 
international law.’
90
 A few months later in early 2008, because some states had 
started to take action against pirates in the Gulf of Aden, the SC adopted Resolution 
1801 and welcomed ‘the contribution made by France to protect the World Food 
Programme naval convoys and the support now provided by Denmark to this end’.
91
 
Resolution 1816 was the first document in which the SC considered the Somali 
piracy an issue under Chapter VII. The SC noticed the seriousness of the Somali 
piracy issue perhaps from IMO Assembly Resolution A.979(24) in 2005,
92
and 
Resolution A. 1002(25) in 2007.
93
 In considering the IMO Resolutions, there was a 
dynamic of institutional interactions between the SC and the IMO. For example, the 
IMO paid attention to how the SC or the General Assembly (GA) addressed the 
piracy issue.
94
 However, it was the IMO that firstly requested the Transitional 
Federal Government of Somalia to give its ‘consents to warships or military aircraft, 
or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government 
service, which are operating in the Indian Ocean, entering its territorial sea when 
engaging in operations against pirates or suspected pirates and armed robbers.’
95
 
In any event, the SC then fully and formally began to focus on the piracy 
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problem off the coast of Somalia in Resolution 1816. This Resolution signifies the 
beginning of taking Somali piracy as a threat to international peace and security.  
B. Threat to International Peace and Security 
All of the Chapter VII resolutions on Somali piracy illustrate: ‘Determining that 
the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as well as 
the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, are an important factor exacerbating the 
situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security in the region.’
96
 It has been noted that ‘it is the situation in Somalia which 




The first reason for explaining this observation perhaps is that the SC has 
almost routinely adopted resolutions under Chapter VII concerning the situation in 
Somalia.
98
 Secondly, the text of these resolutions only shows that piracy and armed 
robbery are exacerbating the situation, it does not directly indicate that piracy and 
armed robbery is a threat to international peace and security. Thus it can be seen that 
piracy is a kind of collateral damage caused by the political instability and conflict 
in Somalia. We can observe that all these Resolutions concerning Somali pirates 
never explicitly determine that piracy and armed robbery constitute a threat to 
international peace and security.  
Therefore, there is an implicit link between piracy and international peace and 
security. If there were no political turmoil in Somali, then there are no conditions to 
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‘exacerbate’ the situation there. In some of the SC meetings on Somalia, it was 
recorded that for example, China, Indonesia, South Africa or Argentina were 
reluctant to agree that piracy and armed robbery alone can constitute a threat to 
international peace and security.
99
 The rather cautious wording and purpose is for 
‘avoiding the criticism which the Council often incurs when applying this notion to 




In the piracy situation in West Africa region, this cautious approach can be seen 
more clearly. Resolution 2018(2011) and 2039(2012) took notes on the piracy and 
armed robbery situation surrounding the Gulf of Guinea; but the two Resolutions 
were not adopted under Chapter VII.
101
 Simma commented that ‘Given the absence 
of large-scale organized violence and the primary effects of piracy on economic 
action, this caution…seems justified.’
102
  
To some extent, the rationale is quite obvious because there is not a serious 
‘failed state’ problem in the Gulf of Guinea. However, it remains to be seen whether 
the SC will someday determine the situation there can constitute a threat to 
international peace and security. In the past few years, with the decreasing number 
of Somali piracy incidents, and the rising number of the piracy problem in the Gulf 
of Guinea, it appears that the SC began to take the Gulf of Guinea pirates more 
seriously. It has issued Presidential Statements and taken one formal meeting to 
discuss its concern about piracy and armed robbery in that region.
103
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Nevertheless, there are other considerations for the SC to determine that piracy 
and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia are threats to international peace and 
security. For example, piratical acts endanger international navigation and cargos 
shipping, the consequence of which are commercial interests and the global 
economy. Thus since Resolution 1816, the SC has addressed Somali piracy by 
separating the issue from the original Somali political and humanitarian scenario. 
That is to say, there are two tracks now in dealing with problems arising from the 
disorderly situation of Somalia. One is still focusing on bringing order and peace 
back to Somalia, the other is tackling pirates. It can be said that though the SC does 
not explicitly define the activity of piracy and armed robbery as threats to peace and 




In short, the SC started to broaden its scope and expand the nature of what 
constitutes international peace and security from Somali piracy.  
C. The Saving Clause and Entering into Territorial Sea 
Unlike Resolution 1373 and 1540 on terrorism and WMD, Somali piracy 
Resolutions all contain a time limit for implementing the SC’s recommendations. 
This can be described as a saving clause. Resolution 1816 contained a six-month 
saving clause with June 2008 as time limit.
105
 This saving clause was then 
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. In the near future, we can foresee that 
the SC will renew the twelve months period every year, based on the request of the 
Somali authorities.   
Another condition also can be found in some of the aforementioned Resolutions, 
which is that the Resolutions: 
Applies only with respect to the situation in Somalia and 
shall not affect the rights and obligations or 
responsibilities of member states under international law, 
including any right or obligations under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea…the resolution shall not 
be considered as establishing customary international 
law.115 
 
This design effectively meets the different needs and interest of the cooperating 
states, and it is also related to a typical sovereignty issue.  
All the Preambles of the Resolutions on Somali piracy repeat that the 
Resolution ‘Reaffirms its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political 
independence and the unity of Somalia.’  
To be precise, this sovereignty issue consists of two elements. The first is about 
recognition of states in international law.
116
 For those who recognised the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) as the genuine government of 
Somalia, the condition makes it clear that these resolutions accomplish ‘no more 
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than what Somalia and cooperating states could have accomplished on their own.’
117
 
At the same time, for those who have not recognised the TFG, the resolutions 
provide the basic legal and legitimate position for them to suppress pirates in the 
territorial sea of Somalia. Secondly, for those who fundamentally see Somalia as a 
failed state, the saving clause affirms that this Somali situation is unique.
118
 
But one political change should be noted that in September 2011, new ‘Somali 
authorities’ were established by competing Somali political factions and with the 
help of the UN.
119
 Hence we can see that before 2011, Somali piracy Resolutions all 
stated ‘TFG’, but since 2011, they have replaced the term TFG with ‘Somali 
authorities.’ 





 that states may: 
(a) Enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose 
of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in 
a manner consistent with such action permitted on the high 
seas with respect to piracy under relevant international 
law; 
(b) Use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a 
manner consistent with action permitted on the high seas with 
respect to piracy under relevant international law, all 
necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery. 
This innovative move of entering Somali territorial seas has been called 
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 which is contrary to the conventional right of hot pursuit 
from within the territorial sea to the high sea. However, arguably the right of such a 
reverse hot pursuit has never been recognised or developed by virtue of customary 
international law.
123
 Even though several Resolutions welcome the adoption of the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct,
124
 Article 15 (j) of the Djibouti Code of Conduct 
expressly denies any right of foreign vessels to enter another state’s territorial waters. 
This right can only be admitted with the consent of the coastal state. Perhaps the 
legal effect of such a decision would be too far-reaching, so the SC must provides 
the saving clause, expressly stating that it shall not be seen as establishing customary 
international law. 
With the political change of Somali after 2011, the wording and terms used in 
the Somali piracy Resolutions have changed. Since Resolution 2077, the SC started 
to recognise and underline the ‘primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in 
the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somali’.
125
 
However, it still ‘encourages Member States to continue to cooperate…at sea off the 
coast of Somalia’.
126
 This means that states can still exert their enforcement power 
in Somalia’s territorial sea. 
Apparently, as the saving clause implicates, the enactment of the Resolutions 
cannot not be seen as establishing customary international law. The Resolutions all 
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clearly stated that Member states of the UN have no intention to change customary 
law. Nevertheless, this does not mean there is no any possibility or precondition to 
bring changes to the customary piracy law, i.e. UNCLOS provisions on piracy. It 
might be useful to ask what constitutes the rationale of setting up UNCLOS Article 
105?  
First of all, the geographical application of UNCLOS Article 105 is on the high 
seas. It also provides for applications ‘in any other place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State’.
127
 This indicates that in normal scenarios, we never assume that a state 
has no effective legislative or enforcement or adjudicative enforcement in their own 
territorial sea. But this embarrassment has been the real scenario happening in 
Somalia. For example, only until recently has it finally drafted its national coast 
guard law, but it still has no anti-piracy and relevant maritime law.
128
  
Secondly, it follows that when and if there are other similar failed state 
situations happened in another region, the SC can intervene in the situation again, 
authorise the same measure based on its legislative power, or by the consent 
provided by the given failed state. Of course, this kind of scenario is less likely to 
happen, but it reveals that the logic behind the existing customary law may not be 
completely convincing. 
In other words, the Somali piracy problem accidently disclosed another legal 
gap or at the very least, a special circumstance in UNCLOS. The SC’s move in 
expanding the geographical scope of arresting and capturing pirates into Somalia’s 
territorial sea is in effect filling such a gap left in UNCLOS.
129
 In sum, the SC does 
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make a slight change in UNCLOS Article 105, though it is on an ad hoc basis. 
Nonetheless, as long as the resolutions are legally binding, ad hoc law-making is 
still law-making.  
D. Ship-Rider Agreements  
Besides the above basic arrangements, one specific designation to combat 
Somali pirates was generated from both Resolutions 1851 and 1897. The 
Resolutions stated that the SC:  
Invites all states and regional organizations fighting 
piracy off the coast of Somalia to conclude special 
agreements or arrangements with countries willing to take 
custody of pirates in order to embark law enforcement 
officials (“shipriders”) from the latter countries, in 
particular countries in the region…provided that the 
advance consent of the TFG is obtained for the exercise of 
third state jurisdiction by shipriders in Somali 
territorial waters and that such agreements and 
arrangements do not prejudice the effective implementation 
of the SUA Convention. 
A basic understanding of the concept of a shiprider is: a local law enforcement 
official is authorised to embark upon another state’s coastguard or navy vessel.
130
 A 
more detailed description could be: ‘a law-enforcement official from state A 
embarked on a vessel of state B who may, subject to specific treaty arrangements, 
authorise intervention aboard state A’s vessels (or in its territorial waters) or arrest 
persons at sea under the law of state A.’
131
 However, the real definition much 
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depends on how specific shiprider agreements are designed and shaped.
132
 For 
example, a recent bilateral shiprider agreement between the United States and the 
Gambia defines that a shiprider ‘means a Security Force Official of one Party (the 
designating Party) authorised to embark on a Security Force vessel or aircraft of the 
other party (the other or authorizing Party)’.
133
  
Why this measure could be described as special is simply because most of the 
states are not very familiar with shiprider agreements. The origin of shiprider 
agreements traces back to almost three decades ago. 
1. Origin and Rationale   
The origin of the concept of shiprider agreements stems from counter-drug 
operations in the 1980s.
134
 For instance, according to Article 17 (9) of the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances 1988, ‘Parties shall consider entering into bilateral or regional 
agreements or arrangements’
135
 (i.e. shiprider agreements) to carry out or to 
enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement at sea. The Commentary book on the 
Drugs Convention plainly states that Article 17 ‘contains highly innovative law 
enforcement provisions to promote the interdiction of vessels engaged in the illicit 
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traffic in drugs by sea’
136
  
Since 1980s, a number of bilateral shiprider agreements were concluded with 
regard to counter-drug dealings
137
 and illegal fishing.
138
 That is to say, each 
shiprider agreement is designed to meet specific purpose. The negotiation of 
relevant shiprider agreements has been led by the US. With a clear emphasis on 
effective law enforcement, these agreements are primarily designed to overcome 
jurisdictional hurdles
139
 and to receive the coastal state’s consent for letting the 
shipriders to board, visit and search suspected ships.
140
 
 In general, shiprider agreements have been executed to counter three problems: 
counter illicit drugs, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal fishing 
activities. Briefly examining these practical applications of shiprider agreements 
underscores some implications for scenarios happening off the coast of the Horn of 
Africa. 
A first thing to bear in mind is that the United Sates is the most experienced 
country in negotiating and implementing these shiprider agreements. In reality, it 
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Second, the purpose of counter-drugs agreements is to pursue traffickers who 
use the so-called ’go-fast’ speedy boats in the Caribbean Sea area. In theory, these 
bilateral treaty arrangements allow both parties to allocate their shipriders and to 
authorise the other party into their territorial sea. In practice, because of the 
limitations of Caribbean states’ capacity to enforce their national laws in combating 
drug-trafficking activities, the real law-enforcement effects are created by the US.
142
  
Third, in the context of countering illegal fishing, precedents also show that in 
the management area of the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission 
(NPAFC),
143
 for example, China and the US concluded a shiprider agreement in 
1993. This agreement allows joint boarding and inspection under special permission 
of the flag state, but in practice, most of the cases were enforced by the US. Past 
experiences show that the effectiveness of the NPAFC has rested upon the voluntary 
cooperation of non-parties, such as China, South Korea and Taiwan. A significant 
implication from this precedent is that the weight of China’s role is critical, as 
Guilfoyle observed, ‘without Chinese-cooperation under the ship-rider agreement it 
is difficult to envisage an effective high-seas inspection regime in the area.’
144
 
In essence, we may find three implications from the above precedents. First, 
shiprider agreements are a kind of ad hoc arrangement based on the consent of one 
side of the treaty parties. There is no ground to suggest any customary international 
could be established by shiprider agreements.
145
  
Second, the political will of each state to cooperate in any one of these 
scenarios is highly critical. It is quite clear that in the case of countering Somali 
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piracy, a firm political will has been declared by the SC.  
Third, shiprider agreements could be a useful means of increasing the policing 
and evidence collecting skills on board multinational naval ships off the coast of 
Somalia. The shipriders sent from regional countries subsequently can gain 
experiences in prosecuting pirates. Ultimately, since it is unlikely to forever rely on 
multilateral military cooperation or assistance from international organisations, 
shiprider agreements thus would be a useful mechanism for capacity building in the 
region. 
2. Strength and Weakness  
The reason that the SC encourages states to reach shiprider agreements is 
because shiprider agreements can ‘facilitate the investigation and prosecution of 
persons detained as a result of operations’ conducted under Resolutions 1851 and 
1897.
146
 Proponents also argue that shipriders help to execute law enforcement 
measures and may bring specialised expertise such as forensic skills.
147
 
Consequently, the critical function of shiprider agreements is a special mechanism 
for enabling the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction over pirates and armed robbery 
off the coast of Somalia.
148
  
One testament in reflecting the advantage of using shipriders was presented by 
the Executive Director of the UNODC. He expressly stated that ’I encourage “ship 
riders” to be deployed on warships operating off the Horn of Africa in order to arrest 
pirates and bring them to justice in neighbouring countries’.
149
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However, it would be unrealistic to suggest that there is no potential weakness 
within the shiprider frameworks. And these weaknesses may be the reason that the 
SC began to omit references to shiprider agreements since Resolution 1950. Four 
scenarios should be considered.  
First, the use of shiprider agreements fundamentally challenges the rationale of 
‘one ship, one law’ under the law of the sea.
150
 The very rationale and purpose of 
UNCLOS is to increase the legal certainty by including the prohibition of using a 
flag according to convenience.
151
 A potential legal ambiguity arises from the 
interpretation and application of a different national law of both parties at the same 
time. For example, Article 7 (4) of the Djibouti Code of Conduct provides that 
shipriders ‘may assist the host Participant and conduct operations from the host 
Participant ship or aircraft if expressly requested to do so…and acted upon in a 
manner that is not prohibited by the laws and policies of both Participants.’ 
Nevertheless, this provision gives no guidance on how to strike a balance between 
two different legal regimes in a specific scenario. If some controversial issues 
concerning the technical and procedural measures arise, or if a violation of human 
rights is evoked, it would be difficult to reach a resolution. 
Second, pursuant to Article 107 of the UNCLOS, a pirate ship can only be 
seized ‘by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and 
identifiable as being on government service to that effect’
152
; commentary on this 
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provision notes that it reduces legal uncertainty.
153
 However, shipriders cannot be 
easily identified, because they are deployed on the other participant’s ship. In reality, 
the use of shiprider agreements could potentially circumvent the UNCLOS.
154
 
Third, according to Resolution 1851 and 1897, it seems that both resolutions 
foresaw the possible abuses of using shiprider agreements. Both the Resolutions 
state that ‘such agreements or arrangements do not prejudice the effective 
implementation of the SUA Convention.’
155
 A curiosity arises as to how this 
safeguard clause should be interpreted? Logically speaking, if a shiprider carries out 
an arrest, the suspect will be prosecuted under the jurisdiction of this shiprider’s 
state. If a party of the SUA Convention arrests a suspect at sea, then it must fulfil its 
obligation as to either prosecute or extradite. Thus the implication of shiprider 
agreements in such a scenario is not clear. 
Fourth, the unsettled maritime delimitation between Somalia and its three 
neighbours (Kenya, Djibouti and Yemen) should also be taken into consideration.
156
 
On one hand, Somalia seems not have acclaimed an exclusive economic zone in 
accordance with UNCLOS. On the other hand, it adopted a national law No. 37 in 
1972, declaring that it extends its territorial sea to 200 miles, which is not consistent 
with UNCLOS. The lack of information on whether Somali legislation is 
harmonised with UNCLOS creates legal ambiguity.
157
 In other words, even if there 
are sufficient well-trained Somali shipriders who could enforce their national law, 
there still will be a fundamental difficulty with regard to the width of its territorial 
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sea and the boundary with Somalia’s neighbours.
158
  
In short, the SC has been trying to fill the legal gaps between the effective law 
enforcement and the absence of rule of law in Somalia by issuing relevant SC 
resolutions. However, the hard truth is, no shiprider agreement has ever been 
established with Somalia and it seems that the idea has largely been abandoned.
159
  
E. Armed Robbery at Sea and the Two-Ships Requirement 
In all the piracy relevant SC Resolutions, it seems that there is no difference 
between the two concepts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. However, there is no 
general or recognised definition of armed robbery at sea. At least, there is no such 
definition in UNCLOS. 
The IMO defines ‘armed robbery against ships’ in its Assembly Resolution 
A.922(22), as ‘any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, 
or thereof, other than act of piracy, directed against a ship or against persons or 
property on board such a ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences.’
160
 
Following a similar vein, the 2004 ReCAAP Article 1(2) defines ‘armed 
robbery against ships’ as: 
(a) any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends and directed against 
a ship, or against persons or property on board such ship, 
in a place within a Contracting Party’s jurisdiction over 
such offences; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the 
operation of a ship with knowledge of facts making it a ship 
for armed robbery against ships; (c) any act of inciting or 
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of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b).161 
In 2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct Article 1(2), and the 2013 Yaounde Code of 
Conduct Article 1(4), ‘armed robbery against ships’ is an act consisting of:  
(a) unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of 
depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, 
committed for private ends and directed against a ship or 
against persons or property on board such a ship, within a 
State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and 
territorial sea;(b) any act of inciting or of intentionally 
facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a).  
We cans see that there are some differences in its terms and conditions. First, in 
these definitions, it is clear that the crime of armed robbery is in the maritime zone 
of territorial seas, these definitions do not specify that the act be committed on the 
high seas or the EEZ. It should be noted again that the UNCLOS high seas 
provisions generally cover the EEZ.
162
 Second, these definitions do not specify that 
an armed robbery requires a ship against another ship,
163
 i.e. two-ship requirement.  
It is unknown whether the drafters or those who were involved in negotiating 
the texts of piracy Resolutions were conscious of these differences in definitions, as 
there is no record that they ever discussed this. However, to assume that those legal 
advisers represented in the UN who do not know or comprehend those definitions 
would be unreasonable, since the IMO or individual states have been involving in 
combating piracy for some years, it is reasonable to assume that the legal advisers in 
the UNSC were aware of the differences. Therefore, whether there is any legal 
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significance to distinguish the two terms is questionable, because the SC Resolutions 




This understanding or interpretation would in effect expand the UNCLOS 
definition of piracy to cover all piratical acts in the territorial sea. Though it may not 
be considered as forming new customary international law, but the SC does fill the 
gap left in UNCLOS. In the sense of reading and interpreting the term ‘piracy and 
armed robbery at sea’, they are the same thing. In another sense, based on a real and 
practical need for combating pirates in Somalia’s territorial sea, the SC has to let the 
two become one, even without giving any reason.  
A further implication would be, pursuant to these SC piracy Resolutions, piracy 
can be committed in anywhere, as long as it is committed at sea. The SC has blurred 
the line between piracy and armed robbery at sea. If there is still a need to 
distinguish the two concepts, and only if someone prefers, now we can call those 
piratical acts committed on the high sea as piracy, and those committed in the 
territorial sea as armed robbery. In short, the SC is trying to set new norms by filling 
gaps. It does not change the customary international law of piracy codified in 
UNCLOS, but it gives the international community an exception to the rule. 
The second issue is whether the two-ship requirement should be considered 
invalid and not useful. The aforementioned definitions do not specify the two-ship 
requirement and the SC has not clarified whether the two-ship requirement is still 
necessary. Therefore, following the same logic, it can be argued that there is no need 
to apply the two-ship requirement in combating piracy and armed robbery in the 
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territorial sea. As long as the SC is able to authorise states to enter into Somalia’s 
territorial sea or any failed state’s territorial sea, armed robbery equals piracy and no 
two-ship requirement is entailed in the concept of armed robbery in the territorial 
sea. But of course, even if this exceptional rule can be applied to other states, 
probably the saving clause of not being recognised as forming customary 
international law will still be established. 
F. Prosecuting Pirates  
There has been some doubts as to whether a state can transfer the suspect 
pirates to another state for prosecution after arresting them. Pursuant to UNCLOS 
Article 105, ‘every State may seize a pirate ship …the courts of the State which 
carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also 
determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject 
to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.’
165
 This provision was designated 
as a reflection of the universal jurisdiction concept. However, whether only the 
seizing state can prosecute and sentence the suspect is debatable.
166
  
While treaty interpretation may result in different outcome, because 
interpretation always entails different bases of value and varieties of facts and 
problems,
167
 it should be noted that the prevailing view takes the point that pirates 
should be prosecuted by the capturing states.
168
 The Virginia Commentary also 
makes a similar observation that the second sentence of Article 105 ‘implies that the 
courts of the State which carried out the seizure will apply national law, including, 
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where appropriate, the national rules governing the conflict of laws.’
169
  
Consequently, the question being asked here is whether the SC Resolutions 
help to clarify or confirm specific positions in existing literature, or on the contrary 
that the SC is developing the law.  
First of all, it should separate contemporary sate practice from piracy-related 
Resolutions. State practice shows that some states like the US, UK and EU have 
concluded some regional agreements with Kenya, Seychelles, etc.
170
 The essence of 
these so called ‘transfer agreements’ is to transfer captured pirates to other states for 
prosecution. Though theoretically, the transfer agreements can be seen as a means to 
interpretation; but on the other hand, the distinction between treaty modification and 
interpretation through subsequent practice ‘is often rather fine’.
171
 In other words, 




Second, SC Resolutions on Somali piracy only call upon states to criminalise 
piracy under their domestic law and to prosecute and imprison those suspected 
pirates the SC has never mentioned whether prosecution can be done by those 
capturing states. Recent Resolutions expressly ‘decide to keep these matters under 
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review, including, as appropriate, the establishment of a specialized anti-piracy court 
in Somalia with substantial international participation’.
173
  
Reading together these Resolutions and UNCLOS Article 105, one could argue 
that even if there is no legal connection between the capturing state and the 
prosecuting state, it would not violate international law. Although the SC has not 
directly endorsed recent practice in prosecuting pirates, proposal for a specialised 
court may be deemed as evidence to show that a new norm concerning Article 105 is 
arising.
174
 It has been observed that recent state practice with regard to Somali 
pirates in effect changed the law of piracy.
175
 This argument can be further advance 
by considering UNCLOS as a living instrument: that can evolve over time for 




G. Private Ends 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the term ‘private ends’ has been controversial. As 
argued earlier, the term should be separated into two categories: one is those who act 
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as belligerents, the nature of which contains clear political ends; the other is those 
who act as environmental protesters, their acts reflect intended for public ends. 
Generally speaking, applying private ends to pirates or Somali pirates would be a 
relatively easy issue.  
First, the SC has been careful not to link terrorism with piracy in all 
piracy-related incidents and Resolutions. The reason may be simply because that 
there is ‘no clear link’ between Al-Shabaab and any pirates groups in Somalia.
177
 
Moreover, based on some researchers’ field work, Al-Shabaab and some other 
Islamic terrorism factions fight with pirates groups from time to time.
178
 As a result 
of this phenomenon, it can be seen that Somali pirates, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea 
or in Southeast Asia, are all acting for financial gains, not political ends. 
Second, the SC has repeatedly called upon states to prevent and combat any 
criminal networks that assist, organize or facilitate illicit financial profits from such 
piratical acts.
179
 The most direct reminder from the SC about the nature of piracy 
was delivered in paragraph 27 of Resolution 2077, in which the SC ‘emphasizes that 
the concerns about protection of the marine environment as well as resources should 
not be allowed to mask the true nature of piracy off the coast of Somalia which is a 




In short, the SC does not develop or clarify the meaning of the term ‘for private 
ends’; however, it does confirm or to some extent clarify that the primary rule in 
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applying and interpreting this concept to piracy would be piracy for financial gains. 
H. International Cooperative Networks 
The SC incrementally developed international cooperative mechanism for 
jointly combating piracy in the Horn of Africa.
181
 It has been observed that 
‘international cooperation sometimes occurs in “big bangs”, in which states jump 
suddenly from low to high levels of cooperation’ on a specific issue.
182
 In fact, on 
the issue of Somali piracy, not only states but also private sectors such as insurance 
companies and shipping companies are all involved in this cooperative network.
183
  
Flowing from a rather strict sense of law-making to a less strict concept of 
law-making or norm-setting,
184
 cooperation can mean substantive cooperation 
through treaty or customary law; can indicate a broader participation in law 
enforcement activities; or refer to cooperation through non-binding instruments.
185
 
It can be observed that the SC accelerates these cooperative networks. It is not 
surprising that many SC resolutions containing a sentence or paragraph which asks 
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The resolutions on Somali piracy hence are not exceptions. In terms of the 
language used, they are not any kind of innovations. However, based on the 
development of different modalities of cooperation and coordination amongst states 
and not-state actors,
187
 it can be seen that cooperation on the matters of Somali 
piracy is quite unique. Consequently the Resolutions on piracy still can be reckoned 
as innovations in international law-making. It has been a continued and dynamic 
interaction between the SC, international organizations, individual states and the 
private sectors, and non-governmental organizations. 
For example, paragraph 4 of Resolution 1851 encourages all states and 
international organizations to ‘establish an international cooperation mechanism to 
act as a common point of contact…on all aspects’ of combating Somali pirates, and 
thus the former United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice convened the first 
meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) in New 
York on 14 January 2009.
188
 The latest 19
th




The CGPCS has established five working groups. Group 1 is entrusted with 
naval coordination, and is chaired by the UK. Group 2 is chaired by Denmark and 
deals with international and national legal issues. Group 3 is chaired by the US and 
works closely with the maritime industry and the IMO. Group 4 is chaired by Egypt 
and focuses mainly on public diplomacy. Group 5 is chaired by Italy and is 
responsible for identifying the financial networks of pirates. The CGPCS identified 
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itself as an international forum, which has brought together more than 60 countries 
and international organizations to work together and meet regularly for the purpose 
of preventing piracy off the Somali coast.
190
 
The CGPCS has two significant achievements. The first one, accomplished by 
the working Group 2, is the development of a legal framework for transferring 
sentenced pirates from prosecuting states to Somalia for incarceration. This has let 




The other contribution is the establishment of the International Trust Fund to 
Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
192
 The key 
purpose of setting up the Trust Fund is to support projects ranging from renovating 
overcrowded prisons to building up prosecution capacity in the region. By October 
2011, the Trust Fund had received about 8.3 million US dollars and the Board of the 
Fund has recommended the disbursement of about 7 million US dollars on a total of 
14 projects.
193
 From December 2012 to October 2016, it received another 13.4 
million US dollars, mainly for providing training and capacity building projects,
194
 
in areas such as facilitating prosecution
195
 and transferring prisoners.
196
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Another innovative way of cooperation was developed in the sphere of 
exchanging information between states and International Organizations. For 
example, The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) has 
developed a ‘maritime piracy global database’, which intends to integrate a diverse 




The main purpose of setting up the database is to circulate the information 
more effectively. In fact, it is quite necessary to develop an information sharing 
system, since it can be observed from these Resolutions or subsequent Reports 
submitted to the SC, that there are not just many, but perhaps too many international 
organizations, NGOs and respective organs of any individual state involved in the 
counter-piracy networks. For example, participants include: the IMO, the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
198
, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), EU Maritime Security Centre in the Horn of Africa 
(MSCHOA), European Police Office (Europol), United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the Baltic and the International Maritime Council (BIMCO), 
International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC-IMB), United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), etc., and the 
list can be much longer than one might expect.
199
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While the cooperative network among these organizations and related 
mechanisms
200
 cannot be thought as a traditional arena for custom or treaty-making 
or standard-setting, it does illustrate a more flexible and dynamic mechanism for 
formulating international norms, shaping mutual expectations, consolidating 
self-interests, and ultimately serving the interests of the international community.
201
 
After all, ‘each international law action contributes separately to the development of 
a specific norm as well as more generally to the overall capacity of international law 
to function effectively through a strong operating system.’
202
 That is to say, the SC 
intervened this issue by identifying the importance of cooperation obligation
203
 of 
UNCLOS in each Resolution concerning piracy at sea.
204
 It has also brought many 
participants into this issue area. In terms of broader participation, the records to date 
seem no need to verify further. The most interesting part of the process perhaps is 
whether any soft law or non-binding norms have been developed?  
The answer is simply ‘yes’. For example, CGPCS Working Group 2 started to 
discuss the privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) in 2009, though 
in that year, a conclusion could not be reached.
205
 In the first few years of the SC’s 
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consideration, it seems that it did not take private sector or other NGOs’ contribution 
into their resolutions. An explanation might be that there was no time to think about 
what private sectors can do. Looking back, the burden of responding quickly to 
international incidents and crisis always is always on the SC, related organizations 
and great powers. It may be pretty natural to ignore NGOs or private sectors or 
shipping industry in the first place. 
In any event, the SC first mentioned PCASP in the Preamble of Resolution 
2020, recognising the work of the IMO and CGPCS on PCASP in a short sentence. 
However, in Resolution 2077, the SC formally expressed its appreciation with 
respect to: 
The efforts made by the IMO and the shipping industry to 
develop and update guidance, best management practices, and 
recommendations to assist ships to prevent and suppress 
piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, including in the 
Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean area, and recognizing the 
work of the IMO, and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast 
of Somalia (CGPCS); in this regard, notes the efforts of the 
International Organization for Standardization, which has 
developed industry standards of training and certification 
for Private Maritime Security Companies when providing 
privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships 
in high-risk areas.206 
After Resolution 2077, it can be seen that the SC began to reiterate the 
importance of the IMO and private sectors in developing soft law guidance, 
recommendation and necessary standards concerning seafarers and PCASP for 
tackling ongoing piracy problems. Consequently, in the 2013 Report on Somali 
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piracy, the SC stated: 
A number of measures have led to a decline in attacks: 
improved international and regional cooperation on 
counter-piracy efforts, including better intelligence- and 
information-sharing; targeted actions by the international 
naval presence to discourage and disrupt Somali pirates; 
increased application of IMO guidance and of the Best 
Management Practices for Protection against Somalia-based 
Piracy, developed by the shipping industry; and prosecution 
of suspected pirates and imprisonment of those convicted. 
The adoption of self-protection and situational awareness 
measures by commercial ships, including the deployment of 
privately contracted armed security personnel on board 
vessels and vessel protection detachments, are also 
believed to have contributed to the decrease in piracy 
attacks.207 
The SC incrementally and gradually noted that NGOs such as the International 
Organization of Standardization and the shipping industry are all important in 
contributing to the norm setting process. Since Resolution 2184, the SC even further 
noted that ‘the joint counter-piracy efforts of States, regions, organizations, the 
maritime industry, the private sector, think tanks and civil society have resulted in a 
sharp decline in pirate attacks’.
208
 We will come back to this soft law-making 
mechanism concerning piracy at sea in Chapter 6. 
Though the SC cannot impose obligations to civil society or private sectors, 
past experiences in preventing blood diamonds or other regional conflicts did 
encourage or invite the private sector and civil society to cooperate with official 
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governments and international organizations.
209
  
In sum, while to encourage or urge further and deeper international cooperation 
is not an innovation only by SC resolutions, the SC has nonetheless undergone its 
own evolution under the context of the counter-piracy theme.  
VI. Conclusion 
It should be recalled firstly that the time when the 2005 SUA Protocol 
negotiations was undergone during the years after the 911 attacks was just the same 
period that SC and its resolutions were being issued for responding international 
peace and security. That is to say, the SC has simultaneously supplemented the 
normative development relating to maritime violence. It can be clearly seen that 
those SC resolutions have been made and taken as international law-making 
instruments in responding terrorism in general and piracy in specific scenarios. 
Before leaving this chapter, a last question needs to be answered. Is there any 
possibility that a conflict of norms scenario will arise between UNCLOS and SC 
resolutions? Yes, it is possible, but it largely depends on how we interpret ‘other 
rules of international law’ stipulated in Article 19(1). Based on the above analysis, 
before deciding Resolution 1540, the language ‘interdiction’ was deleted by the 
request of China. This indicates that members of the SC have been rather carefully 
discussing and formulating the terms and trying to avoid potential conflicts of 
interests. A further question would be if such conflict arises, can international law 
solve it?  
The answer might be straightforward. Article 103 of the UN Charter provides 
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that the Charter obligations shall prevail, provided the SC decision is legally 
binding.
210
 Thus the conflict is less likely to happen; and when it happens, the UN 
Charter is the solution.
211
 
It has been claimed that ‘the law rarely displays a tendency to respond too 
quickly to social change, and international law is no exception’.
212
 It is quite true in 
the sense of treaty or customary international law-making or under the context of 
litigation and dispute settlement procedure.  
Nonetheless, as this chapter shows, the SC can respond quickly to terrorism and 
piracy at sea. That is its unique merit and advantage, as long as the timing is right 
and the subject matter is about international peace and security.
213
 While Kelsen 
considered almost 60 years ago that the function of the SC is to preserve peace, not 
to enforce law,
214
 recent practice in the sphere of terrorism and piracy at sea has 
shown that the SC works far better on these issues than how it performed during the 
Cold War era. The SC has done more than preserving the peace. 
Yet when international crises and major incidents arise, what and how can the 
international community ask for quick response? Having recourse to the SC would 
be an answer, and perhaps the only answer. As Alvarez vividly put: 
The UN Security Council is the deus ex machina of the 
international legal system. Whenever international lawyers 
confront a legal gap-a perennial problem in a system lacking 
a single legislative organ, a credible police authority, or 
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a judiciary with compulsory jurisdiction or need to resolve 
a conflict between two competing legal principles in a system 
notoriously lacking a hierarchically superior settler of 
such conflicts, the Security Council is our potential “god 
in the wings” to resolve our difficulties.215 
International law-making is a political activity. This characteristic is especially 
evident by the composition of the SC and its rather speedy responses to international 
crises and incidents. The SC may impose firm obligations, it may fill legal gaps, it 
may create international institutions and tribunals, it may enforce sanctions, it may 
change the meaning of UNCLOS piracy provisions, etc. Yet, even the SC and its 
resolutions can be used as lawmaking instruments for addressing so many issues by 
its legislative power, a benevolent state or a normal man would never wish for more 
international crises and incidents. 
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Chapter 5  
The US Hegemony in Soft and Bilateral Law-Making: The 
Proliferation Security Initiative and Ship-Boarding Agreements 
‘I don’t drop players, I make changes.’ 
Bill Shankly (1973)1 
‘This is not a partnership of equals. Nothing close to it. If you are 
to be my vice president. You will do what I ask. And we will not have 
this conversation every time you feel uncomfortable with what I ask you 
to do, or how I choose to conduct myself. “That’s our dynamic”.’ 
President Francis J. ‘Frank’ Underwood, ‘House of Cards’, Season 3(2014), 
Episode 11.2 
I. Introduction 





 For this reason, the word ‘hegemony’ has rarely been seen as a word 
with positive connotations.
5
 However, whether we like it or not is one thing, what 
the reality it is would be another. The reality what we live in is the time of hegemony, 
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a time which has been considered that the United States is the only, lonely super 
power after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
6
 This means that the US is the 
dominant state in the word arena.
7
  
This chapter explores a set of hegemonic law-making issues by examining the 
origin and evolution of PSI, which is a set of enforcement measures for preventing 
and stopping at sea the transport of WMD, their delivery system, and related 
materials. 
The PSI has been described as an example of ‘multi-unilateralism’.
8
 It was 
initiated by the US and followed by more than 100 participants to date.
9
 Apparently, 
from commentators’ eye, it naturally contains connotations of unilateralism.
10
 
However, is it really an example of unilateralism? What is the legal nature of the PSI? 
Does it add new norms for combating maritime terrorism? Can we say that it has 
fulfilled what the US wanted thus it can be seen as evidence of hegemonic 
law-making? Has the US unilaterally made international law, created new obligation 
and formed new international norms, without needing the assistance of other states?  
To answer these questions, it will first introduce the PSI and analyse its legal 
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nature, applicable scope and participants. Second, this chapter will discuss whether 
the PSI and the UNSC terrorism-related resolutions enhance each other. Third, it 
will consider whether during the PSI’s initial formation, the concurrent 2005 SUA 
Protocol negotiations had an influence on the PSI. The final section will scrutinise 
11 bilateral ship-boarding agreements the US signed between 2004 and 2010.
11
 It 
will compare the features, advantages and usefulness of these bilateral treaties and 
their relationship with the PSI.  
Ultimately, as this chapter will argue, the PSI and US-led bilateral ship-barding 
agreements both illustrate the impetus and influence in leading normative 
development relating to maritime violence as well as showing the limits of the US 
hegemonic law-making power.  
II. Response to Incidents 
The PSI was announced by former US President George W. Bush in Krakow, 
Poland on 31 May 2003.
12
 The backdrop to this announcement was the incident of 
the So San ship interdiction at sea.
13
  
This interdiction occurred on 9 December 2002 in the Indian Ocean, some 600 
miles off the coast of Yemen,
14
 apparently on the high sea. The So San was a vessel 
with a clear North Korean flag on its funnel. The US navy had tracked the So San 
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for about a month since it left a North Korean port. The US government then asked a 
nearby Spanish navy warship Navarra to check on the vessel. When checked by the 
Spanish warship, the So San master said the ship was registered in Cambodia, and 
their cargo was for Yemen.
15
 However, no ship’s name as So San can be indentified 
in the international register of ships.  
Later on, the Cambodia government confirmed that there was a ship might be 
meeting the description of the So San ship, but it was registered under the name Pan 
Hope. Therefore, the Spanish navy suspected that it was a stateless vessel,
16
 and 
decided to aboard the vessel. At that moment, the So San was trying to run away, so 
the Spanish warship fired some warning shots and boarded the ship.
17
 
When the Spanish navy was checking the vessel, relevant papers showed that it 
was registered in Cambodia. They also found 15 Scud missiles and tanks containing 
a rocket-fuel additive and about 100 barrels of unidentified chemicals. The US navy 
then took control from the Spanish navy. Nevertheless, because Yemen government 
protested that it had legitimate reason for purchasing the Scud missiles from North 
Korea for Yemen’s national defence. The final decision was made by the reason of 




A notable trigger for developing the PSI was perhaps based on the statement 
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made by the US White House Spokesman Ari Fleisher when he was asked about the 
incident on 11 December 2002:  
‘There is no provision under international law prohibiting 
Yemen from accepting delivery of missiles from North 
Korea….while there is authority to stop and search, in this 
instance there is no clear authority to seize the shipment 
of the Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen and therefore 
the merchant vessel is being released.’19 
Another notable incident was the BBC China.
20
 It was revealed in December 
2003, but the incident occurred on 4 October 2003. It was a German-flagged ship 
carrying centrifuge parts, and those parts might be used for nuclear weapons. The 
ship departed from Malaysia and was on the way to Libya. The US asked the 
German government to stop and search the vessel in the Mediterranean Sea, but 
whether it was on the high seas or other maritime zones was not revealed.  
In fact, the issue was easier than the So San scenario, because the nationality of 
the ship was German. The US apparently pushed some pressure to the German 
government and had the ship owner agreed to bring it to Taranto, Italy, where it was 
detained. This incident was claimed by the US as a successful interdiction under the 
guidance of the PSI;
21
 however, it was also claimed by commentators that such a 
claim was not correct.
22
  
It is assumed that there are and must have had many other cases, but most of 
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these interdiction details are being kept secret.
23
 Analysts speculated that the 
purpose of keeping secret is to ‘protect intelligence sources and methods, or perhaps 
to hide any violations of international law or negative publicity’.
24
 
III. The Proliferation Security Initiative 
The PSI appeared to be a new channel for interdiction at sea outside of 
international treaties and multilateral export control regimes. It articulated the 
importance of countering proliferation once it has occurred and managing the 
consequences of WMD. In particular, interdiction of WMD-related materials gained 
more prominence.  
John Bolton, who has been called as ‘the architect of PSI’,
25
 recalled that the 
US was more interested in states who had real operational capabilities, including 
intelligence and military capabilities; thus the question about whether the EU should 
be invited was dismissed.
26
 The first meeting of the PSI was in Madrid, Spain on 12 
June 2003, with 11 states participating in the so-called ‘Core Group’: Australia, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK, and 
the US. The second meeting was held in July in Brisbane, Australia. A key subject of 
the discussion was ‘outreach’ and how to turn the PSI into a real operation.
27
  
Though some of the participants like Japan and Korea had some doubts about 
whether the USA was moving too fast and too aggressively,
28
 the third meeting was 
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held in Paris in early September 2003. The result was significant because 
participants reached an agreement about the Statement of Interdiction Principles. At 
this stage, as a British diplomat remarked, ‘we wanted an activity, not an 
organization’.
29
 Though the US kept China and Russia fully briefed on PSI progress, 
the US intended ‘not to leave PSI’s fate in the hands of others’.
30
 The sharp contrast 
was the Six-Party Talks on North Korea and EU’s participation in the negotiation of 
Iran’s nuclear weapons. In other words, the PSI participants ‘wanted to get 




A. Objective and Nature 
The objective of the PSI is to prevent WMD trafficking at sea. It is also a global 
effort that aims to stop shipments of WMD, their delivery system and related 
materials. It tries to establish a more dynamic, creative and active approach to 
preventing proliferation to or from states and non-state actors of such concern. This 




The PSI is a set of enforcement measures, not a formal treaty-based activity or 
an international organization with constitutive instrument. It is best understood as a 
kind of partnerships that aims to establish the basis of cooperation on specific 
scenarios when the situation arises.
33
 It does not create binding legal obligation for 
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 The most clear explanation about its objective can be found on the PSI official website, 
http://www.psi-online.info/   
33
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participants, but does represent a political commitment to form best practices to stop 
shipments of WMD. PSI participants attempts to use existing national and 
international legal authorities for relevant interdictions at sea.  
B. Participants and Scope 
The participants of the PSI have evolved significantly since 2003. In 2005, 
there were only 30 states; as of October 2015, it had 105 states in this interdiction 
framework.
34
 Among the Permanent five Members of the UN, however, China does 
not endorse the PSI.
35
 Furthermore, some countries with the capacity and incentive 
to utilise WMD related materials have not endorsed the PSI, such as Indonesia, India, 
Pakistan, South Africa, Egypt, and Brazil.
36
  
In August 2005, the Core Group was dismantled because the large number of 
states that wanted to join the PSI discussions and operations and meant that retaining 
the Core Group was not an appropriate option.
37
 An Operational Experts Group 
(OEG) had already been established in early 2004 to operationalise the PSI mission 
and Interdiction Principles. The OEG was composed of 21 members: the original 
Core Group states plus Argentina, Canada, Denmark, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, 
Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Turkey.
38
 OEG states play some leading roles 
in the PSI and those OEG meetings serve as a forum for discussing and developing 
                                                                                                                                                      
Initiative: Security vs. Freedom of Navigation’ (2005) 35 IYBHR 181, 195-196. 
34
 That is the latest number of participants, http://www.psi-online.info/   
35
 M Yu, ‘China’s Position on the Proliferation Security Initiative and Its Reappraisal’ (2010) 3 
Journal of East Asia and International Law 49. 
36
 See for example, TV Thomas, ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative: Towards Regulation of 
Navigational Freedoms in UNCLOS? An Indian Perspective’ (2009) 8 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 657. 
37
 SJ Koch, ‘Interdiction and Law Enforcement to Counter Nuclear Proliferation’ in NE Busch and 
JF Pilat (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation and Policy (Routledge 2015) 265, 267. 
38
 The list can be seen from the PSI website, 




concepts to further the effectiveness of the PSI. For example, the OEG seeks to 
develop and enhance PSI states’ capabilities by considering a range of issues, from 
legal matters to rapid-decision making in case of an interdiction.
39
 
There are basically three types of activities under the PSI cooperative 
framework. The first is formal meetings, including intelligence and experience 
sharing. The second is training exercises, the most important part of which is to 
learn and share shipping interdiction skills.
40
 The third is the actual seizure 
operations.
41
 Before 2009, the OEG met annually for about three to five times. 
There were also some regional meetings and workshops for sharing experiences and 
intelligence. In 2009, the OEG decided to meet more often at the regional level.
42
 
In 2011, the OEG states acknowledged the joint efforts of PSI participants, and 
took note of the need to shorten decision-making time and to help some participants 
develop capabilities to conduct real interdiction operations. The OEG thus 
formulated the Critical Capabilities and Practices (CCP), but there is no detailed 
information or public available news about the contents of the CCP, only a short 
statement on the US State Department website.
43
 
At the tenth anniversary of the PSI, participants met in Warsaw, Poland in May 
2013 and expressed their willingness to take more concrete steps and actions in 
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preventing the spread of WMD and its related materials. The Meeting produced four 
Statements on: strengthening the commitment of PSI participants; ensuring a robust 
PSI; enhancing the CCP; and strengthening national authorities for action and 
expanding strategic communications. 
In January 2016 at the Mid-Level Political Meeting of the PSI participants, 
Thomas Countryman, the Assistant Secretary of State served as Chairmen and 
summarised that the discussions at the Meeting highlighted the importance of PSI 
exercise rotations and reiterated the call to endorsing states to continue examining 
ways to strengthen national laws, including on export control. He also urged states to 
consolidate international legal frameworks, such as ‘through becoming Parties to the 
2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation and the 2010 Convention on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation’.
44
 
In sum, two points should be made: First, since the very beginning, though the 
PSI was unilaterally announced by the US President Bush, it did not fit into the 
category of unilateralism because all discussions and the formulation of the 
Interdiction Principles have been conducted in a multilateral way. Therefore, 
hegemonic law-making may not be necessarily reflecting the approach of 
unilateralism, it can be multilateralism in nature, or can contain the component of 
multilateralism. Particularly if we define multilateralism as ‘the cooperation of three 
or more states in a given area of international relations’, and define unilateralism as 
‘a tendency to opt out of multilateral framework (whether existing or proposed) or to 
act alone in addressing a particular global or regional challenge rather than choosing 
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to participate in collective action’.
45
 Second, though the PSI has no formal 
organizational structure, and was not designed as a treaty-based institution, its 
Political Meetings with all participants may be seen as ‘the assembly of States 
parties’; and the OEG states may be thought as ‘the executive body and the focal 
point to a secretariat’.
46
  
C. Statement of Interdiction Principles 
The essence the PSI is reflected in its Statement of Interdiction Principles,
47
 
which calls to action all states concerned with WMD proliferation’s threat to 
international peace and security. First, states are urged to undertake effective 
measures to interdict the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery system and 
related materials to and from states and non-state actors.  
Second, states should procedures for a rapid exchange of intelligence and 
information concerning suspected WMD proliferation activities. The Statement also 
recommends to dedicating appropriate resources to interdiction operation and 
capabilities to maximising coordination with all participants.  
Third, states are encouraged to review and strengthen their relevant national 
authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen 
relevant international law in supporting these commitment.  
Fourth, the Statement aims to take specific actions in interdiction efforts 
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concerning cargoes of WMD, their delivery system and related materials, to the 
extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with obligations under 
relevant international legal frameworks. 
The Preamble of the Statement of Interdiction Principles illustrates that 
participants are ‘committed to establish a more coordinated and effective basis 
through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related 
materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors’. Participants should also 
consider their own national legal authorities and in accordance with relevant 
international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. There are 
only four paragraphs (principles) in the Statement. The first three principles reiterate 
the objectives and scope of the PSI:    
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert 
with other states, for interdicting the transfer or 
transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related 
materials to and from states and non-state actors of 
proliferation concern. "States or non-state actors of 
proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries 
or entities that the PSI participants involved establish 
should be subject to interdiction activities because they 
are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to 
develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons 
and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either 
selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery 
systems, or related materials. 
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of 
relevant information concerning suspected proliferation 
activity, protecting the confidential character of 
classified information provided by other states as part of 
this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and 




maximize coordination among participants in interdiction 
efforts. 
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national 
legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these 
objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary relevant 
international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to 
support these commitments. 
Some general features of the first three paragraphs can be identified: First of all, 





 had not been discussed. It can be speculated that at that time, 
the US and the Core Group states were intending to go through the UNSC for 
requesting a resolution in addressing the problem of WMD and related materials. 
Second, the targets of the PSI expand to non-state actors, which is identical with the 
UNSC Resolution 1540. Third, the three principles are about intelligence sharing, 
though it has been observed that ‘there are no present plans to turn the PSI into a 
new intelligence sharing forum’.
50
  
The most important part is Principle 4, as can be seen below: 
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts 
regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or 
related materials, to the extent their national legal 
authorities permit and consistent with their obligations 
under international law and frameworks, to include: 
a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any 
such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of 
proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons 
subject to their jurisdiction to do so. 
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b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good 
cause shown by another state, to take action to board 
and search any vessel flying their flag in their 
internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond 
the territorial seas of any other state, that is 
reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to 
or from states or non-state actors of proliferation 
concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified. 
c. To seriously consider providing consent under the 
appropriate circumstances to the boarding and 
searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and 
to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such 
vessels that may be identified by such states. 
d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or 
search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or 
contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are 
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or 
from states or non-state actors of proliferation 
concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; 
and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or 
leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial 
seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such 
cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject 
to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior 
to entry. 
e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good 
cause shown by another state, to (1) require aircraft 
that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes 
to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation 
concern and that are transiting their airspace to land 
for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are 
identified; and/or (2) deny aircraft reasonably 
suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights 




f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are 
used as transshipment points for shipment of such 
cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of 
proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, 
or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of 
carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that 
are identified. 
The first issue that Principle 4 would encounter is that there is no definition 
with regard to ‘WMD, its delivery system and related materials’. This definitional 
vagueness perhaps can be solved by the UNSC Resolution 1540, though the 
definition included in the Resolution still is not so clear. 
Principle 4(a) emphasises the significant role of non-state actors and the flag 
state in taking actions against proliferation. In referring to ‘assist in the transport’ 
and ‘any persons subject to their jurisdiction’, ‘assist’ indicates that the real actions 
in this category can be quite broad. States would need sufficient intelligence to 
verify whether the potential suspects are really assisting the transport or not. Also, 
‘any persons’ could include not only the master and crew of the ship, but also the 
ship owner or the ship’s shareholders. 
Principle 4(b) reaffirms the responsibility of the flag state in enforcing its 
national law or relevant international law within or beyond their territorial sea. It 
provides conditions that if a state has no capability to interdict a ship suspected in 
transporting WMD and related materials, it may request another state with ‘good 
cause’ to help interdict the ship ‘reasonably suspected’ of transporting those WMD 
materials . However, there is no any standard in defining or deciding the range of 




responding to such a request, each state will, of necessity, decide for itself whether 
the information provided by the requesting state warrants acceding to the request.’
51
  
It seems that it fully depends on each state’s own discretion. Likewise, it uses 
similar but not totally identical language of UNCLOS. For example, UNCLOS 
Article 108 provides ‘reasonable grounds for believing’,
52
 Article 110 provides 
‘reasonable grounds for suspecting’, Article 110(3) further provides ‘if the 
suspicions prove to be unfounded’, then the requesting state shall bear 
responsibility.
53
 But there are no safeguards referenced in the Interdiction 
Principles.  
Moreover, to confirm that the condition is satisfied of fitting the reasonable 
suspicion, a state would need all relevant intelligence. Yet, as Allen noted, ‘If forced 
to choose between disclosing intelligence that might reveal its sources and 
methods—particularly if the source is another state’s intelligence agencies or 
assets—or withholding the information, knowing that it will therefore be unable to 
discharge its burden of proof, most states will choose the latter course of action.’
54
 
Principle 4(c) confirms the exclusive right of the flag state over ships flying 
their flag. However, because the PSI does not contain strict legal obligation, it can 
only be seen as ‘an instrument falling in the realm of soft law’.
55
 Thus the PSI only 
suggests ‘to seriously consider’ providing consent. Further, to reinforce this 
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consideration, the US subsequently signed the 11 ship-boarding agreements, which 
will be discussed in a later section. 
Principle 4(d) concerns the boarding zones at sea, from the internal water to the 
high seas. As discussed in Chapter 2, a mere transportation of WMD, delivery 
system and its related materials passing a coastal state’s territorial sea may not be 
considered to be violating UNCLOS Article 19(2) with respect to innocent passage. 
Particularly the shipment of dual-use materials is naturally difficult to identify.
56
 If 
in the contiguous zone, the coastal state only has limited power in customs, fiscal, 
immigration and sanitation issues; accordingly, it would be difficult to use the 
Statement of Principles to trump the UNCLOS. Another prerequisite for PSI 
participants is that a participating state needs to adopt a domestic law for 
criminalizing the transportation of WMD and related materials. 
Principle 4(e) extends the interdiction actions from the sea to the air and land. 
As the US State Department illustrated, ‘PSI actions may be taken to interdict 
shipments transported by land and air. PSI exercises have been held to practice 
interdictions in all three environments. PSI experts have exchanged information on 
their respective legal authorities regarding potential air interceptions, and are 
continuing to discuss how these authorities might be applied.’
57
 Perhaps this is the 
least problematic principle, because there is no international law restricting 
interdiction of WMD and related materials in a state’s land territory. Also, if there is 
a domestic legislation concerning the crime of transferring WMD and its related 
materials, then to require a given aircraft to land or to deny entry into a state’s 
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In short, the Statement shows that the nature of the commitment and the 
language used reveal that it is a political commitment: a gentlemen’s agreement. The 
key feature of the Principles is that any action towards concrete implementation of 
the PSI is founded on the consent of the states concerned. That means the basis of 
interdiction activities is based on the willingness of participants either to take or 
allow those interdictions.
59
 States wish to inspect and board a foreign vessel on the 
high seas suspected of transporting WMD will need prior consent of the flag state. 
Also, vessels are suspected of transporting WMD to states or non-state actors 
through internal water, territorial sea, or contiguous zone can be interdicted only by 
the coastal state, or by prior consent of the coastal state. 
D. Effectiveness 
Due to insufficient information, it is very difficult to analyse whether the PSI 
and the Interdiction Principles are really useful and effective in real operations. 
Almost all commentators have mentioned this difficulty. For example, Dunne said 
that ‘the lack of available information on PSI interdictions, and a reluctance to 
attribute interdictions to the PSI, makes meaningful analysis of real cases difficult.’
60
 
Guilfoyle said that ‘the effectiveness of the PSI…is very hard to judge, principally 
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because these are not the type of activity that tends to be publicly reported.’
61
 Klein 
noted that ‘information as to what interdictions have actually taken place under the 
rubric of the PSI is scarce’.
62
 This means that even we wanted to check whether 
sufficient state practices exist would be quite impossible.  
Moreover, it has been questioned whether PSI has really contributed to some 
interdictions, since the US have had some cooperative mechanisms with specific 
states to interdict WMD shipments even before the establishment of the PSI.
63
 
Though there is no sufficient information regarding real interdictions, a 
calendar of PSI training exercises is posted on the official websites of the US State 
Department
64
 and the PSI official website.
65
 We can presume that through the joint 
training exercises, participants have gained some knowledge and experiences in 
interdicting WMD, its delivery system and related materials.  
In the initial years of the PSI, commentators questioned whether the PSI was 
consistent with UNCLOS or whether it was legal under international of the sea.
66
 
Over the past decade, those concerns ‘seem to have been largely superseded by the 
smooth management of its activities’.
67
 Further, the relevant UNSC resolutions help 
to dissolve some doubts regarding the PSI. In short, though the nature of the PSI 
Interdiction Principles are ‘vague in nature’, it does not change or infringe the 
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The PSI also promotes multilateral cooperative mechanisms.
69
 At the very 
least, the PSI ‘has helped to galvanize a widespread consensus on the pre-eminence 




IV. Relationship with the UN Security Council Resolutions 
The US maintains the position that the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles 
is consistent with the UNSC resolution 1540, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter on 28 April 2004. Pursuant to Resolution 1540, it ‘calls upon all States, in 
accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with 
international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, 
chemical or biological weapons, their means, and related materials.’
71
 While this 
Resolution does not explicitly mention the PSI, nor does it authorise interdiction 
operations by all states, the quoted paragraph can be considered as a sort of an 
implicit endorsement of the PSI.
72
  
Resolution 1540 imposes a general obligation to prevent transhipment of WMD 
and related materials. The Resolution also obliges all states to establish domestic 
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controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means 
of delivery.
73
 It further decides that all states shall: 
Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate 
effective national export and trans-shipment controls over 
such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to 
control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and 
controls on providing funds and services related to such 
export and trans-shipment such as financing, and 
transporting that would contribute to proliferation.74  
Therefore, Resolution 1540 was originally invoked by the US to legitimise the 
PSI, and is certainly more important than the 1992 UNSC presidential statement 




Since 2006, the UNSC has adopted a series of resolutions to tackle North Korea 
and Iran’s nuclear proliferation. The SC adopted Resolution 1718 in response to 
North Korea’s nuclear test.
76
 This Resolution decides:  
In order to ensure compliance with the requirements of this 
paragraph, and thereby preventing illicit trafficking in 
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of 
delivery and related materials, all Member States are called 
upon to take, in accordance with their national authorities 
and legislation, and consistent with international law, 
cooperative action including through inspection of cargo to 
and from the DPRK, as necessary.77  
As we can see, in this paragraph, it only ‘call upon’ member states to take 
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actions, implying a rather implicit and voluntary basis for interdicting North Korea’s 
WMD and related materials. 
Following North Korea’s subsequent nuclear bomb tests in 2009, 2013 and 
2016, the SC adopted three UN Charter Chapter VII Resolutions 1874, 2094 and 
2321 in response.
78
 Resolution 1874 only uses two voluntary paragraphs to ‘call 
upon’ states to interdict WMD and related materials, requiring the ‘reasonable 
grounds to believe’ that the suspect ship holds these substances and requiring flag 
state consent if it is on the high seas.
79
  
Resolution 2094 uses a rather strong attitude in dealing with the same nuclear 
weapons test problem, deciding that ‘if any vessel has refused to allow an inspection 
after such an inspection has been authorized by the vessel’s flag State,’
80
 or if any 
North Korean vessel has refused to be inspected, then all states shall not allow the 
vessels enter into their ports. It further calls upon states to ‘deny permission to any 
aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information 
that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, 
sale, transfer or export’
81
 with regard to WMD, its delivery system and related 
materials. This decision is just like what PSI Interdiction Principle 4(e) stipulates. It 




Moreover, Resolution 2321 decides that if there are ‘reasonable grounds to 
                                                     
78
 UN Doc S/Res/1874 (12 June 2009); UN Doc S/Res/2094 (7 March 2013), UN Doc S/Res/2321 
( 30 November 2016) 
79
 S/Res/1874, para. 12-13. 
80




 See more detailed analysis on other aspects of the Resolution 2094, KT Jordan, ‘United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 2094 on Nuclear Nonproliferation in North Korea: Introductory Note’ 




believe if the vessels are or have been related to nuclear-or ballistic missile-related 
programmes or activities’, member states shall require the flag state to take any one 
or all the four measures: (1) de-flag the vessel; (2) direct the vessel to a port 
identified by the SC; (3) prohibit a designated vessel from entering their ports, unless 
in case of emergency; freeze the vessel’s asset.
83
 
As for tackling Iran’s WMD and nuclear proliferation situation, the SC adopted 
1737, 1747, 1803 and 1929.
84
 These Resolutions on Iran’s nuclear programme are 
more or less modelled on Resolutions on North Korea. In Resolution 1737, it decided 
that all states shall: 
Take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or 
transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or 
by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft 
to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or 
not originating in their territories, of all items, 
materials, equipment, goods and technology which could 
contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or 
heavy water-related activities, or to the development of 
nuclear weapon delivery systems.85  
Resolution 1747, 1803 and 1929 all tried to emphasize and enhance the 
importance of the sanctions on Iran. Resolution 1929 is linked to the PSI, it calls 
upon all states to ‘inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and 
legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and 
relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Iran, in their 
territory, including seaports and airports,’
86
 if there are reasonable grounds to 
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believe the cargo contains WMD and related materials. 
Ultimately, these SC Resolutions can be recognized as ‘relevant international 
law’, in terms of acting under Chapter VII, and relates to international peace and 
security. However, they only have limited effects on practical enforcement 
operations at sea.  
First, Resolution 1540 does not specifically mention ‘interdiction’ in the texts. 
Second, as can be seen clearly, these Resolutions all required flag state consent for 
taking those effective measures. This means that the SC did not create new 
international law with respect to ship-boarding procedure,
87
 thus these Resolutions 
do not have a substantive impact on a flag state’s exclusive jurisdiction and do not 
impair the fundamental principle of freedom of navigation.
88
 
Perhaps Bolton had already noticed this would happen someday, and thus he 
said at the initial stage of the PSI, ‘whether there are gaps or ambiguities in our 
authorities, we may consider seeking additional sources for such authority, as 
circumstance dictate. What we do not believe, however, is that only the Security 
Council can grant the authority we need, and that may be the real source of the 
criticism we face.’
89
 Despite Bolton’s statement, over time, the US has not 
conducted any unilateral interdiction at sea over other state’s vessel. In a similar vein, 
the PSI participants have not sought to find other sources to justify the PSI 
Interdiction Principles.  
One explanation for not having recourse to other sources might be that there is 
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no other method to justify a non-consensual flag state jurisdiction on the high seas. 
A second explanation might be that the US knew that it would be difficult to change 
existing law so it tried to use the bilateral ship-boarding agreements with flag of 
convenience states, to circumventing some difficulties and there will still be able to 
produce some results in combating maritime terrorism. Nonetheless, this cannot 
explain why there has not concluded any new bilateral ship-boarding agreements 
since 2010. A third explanation might be that the US or those initial like-minded 
states never had the idea to create a ‘unilateral norm of intervention which could, 
perhaps, one day be used against its own interests.’
90
  
In sum, even if the UNSC resolutions can be taken as a source of international 
law in combating maritime terrorism, interdiction needs those resolutions to 
authorise the enforcement power more directly and concretely. What the 
international community has in hand is totally not enough, hence the flag state 
jurisdiction prevails. It would be unrealistic to highlight the PSI’s legitimacy or 
effectiveness by just relying on the UNSC resolutions.
91
  
V. US-Led Bilateral Ship-Boarding Agreements 
To increase the influence of the PSI and to broaden the involvement of states, 
the US started to negotiate and conclude bilateral ship-boarding agreements in 2004. 
The US has been negotiating with these flag of convenience states since 2004. 
Sequentially, The US concluded bilateral-ship boarding agreements with Liberia,
92
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 the Marshall Islands
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 in 2007; with the Bahamas
100
 in 2008. The US further 
concluded two agreements with Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
101
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Since the last agreement signed in May 2010 with Saint Vincent and 
Grenadines, there have been no further agreements concluded with other states. This 
does not mean there is no possibility to negotiate agreements with other states. It 
was noted that the US initially intended to conclude about 20 agreements, including 
with Greece, but some have failed.
104
 The rationale behind these bilateral 
agreements is that these states have limited security forces and capacity to enforce 




The US State Department expressly states that these agreements are modelled 
after the agreements between the US and Caribbean states on counter-narcotics 
trafficking.
106
 In essence, the object and purpose of forming these bilateral 
agreements is to promote cooperation between the parties to enable them to prevent 
the transportation of WMD proliferation. 
A. General Features 
In the preambles of the bilateral agreements, they all recall some general 
sources of international law concerning WMD. These documents include the 31 
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January 1992 UNSC Presidential statement, the UNSC Resolution 1540, 1968 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1973 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, 1993 Convection on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction and the 2002 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). Most of the 
preambles state that the agreement is guided by the PSI Statement of Interdiction 
Principles, with the exception of the US-Liberia’s agreement, which does not 
mention the PSI. Also, all agreements reference the customary international law of 
the sea and UNCLOS. 
Each of the agreements defines some basic terms concerning WMD and its 
related materials. The agreements also define states and non-state actors as ‘those 
countries or entities’ who are believed to engage in trafficking WMD, their delivery 
system and related materials. Security force vessels which are used to interdict at sea 




One of the difficulties in the definition is that related materials are defined as 
‘materials, equipment and technology, of whatever nature, which are related to and 
destined for use in the development, production, utilization, or delivery of WMD’.
108
 
These agreements do not address dual-use materials, but it has been noticed that 
most of the related materials are dual-use in nature.
109
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 These agreements do not specifically criminalise WMD trafficking, instead, 
leaving this issue for the flag state to decide based on its ‘constitution and laws’.
110
 
While the flag state has primary jurisdiction, it may waive its primary right and 
consent to the exercise of jurisdiction of the other party.
111
  
In general law enforcement situations, to waive the right of a flag state’s 
jurisdiction to prosecute does not mean the boarding state can enforce the domestic 
law of the other party. The reason is simply that no state can enforce any country’s 
domestic law. So conceptually speaking, a distinction should be made between the 
consent to board a ship and the consent to exercise further jurisdiction to prosecute 
by using the boarding state’s domestic law.  
In fact, under the context of US counter-narcotics scenarios, there is no such 
competing jurisdictional issue, because a flag state’s consent will make the ship 
‘subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.’
112
 There is a special design with 
respect to the procedure for settling jurisdictional issue in the contiguous zone, and 
that is the boarding state ‘shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction’.
113
 However, 
if the scenario is a suspect ship ‘fleeing from the territorial sea’ from a party’s 
territorial sea, then that party shall obtain the jurisdiction. 
While it is clear that the flag state still has the primary jurisdiction, if there is 
no relevant domestic law concerning these WMD crimes in these states or there is 
no capability or no willingness to enforce such domestic law, in effect let the US 
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have jurisdiction to prosecute the suspects. However, until now, it seems that there is 
no such case that has been prosecuted in this matter. 
As noted above, information and intelligence are critical in interdicting ships 
carrying WMD and related materials. Thus these agreements emphasise the parties 
shall ensure the security forces are informed of its respective applicable laws and 
policies. An important designation is to set up ‘points of contact’ for exchanging 
relevant information, detailed communication, decisions and instructions. And the 
points of contacts shall ‘have the capability to receive, process and respond to 
requests and reports “at any time”.’
114
 
B. Deemed Consent for Ship-Boarding 
Once the nationality of a suspect ship can be confirmed by the flag state, or ‘no 
documentation or other physical evidence of nationality is available’,
115
 the 
requesting state can ‘assimilate the vessel to a ship without nationality in accordance 
of international law’.
116
 This ‘international law’ used here certainly reflects 
UNCLOS Article 110(1)(c). This point is apparently important by taking account of 
the So San incident. In terms of information, the contents of any request shall 
contain some basic information, for example, the ship’s name, the registration 
number, home port and the port of origin and destination. If the request is sent orally, 
then the requesting party ‘shall confirm the request in writing by facsimile or e-mail 
as soon as possible’.
117
 
After receiving the request, the requested party has four choices: (1) to conduct 
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the boarding by its self; (2) to authorise the boarding by the requesting state; (3) to 
board the suspect ship together with the requesting party; (4) to deny the 
permission.
118
 However, these agreements provide a limited time for responding to 
the request; if there is no response in the time agreed, then the requesting party ‘will 
be deemed to have been authorized to board the suspect vessel for the purpose of 
inspecting the vessels documents, questioning the persons on board, and searching 
the vessel to determine whether it is engaged in proliferation by sea’.
119
 There are 
only two types of the limited time: either ‘two’ hours or ‘four’ hours. The two hours 
group include Liberia, Panama, Mongolia, Belize, Bahamas, Antigua and Barbuda, 
and Saint Vincent and Grenadines.
120
 The four hours group’s members are the 
Marshall Islands, Croatia, Cyprus and Malta.
121
  
An exception is the condition stipulated in US-Croatia Agreement, which does 
not grant the deemed or tacit consent to the requesting party, but only provides that a 
request shall receive response within four hours. The requested party may ask for 
‘additional information and conditions relating to responsibility for and the extent of 
measures to be taken.’
122
 Most importantly, the requesting sate ‘shall not board the 
vessel without the express written authorization’ from the requested state.
123
 
Another special feature of these bilateral ship-boarding agreements is that the 
agreement may confer rights to third parties. In terms of VCLT, a treaty ‘does not 
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create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent’.
124
 However, 
in the bilateral agreements with Liberia, Panama, the Marshall Islands, Mongolia, 
Antigua and Barbuda, and Saint Vincent and Grenadines, the parties ‘may extend, 
mutatis mutandis, all rights concerning suspect vessels claiming its nationality’ to 




 The bilateral agreements provide some safeguards in taking account of the 
security of the vessel and cargo, including ‘not to endanger the safety of life at sea’ 
and ‘not to prejudice the commercial or legal interests’ of the flag state.
126
 With 
available means and measures, account is also taken in considering international 
human rights law and environmental circumstances. A further safeguard is related to 
the use of force, the specific provision emphasise that the use of force ‘shall be 
avoided except when necessary’ to ensure the security forces and the crew members 
on board,
127
 and the use of force ‘shall not exceed the minimum degree of the force 
which is necessary and reasonable’.
128
  
Also, this kind of provision reminds the parties that one shall not impair the 
inherent right of self-defence of either party. Moreover, there is one provision related 
to an interdiction that is unwarranted or cause ‘damage, harm, injury, death or loss 
resulting from an operation’.
129
 Likewise, if any loss or death is suffered by ‘any 
improper or unreasonable action’, the parties shall consult at the request of either 
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It has been noted that the US has used ‘its comparative advantages in 
diplomatic and legal resources’
131
 with ‘unequal bargaining power’ and to tailor 
these bilateral agreements to US interest and advantage.
132
 Hence ‘it is problematic 




An example of how this unequal bargaining power is wielded is the two-hour or 
four-hour time limit to the deemed authorisation boarding procedure. In terms of 
practicality, both the two-hour and four-hour scheme are ‘grossly inadequate’
134
 for 
evaluating the information provided by the requesting state, thus this arrangement 
can be thought as ‘designed to limit rather than encourage consultation’
135
 or 
‘merely serving as a window-dressing acknowledgement’.
136
 Ultimately, it does not 
make sense for any state to verify relevant WMD information in such a short time, 
since the nature of WMD interdiction cannot be accomplished in only a few 
hours.
137
 In foreseeable scenarios, it is almost impracticable for those less powerful 
and less capable states to take on the interdiction role. 
A connected issue pertains to the provision concerning third parties. It is 
observed that the US ’may seek permission from the flag state to permit a third state 
to conduct the boarding’.
138
 However, this kind of arrangement perhaps can only be 
made in a bilateral agreement led by the US. In fact, this legal strategy is reasonable 
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from the position of a hegemon.
139
 Krisch explained that bilateral negotiations are 
‘far more likely to be influenced by the superior power of one party than multilateral 
negotiations,…the bilateral from is also more receptive to exceptional rules for 
powerful states.’
140
 This explanation is precisely the case in negotiating the PSI 
bilateral agreements. In the sense of filling gaps in law, these treaties do help to 
close some gaps left in UNCLOS, but there are only eleven agreements which is 
simply too few to change existing international law. The reality is that no any new 
agreement has been concluded in the past few years. 
In sum, the rules stipulated in the PSI Interdiction Principles and related 
bilateral agreements have ‘not been proven to be agent for change at all’.
141
 Though 
the PSI Interdiction Principles may not be seen as legal revolution in designing the 
terms and conditions of the agreements, they have been considered as some sort of 
‘evolutionary bilateral results of the multilateral accord’.
142
 This multilateral accord 
indicates that the SUA Protocol negotiation had some impact on the bilateral PSI 
agreements. The question is how and to what extent the SUA Protocol influenced the 
making of bilateral agreements. 
VI. The PSI as International Law-Making? 
Whether the PSI, its Statement of Interdiction Principles and those bilateral 
agreements have some impact to change customary international law concerning 
interdicting WMD has been questioned. Perry has argued that the PSI ‘will tend to 
give counterproliferation interdictions the strength of customary international 
law’,
143
 although he did mention the importance of both the elements of customary 
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international law, namely, opinio juris and state practice.  
However, there are two factors which he considered much more important: the 
growing number of ‘specially affected states’ and ‘the ability of a hegemonic 
coalition to gradually force acceptance of a customary norm upon the world 
community through the persistent exercise of power’
144
. Hence his observation 
emphasized the role of state practice in shaping customary international law.  
In addition, Perry did not add any evidence on the element of opinio juris. 
Doodlin also made a similar argument. He considered the hegemonic role of the US 
will be bringing more state practice and will be ‘gradually establishing it as an 




Perry and Doodline are both incorrect about the process of the formation of 
customary international law. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ stated 
that in all events, customary international law should be ‘of a fundamentally 
norm-creating character’.
146
 What the Court appears to have meant is that such a 
rule should be one capable of binding states generally. opinio juris is that states 
believe that a practice generally contains a legal obligation, or the intention to treat it 
as obligatory.
147
 Such a belief should be complemented by ‘whether acting 
unilaterally or conjointly, were or shortly became parties’ to a convention in question, 
at the same time, should acting actually or potentially in the application of such a 
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State practice consists of what states do and say factually, and what they are 
perceived to be doing and saying. State practice may be voluntary or involuntary in 
the process of forming customary international law. In the Nicaragua case, the Court 
stated that it ‘has to emphasize that, as was observed in the North Continental Shelf 
cases, for a new customary law to be formed, not only must the acts concerned 
‘amount to settled practice’, but they must be accompanied by the opinio juris sive 
necessitates. Either the States taking such action or other states in a position to react 
to it, states must have behaved so their conduct is ‘evidence of a belief that this 
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.’
149
 
Since the nature of the PSI is only a political commitment without indicating a 
legal obligation, there should be no ‘fundamentally norm creating character’ 
contained in the PSI. Furthermore, the rationale of the US bilateral ship-boarding 
agreements with those ‘flag of convenience’ states is that these treaties reveal they 
need a formal treaty and other kinds of consent from the flag state. These bilateral 
treaties exemplify the reality that they are designed for reinforcing contemporary 
law, rather than creating new norms and thus do not have any substantive impact on 
the formation of customary international law.  
To a large extent, Perry and Doodlin’s view reflect some concerns about a 
hegemon or some other great powers’ intention to change existing law or to 
implicitly create law only through state practice.
150
 However, even those who claim 
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‘the more the practice, the less the need for the subjective elements,’
151
 still admit 
that ‘it is necessary to demonstrate some sort of opinio juris’.
152
 While scholars 
emphasise one side or the other element of customary international law,
153
 
international courts and tribunals ‘consistently apply the two-element approach in 
ascertaining whether a rule of customary international law has emerged.’
154
 This is 
why Klein commented that ‘the extent that the PSI is likely to achieve changes in 
international law appears to be limited by the very nature of the activity’.
155
  
In addition, since the PSI is a political commitment, if the PSI participants do 
not follow the Statement of Interdiction Principles, there will be no legal 
consequences but only political consequences; this feature shows ‘the political 




Also, there is shortage of available information regarding PSI interdictions. 
Even if there are many state practices of interdiction, the rationale for keeping 
interdiction activities as secrets ‘tends to diminish the likelihood’ of forming new 
international norms.
157
 Furthermore, even if someone wishes to argue that there is 
an intention to create a binding obligation or that clear opino juris exist, one will 
also encounter contradictory opinions. For example, Byers commented that it should 
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not be assumed that the US is seeking to change customary international law in this 
area.
158
   
In sum, it is generally accepted that hegemons or great powers always wield 
more influence on the formation of international law, regardless of what kinds of 
law.
159
 The nature of the PSI is still facing the fundamental difficulty of lacking 
opinio juris in the process for forming customary international law. Consequently, 




VII. Alternative Explanations concerning International Law-Making 
Nonetheless, if we do not take such a traditional, formal and strict view point in 
considering international law-making, the conclusion will be quite different. In a 
more dynamic and broader concept of international law or international 
law-making,
161
 the PSI suffices to be deemed as an agent of international 
law-making. 
At least three approaches can be used to accord the PSI a sort of international 
law-making. First, according to Pauwelyn et al, an informal international 
law-making under the context of global governance contains three elements: output, 
process and actors. Output refers to an international cooperation which does not 
generate a formal treaty or other traditional sources of international law, but 
produces some ‘guideline, standard, declaration, or even more informal policy 
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 Process indicates that an international cooperation 
‘occurs in a loosely organized network or forum rather than traditional international 
organization’.
163
 Actors refer to participants other than traditional diplomatic actors, 
such as other ministries or domestic regulators.
164
 Accordingly, the concept of 
informal international law-making is defined as: 
Cross-border cooperation between public authorities, with 
or without the participation of private actors and/or 
international organizations, in a form other than a 
traditional international organization, and /or as between 
actors other than traditional diplomatic actors and/or 
which does not result in a formal treaty or other traditional 
sources of international law.165  
If we apply this concept of international law-making to the PSI, these scholars 
argue that it is qualified as informal international law-making.
166
 However, they do 
not specify why and how in detail and do not discuss elements of the PSI. As the 
aforementioned shows, in terms of output, the PSI has not created new customary 
norms or a general multilateral treaty in shipping interdiction on the high seas.
167
 
Nonetheless, the PSI does have the Statement of Interdiction Principles and has 
generated the Critical Capability and Practice initiative in doing training drills. 
Therefore, these documents suffice to be seen as output in the concept of informal 
international law-making. 
 In terms of process, though the PSI is not an organization but an activity, its 
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members have ‘repeatedly expressed commitments and the interests of the states 
acting within the PSI framework to work more actively’,
168
 and its informal 
network has evolved over time. Now it has a regular political meeting and OEG, 
with the former analogous to an informal assembly, and the latter an executive body.  
In terms of actors, John Bolton recalled in December 2003, ‘in fact, with the 
adoption of the statement of interdiction principles, there was not really much more 
for the diplomats to do except hand over responsibility to their operational 
colleagues.’
169
 Thus we can speculate that the operational activities are performed 
by navy, coast guard or some other intelligence or customs officials. These actors 
certainly are in the category of informal law-making. In short, with the sharing of 
experiences throughout the network, an international cooperative norm is merging in 
this WMD interdiction issue area. 
A second approach is the New Haven School’s policy-orientated approach. It 
can be seen as singling out the ‘process’ factor from the above approach.
170
 New 
Haven School sees law-making or norm-forming processes as reflecting action and 
reaction, claim and counterclaim by states or other participants in the international 
community.
171
 It is dynamic in the sense that this approach takes a lot of values, 
choices and political power into consideration.
172
 However, one of the criticisms it 
received is that the way it sees law and law-making processes at the service of a 
given state or a great power’s preference. Hence Kolb argued that ‘this approach is 
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Nonetheless, the criticism of this approach can also mirror its own merit. The 
reason is that traditional source doctrine does not accord much value to a hegemon 
or great power’s role in international law-making. This is because in the context of 
forming customary international law or treaty law, a hegemon or superpower cannot 
have a more influential position in this law-making process. Though powerful states 
may have more widespread state practices and certainly have more opportunities to 
impose their opinions and interests upon other less power states, they do not have 
more votes than other states.
174
  
The difficulty of making or changing customary international law or 
multilateral treaty law opens up the possibility of making more non-binding norms, 
instruments
175
 and informal policy and cooperative networks.
176
 This phenomenon 
has occurred not only in our time, but also throughout history. As Krisch observed, 
when the international legal order cannot be fully controlled by a given hegemon in 
a certain time, it will try to broaden the scope of soft law and make the law-making 
process more flexible and informal.
177
 This observation rightly grasps the essence 
of the PSI. Again, here we see the PSI as a creature of US hegemony, but the US did 
not go it alone by using unilateralism. Rather, the US established the PSI in a more 
subtle and flexible way by building the PSI as an activity, not an organization. The 
reason for utilising this mechanism may be speed and efficiency. Hence it can be 
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argued that the PSI reflects a dynamic mechanism of cooperation in formation, or a 
process of creating a non-binding norm. 
A further question would be, if the PSI contains a soft law and non-binding 
norm format, what exactly is this norm? How should we describe it? In terms of 
time sequence, the PSI was initiated in 2003, then the USC Resolution 1540 
followed in 2004, and the SUA Protocol was adopted in 2005. In between 2003 and 
until 2010, some bilateral ship-boarding agreements were reached. Accordingly, it 
may be reasonable to say that the PSI triggered the debates in the sphere of maritime 
terrorism law. The PSI also set stages or other formal law-making processes in the 
IMO and the UNSC. Therefore, we might call this initial non-binding norm as a kind 
of incentive and motivation for legal change in shipping interdiction.
178
  
The third approach that the evolution of the PSI can be considered as 
international law-making is the international regimes approach.
179
 This view of 
law-making and norm-setting is that international regimes are often created when a 
formal agreement cannot be reached efficiently or when the cost of doing so would 
be too costly. A regime is usually formed with a functional objective and under such 
a circumstance; a hegemonic state still has a powerful role in shaping an 
international regime.
180
 However, once the regime has been established, it will 
naturally evolve and be shaped by its internal and external factors and actors, and 
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general international environment.  
Consequently, if we consider an international regime as ‘sets of principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations,’
181
 the PSI may suffice to be 
reckoned as a regime with a general sense of obligation because of its political 
commitment.
182
 The norms and rules are contained in the Statement of Interdiction 
Principles and some practical training manuals.
183
 In short, it can be thought a part 
of the greater non-proliferation regime in international law. 
VIII. Impacts on the SUA 2005 Protocol 
At the beginning of the SUA Protocol drafting stage in August 2002, the US 
proposed to incorporate the new interdiction developments in the text. There were 
two methods in the US proposal concerning how the flag State could authorize 
another state to board a suspect vessel claiming its nationality located seaward of any 
State’s territorial sea: ‘either advance authorization when the enumerated conditions 
are met; or a procedure for granting authorization on an as-requested basis, including 
authorization when no reply is given within four hours.’
184
  
However, as the final result of Article 8bis shows, the US did not achieve their 
initial objective by bringing the time limits into the SUA Protocol. To some extent, 
the time limit is written in the Article 8bis, but as an ‘opt in’ condition which means 
that the first principle is still based on flag state authorization. Upon receipt of a 
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boarding request, the flag state have four options: authorize the boarding, to board 
the ship by itself, to board the ship together with the requesting state or decline the 
request.
185
 The ‘opt in’ procedure means when a state has ratified the Protocol, it can 
notify the IMO Secretary-General that it accepts if there is ‘no response within four 
hours of the acknowledgement of receipt of a request to confirm nationality’, the 
requesting party is ‘granted authorization to board and search the ship’.
186
  
This final result has two meanings: first, the US failed its ambition in the 
multilateral forum, even though in terms of its hegemonic status, it was powerful and 
influential in the negotiation process. Second, As Jenssen noted, ‘it is very tempting 
to believe’ that the SUA Protocol ‘directly contributed to the developments relating 
to bilateral-agreed maritime counter-WMD operations under the PSI’.
187
 But the 
reality is it only had ‘limited effects on the developments of US bilateral 
shipboarding agreements over the past ten years.’
188
  
Therefore, this is hard evidence that hegemonic law-making does not mean it 
can do whatever it wanted. A better way to see the significance of PSI and bilateral 
ship-boarding agreements is that they fill in some gaps with regard to maritime 
terrorism, but this arrangement is ‘merely another tool in the armoury to promote 
maritime security’.
189
 Or one could say a paradigm shift has been triggered by the 
PSI Interdiction Principles, the bilateral agreements and the SUA Protocol.
190
 If the 
international community consider that a paradigm shift is needed for benefiting all 
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states, then this shift from the strict sense of exclusive flag state jurisdiction on the 
high seas to a looser version of flag state control would be legitimate.
191
  
After all, change in law is difficult and usually happens through a slow process. 
Change is not always revolutionary, thus commentators argued that ‘even a small 
change in emphasis may have produced a different, and arguably more effective, 
legal regime’ in tackling terrorism and proliferation at sea.
192
 
IX.  Conclusion 
Four questions and answers can summarise the points made in this chapter: 
First of all, was the PSI created by the US unilateralism? No, the PSI is a result of 
multilateralism.  
Second, does the Statement of the Interdiction Principles change customary 
international law concerning exclusive right of flag state’s jurisdiction and freedom 
of navigation? No, in the strictest sense of international law-making and the 
formation of customary international law, it does not change anything.  
Third, do the PSI bilateral ship-boarding agreements and the SUA Protocol 
fulfil the expectation of the US? Yes and no. It is certainly true that the US can wield 
its dominant power in shaping rules in bilateral circumstances; however, the PSI and 
SUA Protocol reflect that the US cannot get what it wants in a multilateral 
law-making arena.  
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Fourth, if the US cannot get what it wants in multilateral settings, then is the 
question about hegemonic law-making meaningful? If it does not and cannot make 
some fundamental changes in the development of international law, why should we 
care about a hegemon’s behaviours in the sense of international law-making? 
There are three aspects of an answer to this question: interactions between 
unilateralism and multilateralism; interactions between hard and soft law-making; 
interactions between law and politics. 
First, conceptually speaking, hegemonic law-making does not always mean 
unilateralism, it may only implicate ‘leadership rather than command’.
193
 As Kohen 
noted, ‘the US government made considerable progress toward multilateralism in 
different fields of international cooperation against terrorism, with only one 
exception, that is the use of force.’
194
  
The US tried to change the nature and scope of shipping interdiction after the 
911 theorist attacks: it began by using the IMO multilateral forum, followed by the 
announcement of the PSI and by reaching subsequent bilateral agreements. Though it 
has not succeeded in changing existing law codified in UNCLOS or customary 
international law, it did convince the international community that there is a need to 
change the existing legal framework for combating maritime terrorism.  
The US was unable to exercise its hegemonic weight in brining a foundational 
change in the law of the sea, but, as noted above, a slight evolution in law has been 
triggered and considered. If there is a lesson in this process, it might be that it is 
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almost impossible to change law on a revolutionary scale by multilateralism, let 
alone by US unilateral actions. Consequently, there is no need to worry about 
whether and how the US will unilaterally change law. The US just cannot change 
international law ‘the American way.’
195
 
Second, there can be a counter-argument that the US has changed some aspects 
of soft law or normative development of international cooperation in the field of 
WMD proliferation at sea. In essence, different questions lead to different answers, 
just like some lawyers’ legal strategy will influence the judges’ thinking. 
Accordingly, different nature of concepts leads to different meanings of international 
law-making. Conventional wisdom suggests that International hard law such as 
customary or treaty law occupies the critical role in the sense of traditional sources of 
international law. Nonetheless, if we apply the concept of informal international 
making or international regimes approach to conceptualizing the PSI and relevant 
American moves, an argument can be made that the cooperative mechanisms against 
maritime terrorism are still law-making, just not in the sense of the traditional way. 
Third, international law and great powers have never easily coexisted in a happy 
relationship.
196
 It cannot be denied that the law of the sea or general international 
law has always been pushed or moved forward by the dominant powers in different 
times of history.
197
 It would be unrealistic not to admit that a hegemon like the US is 
able to influence the direction of how international law evolves; however, it would 
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also be naïve to argue that US law-making influence has been enhanced in times of 
the US hegemony.  
A distinction muse be made between the force of law and the force of power. 
The interaction between international law and international politics, as Krisch 
beautifully articulates, ‘is always under pressure from powerful states and needs to 
bow to their demands in order not to be entirely sidelined. Yet it can provide its 
particular value to the powerful only if it does not completely bow to them: once it 
appears merely as a tool, it will be unable to provide them legitimacy they seek.’
198
  
Ultimately, this chapter shows that these US-led soft law and bilateral treaties 
do not contradict the normative development in relation to multilateral treaties such 
as the SUA Convention and Protocol or the resolutions adopted by the UNSC. As 
such, these instruments should rather be deeming as mutually assured 
supplementation in the following years of the coherent development of international 
law-making. 
The point being made lastly is a normative one: if we believe that terrorism at 
sea, on land or in the air constitutes threats to our daily life, and so long as US 
law-making initiatives contain elements of promoting community interests, 
complement certain norm-setting instruments, then we shall expect more hegemonic 
law-making. As noted above, it does no harm if a hegemon cannot succeed, and at 
the very least the US hegemony may prod the international legal system to 
accommodate the changing nature of problems and the need for legal evolution. Such 
episode is another face of international law-making and political reality in action. 
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Chapter 6   
Regional Treaty and Soft Law-Making in the Fight agaisnt 
Maritime Piracy 
George Smiley: ‘”The Story of my meeting with Karla,” he resumed, 
“belonged very much to the mood of the period.”’ 
John le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (1973)1  
I. Introduction 
There have been a lot of regional approaches developed in some specific areas 
such as regional economic integration,
2
 regional human rights regimes,
3
 regional 
seas programmes in the marine environment area,
4
 regional fisheries management 
organizations,
5
 regional security cooperation
6
 and regional arms control 
arrangements;
7
 this phenomenon has spilled over to the maritime piracy field.  
There are four kinds of regional arrangements in combating maritime piracy. The 
first one was developed in 2004 in Asia, namely, the Regional Cooperation 
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Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 
(ReCAAP).  
Along with the rampant phenomenon of Somali piracy, the second one was 
developed in East Africa in 2009. This cooperation framework is the Code of 
Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in 
the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Djibouti Code of Conduct).  
The third is a rather recent episode following the Djibouti Code of Conduct but 
developed in West Africa. The Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy, 
Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in the West and Central 
Africa, which was adopted in June 2013 in Yaoundé, Cameroon (Yaoundé Code of 
Conduct). 
The fourth regional arrangement is something different from the above three. It 
is about establishing bilateral treaties for transferring suspects for prosecution in 
Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania, etc. To be more precisely, the US, UK, EU have 
concluded these bilateral treaties for transferring pirates to aforementioned states. 
A worth noting character of the Djibouti Code of Conduct and Yaoundé Code 
of Conduct is that they were both initiated and supported by the IMO, an 
organization that contains a universal character in charge of varieties of maritime 
issues.
8
 It should be noted that the IMO has been dealing with the maritime piracy 
issue for three decades.
9
 Therefore, this chapter will firstly introduce what the IMO 
has accomplished in tackling maritime piracy, trace the origin and evolution of the 
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ReCAAP, Djibouti Code of Conduct and Yaoundé Code of Conduct; and will then 
scrutinise their strengths and weaknesses. Lastly, it will also investigate how these 
treaty and soft law regimes further develop the law concerning piracy. 
One of key observations from scrutinising these law-making instruments is that 
there is no potential threat to the coherent development of international law-making 
concerning maritime violence. On the contrary, these new efforts and arrangements 
work in a rather smooth and supplementing style to each other. 
II. The International Maritime Organization and Maritime Piracy 
The role of the IMO has been noticed that it ‘remains the single most important 
organization in the fight against piracy’,
10
 and participating in all of the 
piracy-related law-making and norm-creating process.
11
 The phenomenon of 
sometimes sporadic and sometimes rampant acts of piracy let the IMO grasping 
several opportunities to lobby for international cooperation with governments, 
NGOs and the shipping industry. For example, the IMO former Secretary-General 
Mr. Efthimios Mitropoulos contributed a lot and has been a public advocate for 
communication and for obtaining necessary support from the IMO Council, UN 
Secretary-General and the UN Security Council in the recent development of 
international cooperation in suppressing piracy.
12
 It is against this backdrop that 
some initial and major efforts regarding IMO’s contribution to the development of 
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maritime piracy should be illustrated first. 
A. Initial Efforts 
The IMO Assembly adopted its first resolution on piracy in 1983, Resolution 
A.543(13) titled ‘Measures to Prevent Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships’;
13
 it interpreted and recalled Article 16(j) of the Convention on the 
International Maritime Organization,
14
 indicating that regulations concerning 
maritime safety are related to the function of the Assembly. It also requested 
governments to provide relevant information about piracy and armed robbery at sea 
to IMO and urged governments to take actions in tackling the problem and to keep 
the matter under review.  
Adopted in 1991, Resolution A.543(13) was followed by Resolution A.683(17) 
and was titled ‘Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships’.
15
 It recognised the grave danger of piracy and armed robbery to life 
and navigational environment. It urged governments to take all necessary actions in 
suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships. This document also noted the 
UNCLOS piracy provisions and remedies against those piratical acts. 
In 1993, the Assembly passed Resolution A.738(18), ‘Measures to Prevent and 
Suppress Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’,
16
 in which it expressly recalled 
the UNCLOS Article 100, asking all states to cooperate to the fullest extent in the 
repression of piracy and armed robbery on the high seas or any other places outside 
the jurisdiction of any state. This resolution urged states to maintain close ties with 
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neighbouring states for further cooperation. Also, it invited governments to consider 
the use of surveillance and detection techniques in preventing piratical acts. 
Furthermore, it asked governments to instruct national rescue coordination centres 
for promptly informing the security forces in warning or implementing the 
contingency plans. Finally, it recommended these coordination centres are capable 
of communicating in English at all times. 
The IMO Assembly took another two resolutions on the same day in November 
2001. Resolution A.922(22) was titled ‘Code of Practice for the Investigation of 
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships,’
17
 and Resolution A.923(22) 
was named ‘Measures to Prevent the Registration of “Phantom” Ships.
18
  
Resolution A.922(22) firstly recalled the SUA Convention and UNCLOS then 
recognised the continued increase of piracy and armed robbery activities 
worldwide.
19
 It also noted that one of the reasons that made piracy rampant was the 
lack of effective legislation concerning such crimes. This Code of Practice was 
developed by some regional seminars and workshops under the auspices of the IMO. 
This Resolution was also the first time that IMO gave a definition to the concept of 
armed robbery at sea.  
In the Annex of Resolution A.922(22), it articulated, ‘armed robbery against 
ships’ means ‘any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or 
threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, directed against a ship or against persons 
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or property on board such a ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences.’
20
 
It further illustrated the investigation strategy in distributing intelligence and 
information, securing evidence and taking into account of the seriousness of the 
situation about the loss of property and life. 
Since the point of issuing Resolution A.923(22) was to invited all governments 
to exhaust all means to prevent the registration of phantom ships, it urged 
governments to verify the identity of the ships flying their flag, including the IMO 
Ship Identification Number, the proof of ownership by ways of paper or 
electronically verification process. 
B. Major Efforts  
Following the rising problem of Somali piracy in between 2007 and 2008, the 
IMO Assembly requested the Maritime Safety Committee to update the previous 
Code of Practice, and it resulted in two resolutions. The Assembly adopted 
Resolution A.1002(25) under the title of ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
in Waters off the Coast of Somalia.’
21
 It encouraged states to address threats to 
maritime safety and security through bilateral and multilateral instruments and 
cooperative mechanisms. It also urged states to combat piracy in cooperation with 
the IMO.  
In addition, Resolution A.1002(25) urged states to adopt national legislation in 
criminalising piracy and armed robbery against ships and in accordance of 
international law. Moreover, it called upon states to become parties to 1988 SUA 
Convention and 2005 SUA Protocol. Most importantly, it requested the Transitional 
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Government of Somalia to take necessary actions to prevent and suppress acts of 
piracy and armed robbery. These requests included advising the UNSC that it 
consents to warships or military aircrafts entering into its territorial waters. As 




The adoption of Resolution A. 1025(26) was issued for updating the previous 
‘Code of Practice for Investigation of Crime and Armed Robbery against Ships’.
23
 
The revised Code of Practice emphasised the international cooperation aspects in the 
investigation of piratical acts. It redefined the armed robbery against ships as:  
[a]ny illegal act of violence or detention or act of 
depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, 
committed for private ends and directed against a ship or 
against persons or property on board such a ship, with a 
State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and 
territorial sea; any act of inciting or of intentional 
facilitating an act described above.  
It further illustrates how to conduct an investigation in an efficient way. 
Basically, no big changes were added to the revoked Resolution A.922(22), and the 
new definition with respect to armed robbery against ships is deemed the most 
important part of this resolution.  
The change of the definition of armed robbery against ships, as explained by 
the Report of the Correspondence Group on Piracy,
24
 was based on the following 
reason: the Sub-regional meeting on piracy and armed robbery against ships in the 
Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea area, which was held in Dar es 
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Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, from 14 to 18 April 2008, agreed to modify 
the original definition. Consistent with the ReCAAP, the motive for private ends has 
been added to the definition. The formulation of ‘within internal waters, archipelagic 
waters and territorial sea’ replaced the phrase ‘within a State’s jurisdiction’. The 
new formulation reflects the views of France, supported by other States participating 
in the meeting, that the definition for armed robbery against ships should not be 
applicable to acts committed seaward of the territorial sea.  
Roach noticed that this change might be problematic, because ‘it omits any acts 
of violence against ships or their crews committed seaward of the territorial sea, 
such as SUA offence or hostage-taking, not amounting to piracy.’
25
 Hence he 
suggested that the IMO should revert to the old definition.
26
 
Almost at the same time, IMO Maritime Safety Committee also adopted two 
Circulars for providing recommendations to governments and the shipping 
industries about how to practically suppress and prevent piracy and armed robbery at 
sea. IMO MSC.1/Circ.1333 was titled ‘Recommendations to Governments for 
Preventing and Suppressing Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’
27
 and was 
replaced by MSC.1Cir.1333/Rev.1 in 2015.
28
 MSC.1Circ.1334 was titled ‘Guidance 
to Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmaster and Crews on Preventing and 
Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’.
29
 These measures 
include some technical issues and piracy-prevention techniques, including the use of 
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distress flares, the use of defensive measure, non-lethal devices, firearms, unarmed 
security personnel, privately contracted armed security personnel, military team or 
law enforcement officers authorised by governments. It even includes the UN 
Guidance on how to survive as a hostage if kidnapped by pirates.
30
 These Circulars 
provide relevant information about model agreement for regional cooperation, the 
format regarding the ways to report to the IMO with respect to the voyages in 
approaching piracy and armed robbery threat areas.
31
 
While these documents are in the category of non-binding norms, soft law,
32
 
they are now considered as ‘universal guidance’ on problems of piracy and armed 
robbery at sea.
33
 However, since these documents are non-binding guidance, if a 
huge cost might incur, then some governments or shipping industries may not apply 
the guidance. For example, the IMO adopted MSC.1/Circ.1339, ‘Best Management 
Practices for Protection against Somalia based Pirates (BMP)’,
34
 which is the fourth 
edition of the series documents on the same issue.  
Commentators noticed that not all shipping companies are interested in taking 
the BMP, because the cost of applying those measures is very high and the 
possibility of being kidnapped by pirates is so low. For example, it was estimated 
that about 0.9% of ships were kidnapped around the Gulf of Aden and Western 
Indian Ocean. In real numbers, there are about 25,000 ships passing the Suez Canal 
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every year, but in 2011only about 300 encountered pirates.
35
 
C. Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel  
In response to the need of the shipping industry and in securing the safety of 
sea lanes of communication,
36
 the IMO has also developed guidance on the use of 
privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) for protecting seafarers and 
fishermen.
37
 As indicated by the IMO, the guidance was developed for dealing with 
issues regarding the use of PCASP. These documents are: (1) MSC.1/Circ.1443 on 
Interim Guidance to private maritime security companies providing contracted 
armed security personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area;
38
(2) 
MSC.1/Circ.1408 on Interim recommendations for port and coastal States regarding 
the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships in the High 
Risk Area;
39
(3) MSC.1/Circ.1406/Rev.3 on Revised interim recommendations for 
flag States regarding the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on 
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board ships in the High Risk Area;
40
(4) MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2 on Revised interim 
guidance to shipowners, ship operators and shipmasters on the use of privately 
contracted armed security personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area;
41
 (5) 
MSC-FAL.1/Circ.2 : Questionnaire on information on port and coastal State 
requirements related to privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships, 
which is aimed at gathering information on current requirements.
42
 
Although the PSASP issue has been considered in the IMO, it was agreed that 
the IMO is not the best place to develop the criteria for issuing certification 
concerning PCASP; rather, it considered that the best institution would be the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), thus IMO forwarded all 
relevant IMO guidance to ISO to serve as the base documents to be used in 
developing an appropriate ISO standard. Also, the IMO works with the World 
Customs Organization in discussing some compliance requirements in relation to 
PCASP.
43
 In short, the use of PCASP was ‘strongly discouraged’,
44
 and even if it 
needs to be used, it would be under exceptional circumstances.
45
 
In fact, IMO’s response to the Somali piracy has been quite fast, and it can be 
argued that it moves as quickly as the UN Security Council goes. The difference is 
the legal status of their documents. All IMO resolutions, guidance or circulars are 
non-binding; they only carry recommendatory weight, unlike the influence of UN 
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Security Council resolutions issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.   
III. Making the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 
The ReCAAP is the first regional treaty in Asia for promoting and enhancing 
international cooperation against piracy and armed robbery at sea.
46
 It was adopted 
in Tokyo on 11 November 2004 and entered into force on 4 September 2006. To 
date, 20 States have become contracting parties to ReCAAP.
47
 
A. Japan’s Initiative for Responding Incidents 
The Agreement was initiated by Japan’s Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo in 
November 1999. The incentive was when a Japanese owned cargo ship MV Alondra 
Rainbow was hijacked by a group of armed Indonesian pirates when navigating in 
the Strait of Malacca in October 1999.
48
 It was noted that because this incident 
‘drew great media attention in Japan, that triggered the Japanese government's 
initiative’
49
 to develop ReCAAP with Southeast Asian states. According to Japan’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there were another two incidents also important in 
stimulating their efforts for negotiating this treaty. One was the disappearing of the 
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ship M/V Tenyu after departing from Kuala Tanjong on the Indonesian island of 
Sumatra bound for Inchon in the Republic of Korea in September 1998. The vessel 
itself was later discovered at Zhangjiagang in Jiangsu Province, China, but its crew 
and cargo (about 3,000 tons of aluminum ingots) remain missing. The other incident 
was the M/V Global Mars incident in February 2000. The ship was attacked off 




Japan’s Prime Minister Obuchi proposed a meeting with related states at the 
ASEAN + 1 (Japan) summit in Manila in November 1999, and this led to the 
Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in 
Tokyo in April 2000. While heads of governmental agencies from 16 Asian states 
participated in the conference, the US, Australia and the Russian Federation, the 
Director of IMO Maritime Safety Division and shipping industries attended as 
observers. The meeting record was submitted by Japan and kept by the IMO.
51
 
The Conference adopted two documents; the first one is called ‘Asia 
Anti-Piracy Challenges 2000,’ and the objective was to declare the intention for 
combating piracy and armed robbery at sea in Asia. The second document is called 
the ’Model Action Plan for Maritime Policy Authorities and Private Maritime 
Related Concerns to Combat Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’; it set forth a 
number of specific actions to be taken by relevant states and the shipping industries. 
For example, the self-protection, information sharing measures, the use of defensive 
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Participants further endorsed the ‘Tokyo Appeal’, which was a document 
adopted a month earlier in the ‘International Conference of All Maritime Related 
Concerns, both Governmental and Private, on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships’ held in Tokyo. The Tokyo Appeal emphasized the flag 
state’s responsibility in enforcing relevant law upon their ships, the port and costal 
states’ role in the territorial waters, the importance of preventive measures and the 
need to strengthen the network of intelligence sharing.
53
  
Since then, Japan actively organised meetings and seminars for developing an 
international mechanism. It became clear that Japan intended to make a treaty law 
around 2001 after it held the ‘Asian Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy 
and Armed Robbery against Ships’ in October 2001, and it gradually gained support 
from Southeast Asian governments and shipping industries.
54
 Therefore, Japan 
began to draft an agreement and sell the idea at the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and 
South Korea). The detailed negotiation process is unknown, because there is no 
public source available for analysis. Nonetheless, it is believed that the preparatory 
documents for negotiation and negotiation records are kept in each participant’s 
foreign ministry. Japan, Singapore and Laos later signed the treaty in April 2005 and 
deposited the notification in Singapore.
55
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It was noted that there was no problem in copying the definition of piracy from 
UNCLOS, but the definition about ‘armed robbery against ships’ was not so 
certain.
56
 However, the participants reached a relatively easy consensus to apply the 
IMO’s definition with slight modification as provided in ReCAAP Article1(2)(a) 
(b)and (c): ‘any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends and directed against a ship, or against persons or 
property on board such ship, in a place within a Contracting Party's jurisdiction over 
such offences; any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with 
knowledge of facts making it a ship for armed robbery against ships; any act of 
inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).’ It 
should be noted that ReCAAP is the first international treaty recognising the IMO’s 
non-legally binding definition of armed robbery.
57
 
The ReCAAP comprises five parts and 22 Articles. Articles 1-3 indicate general 
definitions of terms, obligations and rights of contracting parties. It states that 
nothing shall affect the right and obligations of any party under international 
agreements to which that state is a party.
58
 This agreement shall also not affect the 
immunities of warships;
59
  the position to any dispute concerning territorial 
sovereignty;
60
 the exercise of jurisdiction which are exclusively reserved for the 
authorities in performing their jurisdictional function by its national law.
61
 Parties 
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shall make every effort to take effective measures in fighting pirates in accordance 
international law and their national law. These measures include: to prevent and 
suppress piracy and armed robbery;
 62
 to arrest and seize ships or aircraft or persons 
who committed the crime of piracy and armed robbery against ships;
63
 to rescue 
victims and victim ships.
64
 
Articles 4-8 stipulate the function and structure of the ‘Information Sharing 
Center’ (ISC), which is set up in Singapore.
65
 As the ISC stands as an international 
organization, the members all enjoy functional privileges and immunities.
66
 Its 
Governing Council is composed of one representative from each of the party and 
shall meet at least once a year in Singapore.
67
 The working method is designed for 
the Executive Director in charge of the administrative, operational and financial 
matters,
68
 but the decision shall be determined by the Governing Council by 
consensus.
69
 The financial sources include the host state (Singapore)
70
 and other 
voluntary contributions of contracting parties, international organizations and any 
other contributions agreed by the Governing Council.
71
  
As its name implicates, the ISC’s chief objective is to share information about 
all relevant piracy issues concerned. These functions cover: managing and 
maintaining the expeditious flow of all incidents;
72
 collecting, collating, analysing 
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and circulating those relevant information;
73
 preparing statistics and analytical 
reports;
74
 providing appropriate alerts to parties if there is a reasonable ground to 
believe that a piracy or armed robbery threat is imminent.
75
 The operation of the 
ISC is to ensure it works in an effective and transparent manner.
76
 In carrying out its 
daily job, it shall keep all the confidential information safe and shall not release and 
disseminate unless the consent is given by the information provider party.
77
  
ReCAAP Articles 9-11 designate that each party shall designate a focal point 
and shall ensure an effective and smooth communication.
78
 Parties shall make every 
effort to request the ships flying their flag to provide relevant information 
concerning piracy and armed robbery against ships to relevant national authorities 
and focal points.
79
 Also, if there is any information about an imminent piracy or 
armed robbery threat, the party are obliged promptly notify the ISC and when other 
parties receive an alert from the ISC, it shall promptly disseminate the alert to 
ships.
80
 Apart from sharing relevant information concerning piracy and armed 
robbery against ships, a party may request any other party to directly cooperate or 
through the ISC for detecting persons, ships or aircrafts who are conducting piratical 
acts at sea.
81
 Moreover, a party may request any other parties to take appropriate 
measures for arresting or seizing ships within the limits by its national laws and 
applicable rules of international law.
82
 Likewise, parties may directly or through the 
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ISC to request to take measure for rescuing victim ships and victims.
83
 The 
exception that it shall request directly to any other parties not through the ISC is 
issues involving extradition or mutual legal assistance.
84
 The requested parties are 
obliged to make every effort to take practical measures and may seek additional 
information for implementing such request.
85
 After taking measures, the requested 




ReCAAP Articles 12-16 cover the general obligation for cooperation in 
extradition, mutual legal assistance and capacity building. Subject to its national 
laws and regulations, a contracting party shall endeavour to extradite pirates or who 
committed armed robbery at the request of another party.
87
 A contracting party shall 
also endeavour to render mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, including 




In terms of capacity building, parties are obliged to cooperate to the fullest 
extent if other parties require capacity building assistance.
89
 These cooperative 
mechanisms may include educational and capacity training programmes for sharing 
experiences and best practices.
90
 If parties are willing to, a further joint exercise 
agreement or other forms or cooperation can be established.
91
 For further 
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encouraging cooperation, each party is obliged to take protective measures in 
fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea, it particularly emphasises the 
recommendations adopted by the IMO.
92
 
The final part contains provisions of dispute settlement, criteria for entering 
into force,
93
 amendment, withdraw and registration procedure. The fundamental 
method for settling dispute concerning the interpretation or application of ReCAAP 
is through negotiations in accordance with applicable rules of international law.
94
 
Article 18(5) provides that ‘it shall be open for accession by any State’, and if there 
is no ‘written objection’ by a party with 90 days then that state may deposit the 
instrument of accession with the depository, and will become a party after 60 days.  
Accordingly, we have seen that some European states like the UK, Denmark, 
Norway and the Netherlands are parties to the ReCAAP.
95
 If any contracting party 
would like to amend the treaty, it may propose an amendment at any time, but the 
amendment shall be adopted with the consent of all parties and it will enter into 
force after 90 days if expected by all contracting parties.
96
 Any party can 
withdrawal at any time and will take effect after 180 days after the depository 
receiving the formal notification.
97
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C. Strength and Weakness  
The set up of the ISC has been considered a success and have had influence in 
easing piratical acts situation in Southeast Asia.
98
 Its strengths can be identified in 
three aspects of international cooperation.
99
 First of all, it requests parties to 
establish focal points for communication, alerting potential threats, facilitating 




Second, The ISC has arranged continuous capacity building workshops for 
strengthening participants’ law enforcement techniques and skills, it can be 
speculated that those workshops would be very useful for less-experienced and 
less-capable states.
101
   
Third, the function of ReCAAP and ISC is to share information and let parties 
to obtain adequate and updated intelligence and knowledge about piratical acts in the 
region, it has gained fruitful experiences and developed well-organised methods in 
tacking piracy and armed robbery issues. By way of holding conferences and 
seminars with other states, international organizations, shipping industries around 
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The above cooperative mechanisms and measures should be seen under the 
obligation of UNCLOS Article 100, which stipulates that ‘all states shall cooperate 
to the fullest possible extent’.
103
 As Wolfrum noted, such obligation has to be 
implemented on the international level and the nature of this obligation is 
procedural.
104
 It should be noted that this provision is identical to 1958 High Seas 
Convention Article 14,
105
 which was originated from Article 38 of the draft High 
Sea Convention.
106
 The ILC provided a comment to this draft provision that ‘Any 
State having an opportunity of taking measures against piracy, and neglecting to do 
so, would be failing in a duty laid upon it by international law. Obviously, the State 




We can see that ‘a certain latitude’ perhaps only indicates that states can decide 
what it wants for cooperation, it does not speak any further about what the scope or 
limits are with respect to this certain latitude; which means that the obligation 
imposed on Article 100 is ‘very vague’.
108
 In a sense, there is a duty to cooperate; in 
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another sense, if a state refuses to cooperate for suppressing piracy on the high seas, 
it would be difficult to argue that it violates Article 100.
109
 Moreover, this obligation 
is only concerned cooperation ‘on the high seas or in any other place outside the 
jurisdiction of any state’,
110
 it is irrelevant to the newly invented concept of armed 
robbery in the territorial sea. Hence there is a role for ReCAAP to play in terms of 
developing the obligation of cooperation for combating piracy at sea.  
Though the strengths can be easily identified, there are some visible 
weaknesses existed. For example, first, for some considerations about national 
sovereignty, Malaysia and Indonesia have not ratified ReCAAP,
111
 it is a clear 
operational loophole.
112
 The effectiveness of this regional treaty regime cannot be 
seen as complete without the two countries.
113
  
Second, as Beckman observed that ‘it is highly unlikely that Indonesia or any 
other country in Southeast Asia…would consent to naval or coast guard vessels from 
other states patrolling its waters.’
114
 This problem also relates to another flaw that 
the ISC was not designed for law-enforcement activities or boarding authorisation. It 
was made to let useful information and intelligence flow among the parties, thus in 
terms of enacting real operations, the ISC has no role to play.
115
 It only acts as an 
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indirect channel for exchanging views, knowledge, experiences and information 
through the agencies of the parties. 
Third, the ISC experiences which it collected and developed in the past decade 
may be an asset for combating maritime terrorism and potential transportation or 
WMD. However, it has no any mandate in the maritime terrorism matter. But if 
some parties have the willingness to broaden the scope of the ISC’s mandate, it may 
not be that difficult to amend the treaty, since the requirement is not very high, 
ReCAAP Article 19 provides that ‘Any Contracting Party may propose an 
amendment to this Agreement, any time after the Agreement enters into force. Such 
amendment shall be adopted with the consent of all Contracting Parties.’
116
 This 
means if there is a political will, then ReCAAP should be and can be easily amended. 
After all, it is only about information sharing. If the ISC are proud of their 
achievement, then it should try to expand the boundaries of their profession. 
D. Conclusion 
Although it is clear that the ReCAAP’ Governing Council ‘shall make policies 
and shall take decisions’ concerning all the matters of the ISC,
117
 it appears that the 
ISC has no law-making power for regulating piracy and armed robbery issues. Those 
policies and decisions can only be thought as international organizations’ 
administrative law, not relevant to substantive issues. To date, the only document 
which might contain some soft law element is the so called ‘Regional Guidance to 
Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia’.
118
 But the future and 
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effectiveness of the Guidance is unknown and difficult to analyse at the moment. 
In terms of treaty law-making, while ReCAAP is a regional treaty, it is obvious 
that its armed robbery definition derived from the IMO. Thus if only to consider the 
armed robbery term, ReCAAP is a reflection of universal law-making process but 
resulted at the regional level. Most interestingly, the original mother definition on 
armed robbery at sea was based on IMO soft law documents. The adoption of the 
term armed robbery in ReCAAP in effect crystallised the IMO-initiated soft law and 
let it become a regional treaty law.  
In a sense, it cannot be denied that ReCAAP and the ISC have provided some 
innovations and incrementally have accumulated many experiences for information 
sharing and capacity building.
119
 Nevertheless, these activities are more about the 
assessment of effectiveness of the regime thus does not fall within the scope of this 
research. In another sense, in terms of regime interaction and ways to learning from 
other regions and organizations, this treaty regime has developed a new norm for 
international cooperation. That is to say, though the ISC can only provide guidance 
for participants, when it shared those guidance and experiences to other regions, it 
spills over the norm to other regions. That is what ReCAAP has been trying to do in 
the past few years, particularly in response to problems off the Coast of Somalia.
120
 
Therefore, there is no potential diversity or conflict of norms in making the 
ReCAAP in the law of the sea concerning piracy and armed robbery. In fact, the 
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ReCAAP upholds the idea of universal international law.  
As we have seen, the ReCAAP is a good case for accommodating new needs 
and it does not raise issues about conflict of rules in international law, can we also 
see the positive developments from the two Codes of Conduct in East and West 
African regions? 
IV. Djibouti Code of Conduct and the Gulf of Aden 
In late 2007, with the rising problems of Somali piracy, the IMO Assembly 
Resolution A.1002(25) firstly called upon governments in the region to conclude 
such an agreement and in cooperation with the IMO in order to prevent and suppress 
piracy and armed robbery against ships.
121
  
In fact, before the final Djibouti Meeting held in 2009, the IMO had already 
sponsored three previous workshops in Yemen, Oman and Tanzania on issues of 
international cooperation for suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea.
122
  
The Djibouti Code of Conduct was adopted on 29 January 2009 in Djibouti. The 
Meeting was held from 26-29 January and convened by the IMO. Participants were 
(17 out of 21 states)
123
: Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Jordan, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Maldives, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, 
Sudan, Tanzania and Yemen.
124
 As of March 2017, 20 states have signed the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct.
125
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A. Features and Designation 
The Djibouti Code of Conduct is the first agreement for combating maritime 
piracy in the region. The Meeting adopted four resolutions and the Code is formed 
by 17 articles. Resolution 1 specifically pointed out that the signatories to the Code 
agreed to cooperate in a manner consistent with international law in four areas: 
(a) the investigation, arrest and prosecution of persons, 
who are reasonably suspected of having committed acts of 
piracy and armed robbery against ships, including those 
inciting or intentionally facilitating such acts;  
(b) the interdiction and seizure of suspect ships and 
property on board such ships;  
(c) the rescue of ships, persons and property subject to 
piracy and armed robbery and the facilitation of proper care, 
treatment and repatriation of seafarers, fishermen, other 
shipboard personnel and passengers subject to such acts, 
particularly those who have been subjected to violence;  
(d) the conduct of shared operations, both among 
signatory States and with navies from countries outside the 
region, such as nominating law enforcement or other 
authorized officials to embark on patrol ships or aircraft 
of another signatory.126 
In addition, the Code was designed for regional states to share information 
concerning maritime piracy through existing national infrastructure and 
arrangements, for example, the Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in 
Mombasa, Kenya and a number of regional information centres.
127
 The signatories 
also undertook and ensured that there are relevant laws in place to criminalise and 
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Moreover, Resolution 1 clearly stated that the ‘within two years of the effective 
date of the Code of conduct, and having designated the national focal pints referred 
to article 8 of the Code of conduct, consult, with the assistance of IMO, with the aim 
of arriving at a binding agreement.’
129
 That is to say, the Djibouti Code of Conduct 
is a non-binding instrument.
130
 
Resolution 2 requested states and international organizations, such as IMO, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and the Crime (UNODC), the European Commission (EC), the 
ReCAAP-Information Sharing Centre and the maritime industry to provide 
assistance for effectively implementing the Code of Conduct.
131
  
Resolution 3 acknowledged that ‘a uniform manner’ for training officials is one 
of the critical parts for achieving the success of cooperation. Thus the Code invites 
the IMO to promote technical cooperation for the ‘wide, effective and uniform 
implementation of the provisions of the Code’
132
 Resolution 4 expressed the 
appreciations to Governments of Djibouti, Japan, Korea and Norway for financial 
support of the Meeting.
133
 
The Djibouti Code of Conduct was inspired by ReCAAP,
134
 and the inspiration 
                                                     
128
 IMO, Ibid, para. 11.; Djibouti Code of Conduct, art. 11. 
129
 IMO, Ibid, Attachment 1: Resolution 1, para 2(1).; Djibouti Code of Conduct, art. 13. 
130
 Djibouti Code of Conduct, art. 15(a). 
131
 IMO Doc C 102/14, Attachemtn2: Resolution 2, para. 3. 
132
 Ibid, Attachemtn3: Resolution 3, Preamble and para. 3. 
133
 Ibid, Attachment 4: Resolution 4. 
134
 Djibouti Code of Conduct, Preamble.; The definition of the Code about piracy and armed robbery 
against ships, as discussed in Chapter 4, is almost the same to the ReCAAP and identical to the 
Yaoundé Code of Conduct. also see above discussion on IMO’s contribution with respect to the 




indicates that the focus of the Code is about information-sharing and 
capacity-building.
135
 To a large extent, the only difference between the ReCAAP 
and the Djibouti Code of Conduct perhaps is only on its legal status,
136
 the former is 
a treaty, the latter is a non-binding soft law instrument. The Code is only design to 
suppress piracy and armed robbery at sea,
137
 and each participant is requested to 
cooperate to the fullest extent in arresting, prosecuting pirates, seizing pirate ships, 
and rescuing ships, persons and property subject to piracy.
138
 It provides that no 
state is allowed to pursue a pirate ship ‘in or over the territory of territorial sea of 
any coastal State without the permission of that State’.
139
 However, the Participants 
of the Code can waive its primary rights to exercise jurisdiction and authorise other 
Participant to enforce its laws against captured pirates.
140
 
One of the designations of the Code is the use of the embarked offices,
141
 the 
so-called shipriders. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, this law enforcement 
measure has not been really applied to real cases in the region.
142
 
Article 8(1) of the Djibouti Code of Conduct provides that each Participant 
should designate a national focal point in order to ensure cooperation, coordination 
and facilitate an effective and smooth communications. At the time of adopting the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct, three piracy information exchange centres (ISCs) was 
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supposed to be situated in Mombasa, Kenya; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Sana’a 
Yemen.
143
 As the cooperative and coordinative activities evolved, all three centres 
started to function in late 2011.
144
 The purpose of establishing these information 
centres and national focal points is to disseminate ‘appropriate alerts within their 




Moreover, the Participants intend to keep each other fully informed with 
respect to applicable national laws and guidance, particularly subjects about 
interdiction, investigation, prosecution and dispositions of captured pirates.
146
 The 
Code also intends to follow IMO’s approach in uniformly collecting, reporting and 
analysing the information and ultimately for disseminating those piracy-related 
information.
147
 But similar to ReCAAP, the Djibouti Code also intends to respect 
the confidentiality of information from each Participant.
148
 In terms of capacity 
building affairs, the Djibouti Code of Conduct encourages the Participants to 
undertake publication of handbooks and convening seminars, educational and 
training programmes in furtherance of the Code.
149
 Furthermore, they may request 
assistance for arranging other forms of cooperation, such as joint exercises.
150
 
In terms of the Djibouti Code’s weakness, first, it is not a legally binding 
instrument, though the Participants intended to conclude a formal and binding 
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agreement within two years of the effective date the Code, but it seems nothing 
really progressed to the multilateral treaty-making phase. Though in November 2015, 
signatories of the Djibouti Code of Conduct have agreed to work towards extending 
its scope to address other illicit maritime crimes, such as maritime terrorism, 




Second, a general difficulty for reporting piratical acts to a flag state’s national 
focal point is that commercial ships or fishing trawlers do not always do so when 
they have seen or encountered piracy-related incidents,
152
 especially the law 
enforcement capacity of such a state is perceived very weak. Third, it can be seen 
that existing international law with respect to hot pursuit, claims of injury or loss
153
 
were not changed by the Djibouti Code of Conduct.  
Therefore, Haywood and Spivak doubted whether the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct can be a successful story in the fight against piracy at sea, they commented: 
Unlike ReCAAP, all the stipulations are voluntary, and the 
level of actual commitment has been very modest,….the 
initiative for establishing the Djibouti Code came from the 
IMO rather than the regional countries themselves…it 
remains to seen whether the Djibouti Code will become a 
self-sustaining organization in the long term.154  
B. Impacts on the Duty to Cooperate 
Nonetheless, the aforementioned limitations do not reflect its real achievements 
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on broadening the meaning of the obligation in international cooperation for 
suppressing maritime piracy. In other words, ‘the recognition of improving 
information sharing was a first important step forward in suppressing piracy and 
armed robbery at sea.’
155
 As indicated above in this chapter, what really need to be 
observed are the broadening scope and the meaning of the duty to cooperate for 
combating piracy and armed robbery at sea.  
The importance and the crucial role of international cooperation on maritime 
violence and security issues has been emphasising by several UNGA Resolutions on 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea in the past decade:
156
 
Recognizes the crucial role of international cooperation 
at the global, regional, subregional and bilateral levels 
in combating, in accordance with international law, threats 
to maritime security, including piracy, armed robbery at 
sea, terrorist acts against shipping, offshore 
installations and other maritime interests, through 
bilateral and multilateral instruments and mechanisms 
aimed at monitoring, preventing and responding to such 
threats, the enhanced sharing of information among States 
relevant to the detection, prevention and suppression of 
such threats, and the prosecution of offenders with due 
regard to national legislation, and the need for sustained 
capacity-building to support such objectives.157 
These UNGA also reiterates the significance of information-sharing, prompt 
reporting of acts of piracy and armed robbery incidents and takes note of the 
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important role of the IMO in assisting states potentially affected by maritime 
piracy.
158
 In short, such UNGA Resolutions can be deemed as opinio juris in the 
formation of customary international law, and have certain effects in conjunction 
with multilateral treaties for providing evidence of emerging rules of international 
law.
159
 Therefore, it is also important and necessary to provide evidence of state 
practice in supporting the emerging rules of international law on the meaning of 
international cooperation in the fight against piracy at sea.  
One of the practices made by the signatories of the Djibouti Code of Conduct 
was to establish a regional training centre In October 2011, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU)
160
 was signed between the IMO and the Djibouti for 
establishing such a regional training centre,
161
 and it was officially opened in 
Doraleh, Djibouti in November 2015.
162
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IMO also funds the Djibouti Regional Training Centre and has facilitated about 
60 training courses and more than 1000 officials have been trained.
163
 
Another practice was the three ISCs in Mombasa, Dar es Sallam and Sana’s 
signed an agreement with ReCAAP-ISC for establishing a set of standard operating 
procedures for communicating and exchanging piracy-related information and will 
result in a major expansion of the reporting area of such incidents.
164
 The decision 
to connect closer ties between the four ISCs came against the context of the 
continuing threat of maritime piracy to trade and ships through the Indian Ocean and 
the Gulf of Aden. 
India, a ReCAAP Contracting Party, and many ships with flag or crews from 
ReCAAP Contracting Parties are being affected. The Djibouti Code of Conduct and 
ReCAAP ISCs have since then trying to ensure piracy information can be shared as 
wide as possible.
165
 The IMO also supports continued dialogue between the four 
ISCs and aim to promote regimes action and collaboration through sharing 
experiences on capacity building.
166
 
In addition, a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was established at the IMO in 
April 2010 for further implementing the Djibouti Code of Conduct. It functions with 
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the auspices of the IMO Djibouti Code Trust Fund.
167
 The PIU aims to provide four 
functions:
168
 First, it has been overseeing training activities, including logistical, 
technical, and operational exercises. Second, the PIU has been working on the 
development of law enforcement capacity and has developed a maritime situational 
awareness programme which includes the upgrade of hard ware, general 
infrastructure about the use of radar, long range identification and tracking of 
ships.
169
 Third, it set up a number of workshops with the support of relevant 
international organizations for ensuring each Participant’s national law is applicable 
to crimes of piracy and armed robbery; also focusing on the process of enforcing 
those national laws, prosecution, and investigation. Fourth, the need to interact with 




For example, a joint ReCAAP-Djibouti Code of Conduct seminar was held in 
Tokyo in December 2012. The purpose of the seminar was to enhance the mutual 
understanding and promote networks for information sharing on issues of piracy and 
armed robbery.
171
 These interactions, experience-sharing conferences and networks 
have deepened the significance of the role of the epistemic communities in 
suppressing maritime piracy and in effect promoted the interests of the international 
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It may be seen from the first impression that the Djibouti Code of Conduct does 
not contain equal international law-making influence compared to ReCAAP. 
However, with the aggregated practices of ReCAAP and the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct, the duty to cooperate in the fight against maritime piracy has been 
enhanced and expanded to areas of information sharing, capacity building and 
educational training.  
This development expressly shows that the vague and general UNCLOS Article 
100 usage of ‘shall co-operate to the fullest extent’
173
 has been explored and 
excavated throughout the evolution of the binding ReCAAP and the non-binding 
Djibouti Code thus the contents about what should be included in this cooperation 
duty is clearer and more concrete than a few decades ago.  
Moreover, the exchange of views and interactions between the three ISCs of the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct and the ReCAAP-ISC help to harmonise the potential 
inconsistent state practice in Asia and Africa.
174
 In other words, the two regional 
regimes interaction did not produce fragmentation effect in law but to reflect and 
follow the rules made by the IMO. If to take IMO resolutions and guidance on issues 
of maritime piracy as another kind of opinio juris produced from an international 
organization, then the combined effect of ReCAAP and Djibouti Code surely can be 
evidence of state practice in supporting emerging rules of customary law in the fight 
against maritime piracy. 
                                                     
172
 MA Young, ‘Regime Interaction in Creating, Implementing and Enforcing International Law’ in 
M Young (ed.) Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (CUP 2012) 85, 
19-110. 
173
 UNCLOS, art. 100. 
174




V. Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the Gulf of Guinea 
The UN Security Council noted the rising security threats posed by piracy and 
armed robbery, drugs trafficking and other organized crimes in the Gulf of Guinea in 
2011.
175
 The SC conducted an assessment mission in November 2011 for 
investigating the seriousness and real situations in the region.
176
 The results showed 
that in 2011, there was no collective intelligence and surveillance system across the 
region, including ‘the coastal radars covering the Gulf of Guinea coastline.’
177
 Also, 
there were no optimal financial appropriation and contributions in the maritime 
sectors, thus it needs funds to procure and sustain maritime security equipment and 
to implement capacity-building training programmes.
178
  
Moreover, there was no any formal system of information-gathering and 
sharing exists between states or regional organizations, hence the SC suggested that 
the region will require information-sharing standard, joint training programmes and 
maritime policing operations.
179
 Most importantly, the SC found that there were no 




The SC then issued Resolution 2039 which urges states in the region to: 
[t]ake prompt action….with the support of the international 
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community, and by mutual agreement, to develop and 
implement national maritime security strategies, including 
for the establishment of a legal framework for the 
prevention, and suppression of piracy and armed robbery at 
sea as well as prosecution of persons engaging in those 
crimes, and punishment of those convicted of those crimes 
and encourages regional cooperation in this regard.181 
Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 2018 and 2039, and built on relevant security 
related provisions of the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the 
Establishment of a Sub-regional Integrated Coast Guard Function Network in West 
and Central Africa (IMO/MOWCA MOU),
182
 the IMO assisted the Economic 
Community of Central and African States (ECCAS)
183
, the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS)
184
 and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC)
185
 
to negotiate the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. The Strategy to form the Code of 
Conduct was initially endorsed at ministerial level by a meeting held in Benin. It 
was then formally adopted on 25 June 2013 in Yaoundé, Cameroon, by 25 
representatives (including 13 Presidents) from West and Central African 
Countries.
186
 The signatories are: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, 
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Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
187
 
A. Features and Designation 
The Yaoundé Code of Conduct aims to develop a legal framework for 
international and regional cooperation in the fight not only on piracy and armed 
robbery at sea, but also to consider ‘transnational organized crimes in the maritime 




(a) Money laundering.  
(b) Illegal arms and drugs trafficking.  
(c) Piracy and armed robbery at sea.  
(d) Illegal oil bunkering.  
(e) Crude oil theft.  
(f) Human trafficking. 
(g) Maritime pollution. 
(h) IUU fishing. 
(i) Illegal dumping of toxic waste. 
(j) Maritime terrorism and hostage taking. 
(k) Vandalisation of offshore oil infrastructure. 
Accordingly, the first identifiable feature of the Yaoundé Code is that it does 
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not specifically focus on maritime piracy; rather, it takes a comprehensive approach 
to cover varieties of organized crimes at sea.  
Second, the Yaoundé Code welcomes a number or global and regional 
organizations in assisting technical training and providing forms of capacity building 
to combat transnational organized crime at sea,
189
 which includes United Nations 
Regional Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and Central Africa (UNOCA), the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), IMO, ECOWAS, ECCAS 
and GCC. Therefore, it can be observed that the scope of the Yaoundé Code is quite 
different from the ReCAAP and Djibouti Code of Conduct.  
Third, its legal status, as indicated in Article 17, ‘within three years of the 
effective date of this Code of Conduct, the signatories intend to consult and….to (a) 
eventually transform this Code of Conduct into a binding multi-lateral 
agreement.’
190
 That is to say, it is a non-binding legal instrument, identical to and 
inspired by the Djibouti Code of Conduct.
191
 
Fourth, similar to the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Yaoundé Code aims at: 
sharing and report information; interdicting ships suspected of engaging in 
transnational organized crimes at sea; ensuring suspects can be apprehended and 
prosecuted; facilitating proper care and treatment, particularly to those who have 
been subjected to violence at sea.
192
  
However, unlike the Djibouti Code of Conduct, it reaffirms ‘the principles of 
sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in 
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the domestic affairs of other States.’
193
 Also, it contains one provision on the 
heading of ‘guiding principles’, which intends to cooperate and coordinate to the 
fullest extent; however, for fulfilling the objectives in international cooperation, ‘a 
balance is maintained between the need to enhance maritime security and facilitation 
of maritime traffic and to avoid unnecessary delays to international trade in West 
and Central Africa.’
194
 It is doubtful whether this provision can be of help or on the 
country, a possible excuse and hindrance to future cooperation in implementing the 
Yaoundé Code of Conduct. 
Fifth, the Yaoundé Code emphasises the importance of harmonising national 
implementation of security measures at sea.
195
 One interesting development is that 
the Code provides a separate regulation on IUU fishing. Article 8 highlights the 
importance of policy harmonization for conservation, management and sustainable 
use of marine living resources. It should be noted that in such a soft law, this 
provision uses the obligatory term ‘shall’, it provides that signatories ‘shall consult 
at the bilateral, sub-regional level’ and ‘shall cooperate and collaborate with 
sub-regional fishers bodies and the Food and Agriculture Organization.’
196
 It seems 
that only this requirement on IUU fishing is mandatory. Other provisions only use 
‘should’, ‘may’ or ‘intend’ in formulating the rules in the fight of maritime organized 
crimes.  
To some extent, it is difficult to understand why only put the ‘shall’ term in the 
Code and only relates to IUU fishing. One aspect of the explanation is the food 
security and declining resources of fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea. This 
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phenomenon has been reckoned as a major threat in the region.
197
 However, there 
are many identifiable threats in the region, such as migrant smuggling, drugs and 
arms trafficking, including those transnational organized crimes stipulated in the 
Yaoundé Code of Conduct.
198
 Perhaps this development reflects a reality that 
compared to other security threats in the region, food security is the most important 
one among others. 
Sixth, it also contains a provision to encourage signatories to conclude shiprider 
agreements.
199
 However, as similar to the situation off the Coast of Somalia, there 
are some maritime boundaries which have not been delimited in the Gulf of 
Guinea.
200
 These inconclusive maritime boundary areas in effect can generate some 
uncertain or unnecessary jurisdictional issues in law enforcement activities.
201
  
Nonetheless, the real weakness of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct perhaps 
reflects in its over-ambitious targets on varieties of crimes at sea and duplication of 
several parallel policy initiatives pursued by ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC, hence it 
has been criticised as unrealistic, confusion, ‘no indication that it can be sustained in 
the future… thereby creating further uncertainty’.
202
 Is this a fair observation or a 
too harsh criticism? 
B. Impacts on the Duty to Cooperate 
Unlike the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct Article 10 
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and 11 do not inform too much detail about whether signatories are going to 
establish information sharing centres in specific cities. Hence the two provisions 
themselves do not reflect much positive impacts on the duty to cooperate.
203
  
A development with respect to the Yaoundé Code was IMO issued Assembly 
Resolution A.1069(28) in November 2013 for urging governments to cooperate for 
strengthening legal frameworks, coordinating law enforcement activities and sharing 
information, making financial contributions to the IMO West and Central Africa 
Security Trust Fund.
204
 The IMO did provide a strategy in 2015 for implementing 
the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and in conjunction with the IMO/MOWCA MOU.
205
 
However, it seems that this strategy has not produced fruitful state practice or 
operational measures. Or perhaps it is too early to make a judgment. 
Yet, two regional centres have been established in order to ensure the effective 
coordination in the Gulf of Guinea. The Maritime Trade Information Sharing 
Centre-Gulf of Guinea (MTISC-GoG) was fully operated in Ghana in October 2014. 
It functions as a vital resource for the shipping industry and as a part of 
contributions of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct.
206
 In fact, MTISC-GoG has ceased 
to operate in June 2016. It then has been replaced by the Maritime Domain 
Awareness for Trade– Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG).
207
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The IMO assisted the ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC in establishing the 
Interregional Coordination Center for the Implementation of Regional Strategy for 
Maritime Safety and Security in Central and West Africa (ICC) in June 2014.
208
 Its 
main function is to work as means for the three regional organizations for 
channelling cooperation, coordination and communication.
209
 
In short, in contrast to the Djibouti Code of Conduct, it is clear that the 
Yaoundé Code of Conduct produces less possibility and creativity in state practice 
with regard to the duty to cooperate in the suppression of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships. That is to say, to date, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct has no clear 
potential for setting new standards or promoting emerging rules of international law 
in contrast with the Djibouti Code of Conduct and ReCAAP. 
VI. Cross-Regional Arrangements on Transferring of Suspected Pirates and 
Information-Sharing 
There are other regional and cross-regional arrangements in dealing with 
maritime piracy. First of all, the European Union (EU) launched the European Naval 
(EUNAVFOR) Somalia Operation Atalanta for activities concerning law 
enforcement and interdiction mission off the coast of Somalia since November 
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 The nature of which is based on the European Common Security and Defence 
Policy. Its mandate has been prolonged several times by the European Council; most 
recently a two-year extension was proved until 31 December 2018.
211
 The object of 
Operation Atalanta is to deter, prevent and repress of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somalia coast. The cooperating partners of the mission include some 
non-EU members such as Norway and Serbia, South Korea, Colombia, etc.
212
 Many 
international organizations such as the United Nations World Food Programme 
(WFP), United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), the International Police Organization (INTERPOL) 
also participate in cooperation with regard to law enforcement and judicial issues of 
maritime piracy in the region.
213
 
Secondly, the arrangements include information-sharing networks established 
by the INTERPOL, the European Police Organization (EUROPOL) and individual 
states.
214
 And such information is open to share with piracy-concerned states and 
international organizations. For example, the INTERPOL developed two important 
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database for assisting piracy prosecution and prevention. One is the Global Database 
on Maritime Piracy, the other is the Digital Photo Album Database. The two 
database systems include more than 4,000 records in relation to 1,100 suspected 
pirates and 300 photographs, possible financiers, telephone numbers and bank 
accounts which have been used for ransom payments.
215
 Additionally, the US also 
established the US Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) for cultivating 
forensic expertise by using digital biometric devices in order to search and identify 
suspected pirates.
216
 As observed by the INTERPOL, these database networks and 
information-sharing efforts have been quite successful. States such as Belgium has 




Further, if we apply alternative views on international law-making or 
norm-setting,
218
 these international cooperation and information-sharing 
mechanisms can seen as promoting a greater sense of obligation and normative 
development for combating piracy at sea. 









 The UK and 
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the US also have reached bilateral instruments with Kenya for transferring suspected 
pirates for prosecution in Kenya.
223
 According to some news reports, Denmark also 
adopted a bilateral treaty with Kenya for transferring suspects and prosecution. In 
addition, it seems that China and Canada also tried to reach a similar agreement with 
Kenya.
224
 Moreover, the EU started to negotiate other transfer agreements with 




The general feature of EU’s four transfer agreements with Kenya, Seychelles 
and Mauritius contains three elements: the requirement of fair trial and appropriate 
detention procedure; the financial support to upgrade the prison facilities to meet 




As discussed in Chapter 4,
227
 these transfer agreements can be used for the 
purpose of treaty interpretation and they have substantially broadened the nature and 
scope of UNCLOS Article 105 and the meaning of cooperation in the fight against 
maritime piracy. In short, these cross-regional arrangements and interactions 
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mutually enhance the legal and normative development in fighting maritime piracy. 
VII. Conclusion 
Theoretically speaking, regionalism poses suspicion and doubts to the integrity 
and universality of international law.
228
 As the IL Report on Fragmentation of 
observed, the problem of fragmentation refers: 
[s]pecialized law-making and institution-building tends to 
take place with relative ignorance of legislative and 
institutional activities in the adjoining fields and of the 
general principles of and practices of international law. 
The result is conflicts between rules or rule-system, 
deviating institutional practices and, possibly, the loss 
of an overall perspective on the law. 
Accordingly, the potential problem of conflict of rules and the issue of 
universality has been questioned by international lawyers and international relations 
experts. Their concern focused on the interplay and relative ignorance of public and 
private sectors in involving the standard-setting, norm-shaping, law-making and 
policy-coordinating process in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea.
229
  
Nevertheless, as this chapter demonstrates, the danger or threat to the coherent 
development of international law-making is overstated. On the contrary, throughout 
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the lead of the IMO and the EU, these regional and cross-regional regimes made 
their own international instruments without making rules conflicted with other 
existing rules and norms in relation to maritime piracy. This development implicates 
that information-sharing and transparency in making relevant rules and promoting 
norms are important factors for combating piracy at sea, because there are so many 
stakeholders and participants, public or private, involved in the problem-solving, 
diplomatic and negotiation processes.
230
 
Looking back, perhaps the most important development in law was not on the 
law enforcement aspects, but the pre-enforcement procedure concerning 
information-sharing.
231
 On the one hand, it seems a pity that more enforcement, 
concrete policing investigation and prosecution measures regarding the duty to 
cooperate had not been made in the law-making process. On the other hand, what 
the international community has gained from the past few decades is not a package 
deal, but an incrementally clearer obligation and complementary guidance on how 
and what to cooperate in the suppression of maritime piracy.  
In short, regionalism represents some fragmented steps ‘in what seems to be an 
enduring movement towards universality’.
232
 Hence the sporadic and piecemeal 
evolution of international law-making concerning maritime piracy is surely on the 
track towards universal international law.
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions 
Minister Jim Hacker: ‘Will you give me a straight answer to a straight 
question?’ 
Sir Humphrey Appleby: ’Oh, well, Minister, as long as you are not asking 
me to resort to crude generalizations and vulgar over-simplifications 
such as a simple yes or no, I shall do my utmost to oblige.’ 
‘The Writing on the Wall’ (1980), Yes Minister, BBC TV Series1 
This study was designed to answer questions about the catalyst, mechanisms of 
change and the trends in making international law concerning maritime violence. 
The thesis considers whether the law develops in a coherent way, what are the 
lessons from the law-making history and what should international lawyers expect 
from the changing circumstances in the fight against maritime violence.  
For answering the questions, this study firstly surveyed the gaps in law and the 
possibility of using the UNCLOS amendment procedure in Chapter 2. Secondly, the 
thesis considered the making of 1988 SUA Convention and 2005 SUA Protocol in 
the fight against maritime terrorism in Chapter 3. Thirdly, it went on to review the 
legislative role of the UNSC for combating violence at sea in Chapter 4. Fourthly, 
the thesis investigated how the US responded to maritime violence and relevant 
law-making activities in Chapter 5. Fifthly, the theme of regional approaches for 
tackling maritime violence and whether regionalism has been cultivated in a 
coherent fashion along with the UNCLOS framework was explored in Chapter 6. 
The thesis started from expressing the view that UNCLOS did not really 
develop the law on maritime violence, rather simply replicate, with minor 
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modifications, the existing law relating to piracy at sea. However, the law did not 
just freeze in time and it has evolved in this field since the adoption of UNCLOS. 
The main reason for this evolution is a series of influential incidents and crises, 
which triggered the law-making intention and activities for combating maritime 
violence.  
The response to relevant incidents and crises has been multifaceted, and 
specific actors such as the US, the IMO and the UNSC took the lead for creating 
new international instruments and mechanisms for accommodating the changing 
nature of violence at sea. Counterfactually speaking, if there were no Achillie Lauro 
hijacking, the 911 terrorist attacks, the So San interdiction, Somali piracy crisis, etc., 
subsequent law-making acts would probably not have taken place.
2
 This 
phenomenon indicates that incidents and crises function as an engine for identifying 
gaps in law as well as a catalyst for international law-making. 
Maritime violence is not the only area where there are legal gaps and 
challenges.
3
 The law-making history of the law of the sea shows that states 
addressed certain legal problems in UNCLOS through the adoption of the two 
implementing agreements, namely, the Part XI Agreement
4
 and the Fish Stocks 
Agreement.
5
 It seems now that a third implementing agreement on the management 
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of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction is on the way of 
creation.
6
 However, the trend of law-making concerning maritime violence did not 
follow such a course but rather relied on a variety of binding and non-binding 
instruments, including multilateral treaties, bilateral treaties, the UNSC resolutions, 
the IMO’s initiatives and soft law. In other words, those important tools for change 
have emerged outside the legal framework of UNCLOS.
7
 
International law-making in relation to maritime violence has many faces. First, 
courts have some roles to play for filling gaps in law. On the one hand, national 
courts’ decisions are rare and sometimes contradictory. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
international and national courts did not really resolve the environmental activist 
disputes with respect to the definition of piracy. On the other hand, there has been no 
significant international case law in dealing with the ambiguity regarding the term 
‘for private ends’ in the law of maritime piracy. Nonetheless, this does not mean that 
it is impossible for international courts and tribunals to interpret the term in the 
future. For example, the arbitrators on the Arctic Sunrise case would not have 
dismissed the opportunity for interpreting the ‘for private ends’ concept if the 
two-ship requirement was filled. If an international court and tribunal gives an 
interpretation, then it certainly has the potential for becoming an authority on this 
issue and the ambiguity may be resolved.  
Second, multilateral treaties such as the 1988 SUA Convention and 2005 SUA 
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Protocol have been used as law-making instruments, but it is doubtful that important 
provisions have become customary international law for fighting maritime violence, 
particularly when it touches on issues of interdictions at sea. After all, treaties are 
only binding on the contracting parties, thus for those non-parties of the 2005 SUA 
Protocol, they will refer back to the exclusive right of flag state jurisdiction pursuant 
to UNCLOS and customary law of the sea. In other words, multilateral treaties in 
this field only reflect limited usefulness in tackling maritime violence.
8
  
Third, though the PSI has no potential for becoming customary international 
law for interdicting the WMD and related materials, it can be seen as an emerging 
cooperative norm shaped and lead by the US. It should be noted and should not be 
ignored that the US hegemony occupies the most influential role in initiating 
proposals and leading the direction of international law-making in fighting violence 
at sea. 
 Fourth, the UNSC has not adopted a comprehensive approach on issues of 
WMD proliferation and piracy. It did take a comprehensive approach in the 
Resolution 1373 and 1540 by imposing obligations on ‘all states’. However, the 
UNSC tackled Iran and North Korea’s WMD Proliferation problem on a 
case-by-case ground. Likewise, the UNSC’s attitude on maritime piracy was based 
on a region-by-region approach with respect to Somali piracy and piratical acts in 
the Gulf of Guinea. 
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Fifth, the ReCAAP, the Djibouti Code, Yaoundé Code of Conduct and 
cross-regional transfer agreements represent a variety of solutions to the problem of 
maritime piracy along with the efforts made by the IMO, the UN, EU and other 
international organizations. The most important contribution made by these soft law 
and treaty instruments is they are deepening and broadening the meaning with 
respect to ‘the duty to cooperate’ for suppressing piracy at sea. Concrete measures 
include establishing information sharing institutions and strengthening law 
enforcement capacity.  
It has been seen that these instruments and norms derive from many sources, 
institutions and organizations. This development probably generates the first 
impression that such a fragmented international law-making process is creating 
conflicts or potential conflicts of international law. However, this research has 
demonstrated that the law developed in a coherent way and did not produce 
substantive or competing rules against one another. That is to say, the nature of this 
kind of fragmented international law-making is benign and productive, because 
instruments concerned have been mutually complementing and supportive. As long 
as law-makers have taken relevant legal regimes into consideration during the 
diplomatic and negotiation course and do not create conflict of rules, then this 
sporadic and fragmented law-making process is not necessarily a bad thing.  
Indeed, this process reveals that there has been interplay and synergy between 
different international law-making instruments and attempts, what requires to be 
recapped in the last part of the thesis is the inter-relationship between the various 
techniques and how they may support each other.  




treaties such as the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity
9
 and the 1994 WTO 
Agreement
10
 can be systematically integrated into the UNCLOS framework.
11
 This 
indicates that ‘a major law-making treaty such as UNCLOS has an ongoing impact 
on the structuring of later law-making agreements that affect matters regulated by 
UNCLOS.’
12
 It has also been observed that contemporary maritime-related 
international institutions have been assisting one another in promoting cooperation 
and coordination for harmonising potential conflict of norms.
13
 
 When law-makers and initiators decided to take multilateral treaty law as an 
instrument for developing the law relating to maritime violence, such as the time 
before convening the SUA diplomatic conferences, related UNGA, SC and IMO 
resolutions paved the way for negotiating the two SUA treaties. In addition, the SC’s 
law-making Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are the sources for justifying the legality of 
the PSI. Though the nature of the PSI is soft law, it constitutes the normative basis 
for later-concluded bilateral ship-boarding treaties. Looking back, as noted in 
Chapter 5, the SUA Protocol also contributed to the development of PSI-related 
bilateral treaties. When the right moment comes, and if there is strong consensus for 
a change based on existing soft law instruments, a treaty is not necessary; if the 
willingness to change is not strong enough, a multilateral treaty or poorly ratified 
agreement will not necessarily strengthen it.
14
 
Moreover, by utilising SC’s piracy-concerned resolutions, the SC and the IMO 
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worked closely for tacking piracy crises in Africa. As has been observed, the SC 
resolutions provide the EU and other stakeholders a legitimate reason for sending 
naval forces to the Coast off Somalia. This also gave them the incentive for 
negotiating suspects-transferred agreements, which means these instruments were 
indirectly promoted by the SC resolutions. Likewise, as argued in Chapter 4, this 
development has in effect changed the meaning of UNCLOS Article 105. 
Besides, the IMO was the leading organization to make those soft law 
instruments in regulating maritime piracy. It was also the IMO who initially 
proposed the two Codes of Conducts for regional cooperation in the Gulf of Aden 
and the Gulf of Guinea. Not only the norm of information-sharing requirements and 
the practice of cooperative networks can be deemed as emerging rules of customary 
international law, but they also can be used for interpretation purpose pursuant to 
VCLT 31(3)(b) and (c), i.e. subsequent practice and relevant rules of international 
law. What is more, the information-sharing and the capacity building measures 
established either by treaty or soft laws among the regions concerned are qualified 
as mutually assured supplementation to the UNCLOS framework for fighting 
maritime piracy.  
It is truism that no legal or social circumstances are static and law evolves 
while general situations and social needs change. The pith of considering significant 
incidents and crises is that they always contains some unforeseeable and 
unpredictable scenarios, hence new legal gaps and difficulties may be revealed when 
new incidents and crises occur. Yet the thesis concludes that previous experiences in 
this field have proved that the international community was able to deal with new 




If the way that international normative development proceeded in the twentieth 
century can be analogous to the style how a symphony orchestra prepare and 
perform its own musical composition and songs; then the nature of the twenty-first 
century international law-making is more like performing the jazz music. The 
essence is that law-makers need to constantly improvise and regularly make 
dialogues with their own instruments and colleagues around the world. In short, to 
improvise does not necessarily lead to conflicting or inharmonious outcome; 
improvisation can be coherent and concordant.
15
 By utilising the law-making 
mechanisms discussed in this study, the idea of universal international law of the sea 
will survive for combating maritime violence, though it looks like a bit fragmented 
at first sight.  
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Violence at sea has long been a problem for the international community, 
although the nature and preponderance of incidents has evolved over time. This 
issue was dealt with in a cursory manner in the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea and therefore states have had to develop the legal framework 
through other instruments in order to address growing problems of maritime 
violence.  
This thesis examines mechanisms of change in the development of international 
law concerning maritime violence. It considers how international law has responded 
to this threat, and analyses a variety of different law-making techniques. This study 
observes that major international law-making activities concerning maritime 
violence in the recent decades have been in response to international incidents and 
crises, such as the Achille Lauro, the September 11 attacks, and the Somali piracy 
crisis. Counterfactually speaking, such law-making acts would not have taken place 
if these crises had not happened.  
The study also notes another shift of focus in making international rules aiming 
to tackle maritime violence away from customary international law and multilateral 
treaties towards an incremental dependence on United Nations Security Council 
resolutions, International Maritime Organization’s initiatives, regional cooperative 
measures, and treaty interpretation techniques for filling the gaps left in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
With this shift in law-making in mind, the thesis first explores gaps in law 
regarding piracy and terrorism at sea and reviews the negotiation of two major 
maritime terrorism treaties, i.e. the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and its 2005 Protocol. 
Secondly, it then inspects the United Nations Security Council’s law-making 
activities in combating terrorism and piracy. Thirdly, it surveys the creation and 
evolution of the Proliferation Security Initiative and also scrutinises the United 
States-led bilateral ship-boarding agreements for combating transportation of 
weapons of mass destruction. Finally, it compares and contrasts the regional 
approaches across Asia, Africa and Europe in the fight against piracy and armed 
robbery at sea.  
The thesis contends that each of the law-making technique employed in 
fighting maritime violence is not alternative or optional to one another, but rather 
used in a supplementary fashion to the overarching framework of the law of the sea. 
